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Africa is at the cross roads as it redefines itself within a new framework of political 
and economic linkages.  The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United 
States illustrate both the dangers of reckless foreign policy choices as well as the need 
for cooperation with regard to transnational threats.  From the exclusive policies of 
‘total onslaught’ to the inclusive policies of the African Renaissance, South Africa has 
tried almost everything but remains unable to find an acceptable niche for herself in 
Southern Africa.  Deep suspicions about South African intentions and commitment 
persist despite the reality of shared fears of further marginalisation, and aspirations of 
more propitious integration, within a rapidly globalising international environment.  
 
In understanding these dynamics, this study traces the evolution of South Africa’s 
contemporary relationship with the Southern African region and rationalizes this 
relationship within a broader theoretical framework based on development, discourse 
and hegemonic stability theories as well as the middle-power and pivot-state 
paradigms.  In addition, the study assesses South Africa’s foreign policy options in 
light of both domestic constraints and the perceptions of other countries within the 
region.  
 
In essence, South Africa’s regional foreign policy dilemma is a product of the 
country’s inability to adjust timeously its strategic compass in the mercurial world of 
foreign policy where a country seeking to advance an ambitious foreign policy agenda 
will always be confronted with powers arrayed against it, forces that it cannot manage 
and battles that it cannot win.  As this thesis argues, South Africa’s inability to 
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convince other states that her vision is complimentary to their needs has inhibited her 
ability to engineer a process of transformation and development in the region.   
 
The challenge for the South African government is to shift the power dynamic against 
which projections of South African dominance trigger fierce rejection or reluctant 
cooperation by regional governments.  This foreign policy drive has to be 
underpinned by a clearly defined developmental strategy that is able to compromise 
between high ideals and stark realities, between a preference for paternalistically 
reshaping regional relations and realising that given internal challenges and 
international expectations, South Africa needs the region perhaps even more than the 
region needs South Africa.  In order to restore some balance to this trend, regional 
relations grounded in transformative development must be seen as a critical 
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Introduction: Understanding South African Foreign Policy 
 
Claude Ake, the legendary doyen of African studies, once observed that African 
countries were poised between a discredited past and a future which refuses to arrive.  
Considering South Africa’s foreign policy relations with the Southern African region, 
it is an apt assessment.  From the exclusive policies of ‘total onslaught’ to the 
inclusive policies of the African Renaissance, South Africa has tried almost 
everything but remains unable to find an acceptable niche for herself in Southern 
Africa.  Rather than a happy marriage of mutually interested partners, it appears that 
many of the states in the region may now be harboring deep suspicions about South 
African intentions and commitment.  It is almost as if there is a feeling of non-
complementariness between the interests of the regional states and South Africa.  This 
is despite the reality of shared fears of further marginalization, and aspirations of 
more propitious integration, within a rapidly globalizing international environment. 
 
1.1 Background to Study: The Fundamentals of South African Foreign Policy 
The principles of South African foreign policy -- as articulated in May 1994 by the 
then Foreign Affairs Minister, Alfred Nzo, to Parliament and later captured in a 1996 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Foreign Policy Discussion Document -- 
encapsulates the Republic’s commitment to: 
• the promotion of human rights, specifically the political, economic, social and 
environmental circumstances conducive to these; 
• the promotion of freedom and democracy throughout the world; 
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• principles of justice and international law in the conduct of relations between 
nations; 
• international peace and internationally agreed mechanisms for the resolution 
of conflict; 
• the promotion of Africa’s interests in global affairs; and 
• expanded regional and international economic cooperation in an 
interdependent world.    
In August 1994, Mr Nzo also expounded guidelines regarding South Africa's foreign 
policy: 
• the conduct of South Africa's international relations should be transparent and 
take place in close consultation with Parliament; 
• the national interests of South Africa should  always dictate its policies; 
• South Africa must expand its participation in regional, continental and global 
multilateral organizations; 
• the security and the quality of life of South Africans, as well as justice and the 
international rule of law, peace, economic stability and regional cooperation 
were some of the fundamental principles underlying the foreign policy of 
South Africa; and 
• South Africa could not become involved in all laudable initiatives and issues 
in international politics, because of a lack of adequate resources.    
More recently, the DFA produced a Strategic Plan 2007-10 which outlined South 
Africa’s priorities as: 
• Consolidation of the African Agenda;  
• Strengthen South-South cooperation; 
• Strengthen North-South cooperation;  
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• Participate in global system of governance; and  
• Enhance bilateral political and socio-economic relations.    
 
The Jacob Zuma administration has since introduced an outcomes-based approach for 
Government which was adopted by Cabinet in 2009.   Outcome 11 identifies the 
overriding objective of South Africa’s international approach as “Creating a better 
South Africa and contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world.” It is 
premised on an understanding that South Africa’s developmental prospects are 
enhanced in a regional and global context characterized by peace, security and 
prosperity.   Outcome 11 promotes four priorities with set deliverables: 
Table 1-1: Outcome 11 Priorities 
OUTCOME 11 PRIORITIES DELIVERABLES 
Enhanced African Agenda and  
Sustainable Development 
 
• Deepened contribution to Regional, & 
Continental Security & Stability and 
Sustainable Development 
• Contribution to Peace Missions and Post 
Conflict Reconstruction and Development 
(PCRD) 
• Enhancing Technical and Development 
Cooperation 
Enhanced Regional Integration 
 
• Regional  Economic Integration 
• Regional Political Integration 
Reformed Global Governance  and 
Peace & Security Institutions 
 
• Enhanced Representation in and Strengthening 
of Regional, Continental & Global  Platforms 
and Governance Institutions 
Enhanced Trade and Investment  
 
• Increased Export Growth to Targeted 
Economies 
• Increased Inward Investment from Targeted 
Countries 
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Arguably, one of the most visible shifts in the post apartheid South African 
government's foreign policy orientation has been its commitment to become a true 
developmental partner in Southern Africa.   The then-Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, 
reminded South African ambassadors during a September 1995 conference that, 
“Despite our own limitations and problems, it is our objective to make a significant 
contribution to ensuring peace, democracy, respect for human rights and sustained 
development.   These principles are fundamental to our foreign policy.”  
 
This thinking is not only driven by economic logic, but also political solidarity - many 
peoples and governments in the Southern African region supported the South African 
liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), during the apartheid 
years.  Therefore, politically, especially in multilateral forums, South African 
representatives have made an effort not to set South Africa apart from the region.  In 
fact, they have often labored to insert the needs and interests of the Southern African 
region as a priority on the agendas of forums such as the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).   The ANC’s 2007 foreign policy discussion 
paper, International Policy: A Just World and a Better Africa is a Possibility, affirms  
that South Africa’s foreign relations are based on a pro-African, South-
Southorientation, which seeks a ‘strategic partnership’ with the industrialized North 
with the goal of consolidating an African and South-South agenda.   The document 
reminds South Africans that “our security and prosperity is linked and co-exists with 
the consolidation of the African Agenda.” It is, therefore, not surprising that South 
Africa has been actively engaged in developmental activities that aim to improve the 
general socio-economic conditions of the people of Africa in general and Southern 
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Africans in particular.   By providing neighboring and other states with technical 
assistance in respect of economically viable and sound projects, South Africa aims to 
achieve a number of objectives, namely:  
• improved bilateral and multilateral relations;  
• exchange of technology, information and expertise;  
• cooperation between police and armed forces to combat cross-border crime;  
• improved two-way trade and the formation of joint ventures;  
• joint cross-border projects to combat the spread of diseases, both human and 
animal;  
• the creation of conditions that allow people to become economically active in 
their own countries, thus discouraging illegal migration; and  
• assistance with democratization.    
(www.gov.za/yearbook/foreign.htm) 
 
At the heart of such objectives, are the reality that integrated political, economic and 
security structures and processes will promote sustained growth and development in 
the region, laying the foundations for intra-regional trade and infrastructural 
development.   It is an indicator that South Africa’s foreign policy objectives are, in 
essence, an outward projection of the country’s domestic imperatives. 
 
Despite such principles and priorities, it has not been easy to translate the 
government’s aspiration to break with the legacy of the apartheid era into policy, 
especially given the dual nature of the imperative of transformation.   Johnston (2001: 
11) succinctly identifies these:  
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The first is the internal dynamic of democratization which imposes its 
own priorities and creates its own opportunities.  The second is the 
changing international terrain, on which the new political configurations 
of the post cold war world, and the developing patterns of social and 
economic relationships usually described under the rubric of 
‘globalization’, make themselves felt.    
 
Indeed, the capricious international order challenged South Africa to not only 
establish solidarity with other similarly challenged states,  but also to placate and 
harness global forces (in competition with other states) in order to finance the 
country's reconstruction.   As Janis van der Westhuizen (1998) puts it,  
South Africa's seemingly inconsistent foreign policy reflects the obstacles 
and frustrations facing-many states in the developing world.   It has to 
maintain its linkages with the global economy, yet ensure that these 
linkages do not further exacerbate existing inequalities.    
 
The burden of negotiating this treacherous path of promoting national interests in a 
competitive global environment was acutely felt by South Africa’s newly constituted 
democratic leadership whose active foreign policy engagement was necessitated by 
the country’s emancipation from longstanding international isolation.   Foreign policy 
in the Mandela era was driven by a “heady mix of idealist principles and grandiose 
objectives” which threw into stark relief the serious limitations a middle-level country 
such as South Africa faces in advancing an ambitious foreign policy agenda (Le Pere 
and van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 132).   During this period, the post-revolutionary fervor 
associated with liberation policies resulted in normative and theoretical confusion 
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about proper foreign policy goals and objectives.   The Mbeki era concentrated on 
establishing a new set of priorities and normative principles that would be more in 
keeping with South Africa's interests and its capabilities on the global stage (Le Pere 
and van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 132).  This resulted in a move away from universality to a 
conciliatory pragmatism; a more carefully calibrated definition of how South Africa 
would concentrate its international energies and diplomatic resources.   A broad and 
embracing framework of 'active multilateralism' provides the conceptual 
underpinnings for a strategic focus on Southern Africa, Africa, and the countries of 
the Southern Hemisphere, while not neglecting important bilateral relations with 
countries of the North.  It is argued that:  
in the implementation of foreign policy, financial, commercial, political 
and defense interests supplanted the new government's carefully crafted 
ethical dimension.  This reflected the government's adoption of an eclectic 
synthesis of neo-realist and neo-liberal principles which remained 
cognizant of a globalizing world economy (Spence, 2004: 39).    
 
Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2002b) succinctly capture some of the most salient 







Table 1-2: Comparison of Pre and Post Apartheid Foreign Policy 
OLD (Pre-1994) NEW (Post-1994) 
Locus of decision making 
• State Security Council 
• President 
• Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Defense 
Locus of decision-making 
• Cabinet 
• The Office of the Presidency 
• Department of Foreign Affairs, 
• Department of Trade and Industry 
• Department of Defense 
Marginalized Sectors 
•   Parliament 
•   Public opinion and the media  
•   Political Parties 
•   Most external actors except 
fellow      pariah states 
Involved Sectors 
• Parliament and the portfolio 
committee system 
• Public opinion and the media 
• The ruling party and alliance 
partners (ANC, SACP, COSATU) 
• Extensive interaction with states, 
multilateral institutions, and the 
global economy 
Ideological Orientation 
• Apartheid mentality, racism 
• Anti-communist – defense against 
the ‘total onslaught’ 
Ideological Orientation 
• Ongoing contest between idealist 
and 







• More democratic, open and 
transparent 
• More inclusive and consultative 
• However, still plagued by intra-
state competition and conflict 
 
 
Undoubtedly, with the passage of time, the ‘miracle’ that has been the negotiated 
settlement in South Africa has started to give way to a more balanced and sober 
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assessment of South Africa, its foreign relations and particularly its engagement in 
Africa (Cilliers,1999).  There has been a growing realization by ‘idealists’ within the 
RSA government as well as the expectant region that post-apartheid South Africa as a 
model for transformative development and an engine for growth through trade and 
investment would not be motivated by altruistic sentiment only.  South Africa would 
need the rejuvenation of the region to provide it with untapped markets for its 
business sector, thereby underpinning its own domestic growth that was vital for 
addressing the economic backlogs inherited from the apartheid state.   
 
1994 marked the beginning of the march of South African capital into Southern 
Africa; driven by the conviction that 'unless there is growth and development 
throughout the region, not only will trade opportunities be constrained but 
destabilizing shocks from crises in neighboring countries could well impact in various 
ways on efforts to promote growth in democratic South Africa' (Davies et.al, 1993: 
33).  Unfortunately, perceptions of Pretoria’s domination of Africa were augmented 
by the dynamic role played by South African corporations in exploiting the natural 
commercial advantages offered by new post-apartheid relations with the region.   In 
fact, this became a key obstacle to the South African foreign policy strategy of 
development as a goal and regionality as the means. 
 
However, Jeff Radebe, former Minister of Public Enterprises (1999-2004), argues that 
only “a short-sighted response” to South Africa’s dominance across the continent 
would lament “how South African business can use its dominance to entrench itself as 
a new-style commercial mercenary force that benefits from its economic activity on 
the continent but also relies on Africa to remain undeveloped to feed the hunger of the 
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new pirates.” He, in a sense, affirms a central contention of this thesis: transformative 
development in Southern Africa is impossible without South Africa playing a leading 
role (immediate concerns over hegemonic dominance will subside in the long-term 
with the region’s realization that South Africa needs it as much as it needs South 
Africa as an anchor and driver of mutually beneficial integration).   Of course, the 
challenge facing South Africa is how to contribute to such mutually-needed 
development in a way that addresses short term concerns without impeding the long 
term vision.   In this regard, this thesis contends that the acquiescence and 
understanding of the region (with its overview of post-apartheid government 
pronouncements, Chapter 5 shows that there is already an understanding within South 
African government circles that the country cannot be isolated from the region) of  
South Africa’s role is critical to a prosperous Southern Africa: development, like 
democracy, cannot be exported or imposed by an external agent, however benign, 
without the acceptance and participation of those affected. 
 
1.2 Conceptual Clarification of Key Terms 
In research designs, terms should be defined to facilitate the readers’ understanding of 
intended meaning.   It is not important that the reader subscribes to this designed 
meaning, but as long as the reader knows what the researcher means when employing 
a particular term, the reader is able to understand the research and appraise it more or 
less objectively (Castetter and Heisler: 1977, Creswell: 1994).  Four potentially 
illusory terms, ‘Southern Africa,’ ‘foreign policy,’ ‘national interest’ and 




1.2.1 Southern Africa 
Southern Africa, according to McGowan (2002: 267), is more often than not defined 
as comprising of the fourteen members of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC): “Twelve members are on the Southern part of the African 
continent with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) being the most northern.   
Two members are tiny islands in the Indian Ocean – Mauritius and the Seychelles.” 
Naidu and Roberts (2004: 1) concur that the southern African region is made up of all 
countries south of and including Tanzania and the DRC.  However, this division of 
the continent into East Africa, Southern Africa and so forth hardly rests on stout 
foundations.   SADC’s original membership was defined by the apartheid state’s 
economic, political and military destabilization campaigns and therefore reflected 
both South Africa’s historical economic ties on the continent and its military reach.   
For example, Tanzania was a founder member of the Frontline States grouping and of 
the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and SADC. 
 
Table 1-3: Differentiating between SADCC and SADC   
 SADCC SADC 
CREATION Decision by a political 
grouping, the Front Line 
States (FLS). 
Evolved out of the SADCC 
Conference. 
MOTIVATION Achievement of regional 
autonomy outside a South 
African sphere. 
Consolidation of Southern 
Africa’s position in a changing 
world economic environment. 
  
There is, and can be, no unique definition of the region in the sense either of an 
uncontested boundary or a set of one or more meanings with which it might be 
invested and would set it apart from others which lie immediately across that 
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boundary or further afield.   The definition of Southern Africa adopted is essentially 
instrumental, that is, one of convenience and common usage (Simon, 1998: 244).  
Although other countries may be included for specific purposes or in certain 
institutional contexts, the ten countries of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are those 
most widely considered to make up the region, by virtue of contiguity, important 
elements of shared environment and history, and many common interests which 
include deeper regional integration, political stability, food Security and HIV Aids.   
In this study, these ten countries are regarded as constituting the Southern African 
region, a categorization which conforms to that of the African Union (AU) (AU 
Profile, www.africa-union.org).   Annexure 1 contains a snapshot of the relevant 
economic, military and socio-economic indicators for these Southern African 
countries. 
 
1.2.2 Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy is viewed as an instrument through which a country and its 
government structures conduct relations with the rest of the world - politically, 
economically and socially.   It is the art of building for the long term, the careful 
nurturing of relationships, the elaboration of policies that enhance available options 
while constraining those of potential opponents.  In this sense, it is the “output of the 
state into the global system” (Russet and Starr, 1992: 179).  Foreign policy implies a 
“conscious image of what is or ought to be the country’s place in the world, or some 
general guiding principles or attitudes determining or influencing decisions on 
specific issues” (Wallace, 1971: 11).  Whilst some regard foreign policy as a set of 
actual measures taken by leaders representing national entities with specific interests 
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and needs, many others consider it the pursuit of universal purposes in a global field 
of human relations.  Moreover, there are those who regard it as a ‘boundary’ activity 
(Evans and Newnham, 1990: 123).  They suggest that those who engage in the 
making of policy straddle two environments: an internal/domestic environment and an 
external/international one.  Policy makers and the policy system itself stand at the 
juncture between the two and must therefore seek to mediate between them (Evans 
and Newnham, 1990: 123).    
 
The analysis of foreign policy involves an understanding of both the domestic and 
international environments and the relation of one to the other.  This presents a 
particular challenge; in Rosenau’s words, “the foreign policy undertaking is the most 
delicate of political actions and the most fragile of political relationships” (Rosenau, 
1971: 93).  The domestic environment forms the context against which foreign policy 
is made and reflects factors such as prevailing ideology and national interests.  The 
international environment is where foreign policy is actually implemented.  Vale and 
Mphaisha (1999: 89) maintain that foreign policy is “the sum total of all activities by 
which international actors act, react, and interact with the environment beyond their 
national borders.” In a globalizing world, foreign policy is no longer the exclusive 
prerogative of states and governments.  Foreign policy is both a reaction (response) to 
the environment and an action (initiative) directed at the environment.   This implies 
that the foreign policy of states can be conditioned by both their internal properties 
such as the dominant domestic societal actors and the structural properties of the 
international system.  Kegley and Wittkopf (1993: 60-70) posit that “there are several 
national attributes which are important for a country’s foreign policy and these 
include its history, geo-strategic location, economic prowess, military power and 
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resource endowments.” These taken together permit and constrain a country’s ability 
to act and interact with its external environment. 
 
Van Nieuwkerk (2010: 84) also draws an important distinction between international 
relations which “is about the central question of how societies co-exist” and foreign 
policy which he refers to as a subsidiary question of “how states inter-relate.” In this 
regard, he draws on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU to 
show that increasingly even collective of states tends to pursue activities which 
resemble foreign policy.  Van Nieuwkerk’s arguments echo that of Webber and Smith 
(2002) who observe that contemporary foreign policy is focused on the ways in 
which, and the extent to which, national governments have succeeded in dealing with 
the challenges of a substantially  transformed world.  Indeed, as technological 
advances reinforce the idea of a ‘global village’ in an increasingly interdependent 
world, foreign policy assumes new significance: the values and principles that a 
country promotes through foreign policy will not only determine its survival and 
prospects in the international arena but also will shape its relationships with other 
actors.  In this sense, the values and principles that drive foreign policy are especially 
critical to a South Africa which has reclaimed its position on the international stage 
after a period of apartheid isolation.    
 
In essence, it can be deduced that any country’s foreign policy represents how its 
domestic values and priorities are translated onto the international stage.  It is the link 
between activities inside a state and the world environment outside it.  Rosenau 
(1987: 1) notes that “the analysis of foreign policy is a bridging discipline that takes 
as its focus of study the bridges that whole systems called nation-states build to link 
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themselves and their subsystems to even more encompassing international systems of 
which they are a part”.   Johnston (2001: 12) posits that:  
Foreign policy is made and executed in the realm of contingent events, 
imperfectly understood motives and broad, long-term movements which 
are difficult to chart.  In a policy-making environment like this, principles 
which are unduly numerous, narrowly drawn or rigidly applied may have 
to be frequently sacrificed to the effects of unpredictability and 
misinterpretation.  The consequence is considerable damage to the 
credibility and integrity of policy, especially where the principles 
concerned are supposed to reflect not only the interests but the values of 
the state concerned. 
 
 Foreign policy-makers are thus faced with the unenviable task of constructing a 
coherent set of principles which is defensible in terms of broad visions such as 
achieving democracy and human rights without neglecting classical yardsticks of 
national interest.   In this regard, Hamill (2001: 49) argues that foreign policy 
outcomes are normally a trade-off between “what justice demands and what 
circumstances permit.” Essentially, this decision-making process involves a rational 
reconciliation or balancing of ends and means or, more specifically, of the desirable 
with the possible, in respect of foreign policy.   (Du Plessis, 2002: 118) 
 
Foreign policy, in Morgenthau’s famous formulation, is about the “national interest 
defined in terms of power;” therefore, its proper or ‘normal’ conduct requires the 
virtual exclusion of variables such as ideological values or moral principles 
(Morgenthau, 1951: 242).  ‘Normal’ states conduct their policies with due regard to 
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geo-political realities and maximize their gain potential by eschewing potentially 
divisive and, therefore, weakening, internal ideological considerations (Evans, 1991: 
7).  In foreign affairs all is relative - relative to one’s own needs, position, dangers, 
hopes and purposes.  In essence, the making of foreign policy is founded on ego-
centricity: given the character of the contemporary international system, of sovereign 
states and the conventions upon which they rest, foreign policy can only make sense 
in so far as it is calculated to advance, or at least to defend, the interests of the state 
concerned. 
 
One may conclude that foreign policy is a multidimensional set of policies, objectives, 
principles, strategies and plans which cannot easily be packaged into a neatly 
described ‘formula’.  It is indeed questionable whether there is such a thing as a 
single, coherent and rational foreign policy.  It may be argued that we are really 
dealing with a series of disjointed, finite and often mutually conflicting policies 
emerging from different governmental levels and divisions that are responding 
piecemeal to their own narrowly-focused problems (Couloumbis and Wolfe, 1990: 
115).   
 
More than a decade and a half after South Africa’s transition to democratic rule, the 
scope and substance of the country’s foreign policy remains a contentious issue.   
There is still no official document on South Africa’s foreign policy.   Instead, the 
speeches of relevant politicians and officials as well as DFA foreign policy discussion 
documents, strategic plans and the policy documents of the ruling party give broad 
direction.   In advising Parliament against the need for a codified foreign policy 
doctrine Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo once pointed out in 1995 that “…our 
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current foreign policy, in which each decision is made on its merits within a 
prescribed normative framework, is adequate enough for our circumstances.” While 
foreign policy in this study is understood as a multidimensional set of objectives, 
principles and strategies which cannot easily be packaged into a single neat ‘policy’, 
the disadvantages of South Africa’s current foreign policy orientation is manifest in 
the much-publicized criticism of its ambiguity.   What has emerged is a policy 
package that seeks to communicate to all key stake-holders (domestic constituency 
and regional neighbors) without fully addressing the concerns raised by each 
constituency. 
 
1.2.3 National Interest 
Stephen Krasner, in his 1978 classic Defending the National Interest, unpacked the 
concept of national interest in terms of general societal goals which persist over time, 
and have a consistent ranking of importance in order to justify using the term.   The 
‘consistent ranking of importance’ can best be explained by the Commission on 
America’s National Interests which in 1996 identified national interests as “vital 
interests that justified the unilateral use of force” (Ellsworth et al: 12).   In addition, 
Jessop (2009: 373) emphasizes the notion of choice by arguing that national interests 
are strategically selective since “there is never a general interest that embraces all 
possible particular interests.” 
 
There is even the view that the national interest should be largely inward-looking: “a 
function of our duty to ourselves in our domestic problems” (Kennan, 1951: 730).  
Nuechterlein (1978) complicates the notion of national interest even further by 
differentiating between public interest (the way in which a government deals with the 
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internal environment of the state) and national interest (the way a government deals 
with the external environment).   Of note is the postulation by J.   David Singer, 
President of the International Studies Association (1985-86),  that “ ‘the national 
interest’ is a smokescreen by which we all too often oversimplify the world, denigrate 
our rivals, enthrall our citizens, and justify acts of dubious morality and efficacy” 
(cited in Clinton, 1994: x).   Indeed, the pre-democratic South African state used the 
concept of ‘national interest’ in its defense of apartheid policies and practices, 
including the destabilization of the Southern African region.    
 
Interestingly, despite the context (policy justification) in terms of which the concept 
of national interest has been used, South Africa has not defined, developed or 
unambiguously articulated its national interests.   At the same time, South African 
foreign-policy makers continue to articulate that “South Africa’s foreign policy is 
premised upon its national interests …” (Pahad, 2003).   Without a shared 
understanding of the country’s long-term interests, it is not surprising that South 
Africa’s foreign policy is often criticized for lacking basic coordinates and a clear 
sense of priorities. 
 
Attempts to identify South Africa’s national interest are usually inferred from official 
documents and statements which have fostered a generally muted discourse aimed at 
seeking clarity about the issue.   The ‘terminological inexactitude’ (to use Winston 
Churchill`s colorful phrase) that has since crept into the discourse of national interest 
is well captured by Van Nieuwkerk (2004: 92):  
For the ANC and government, the state’s strategic policy priorities, as 
determined annually by the Cabinet lekgotla (and announced during the 
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president’s annual state of the nation address in parliament), equals the 
national interest.   In the longer term, some level of predictability is 
provided in the election manifesto with which a party campaigns the 
elections, and in the case of the ANC the 1956 Freedom Charter provides 
the guiding light.   In the view of the opposition, government often blurs 
the lines between party and national interests. 
 
While the process of conceptualizing the country’s national interests has been 
initiated at the international relations cluster level, such views affirm that it is likely to 
take another five years before consensus is reached on such ‘general societal goals’.  
Currently, national interests are conflated with more short-term foreign and domestic 
strategic policy objectives as articulated in the Medium Term Strategic Framework: 
2009-2014, Cabinet Lekgotla documents or the 2010 Outcomes Document.   The 
danger of confusing more enduring national interests (linked to survival of the 
country) with such short term objectives is that there is a deceptive focus on domestic 
imperatives (linked to survival of a particular government).   Without a clearly 
articulated long-term vision, South Africa will not be able to convince other Southern 
African states that her regional foreign policy is complimentary to their needs (which 
are important if the integration roadmap that the region has agreed to, is to be 







Fig1-1: Unpacking RSA’s National Interests 
For the purposes of this study, South Africa’s national interests is considered as being 
constituted by the following key components: 
• National security/sovereignty: The stability of the Republic and its 
constitutional order, its institutions and the safety of its people as well as 
preservation of the territorial integrity of the state. 
 
• National prosperity: Sustainable and inclusive economic growth and 
development. 
 
• Core values: South African national objectives, as reflected in the preamble of 
country’s Constitution. 
 
It is a conceptual framework that is informed by the paradigm of human security, 
which looks at security as being more than just the self-preservation of the state but 
also the safety and prosperity of the citizens and the values that they hold sacrosanct.  
Even if South Africa’s national interests are anchored in national sensitivities and 
historical imperatives, its geo-strategic projection must extend beyond the borders of 
the country if they are to be secured in a globalizing inter-dependent world.   In this 
regard, South Africa’s national interests should be closely linked with a set of 
ancillary interests that encompass: 
• Regional stability and prosperity  
 
• Continental stability (peace, good governance and socio-economic 
development) 
 
• A just international environment (which can only be achieved through global 
Governance reform driven by strengthened South-South relations) 
 
This conceptualization reflects the reality that, in an inter-dependent foreign policy 
world, the advancement of South Africa’s national interests is invariably linked to the 




1.2.4 Transformative Development 
In 1885, the Englishman Allan Octavian Hume made the statement that you cannot 
have separate, unequal peoples living alongside one another in great riches and deep 
poverty, without inviting catastrophe (cited in Mathoma, 2001: 28).   This is even 
truer in a globalised, interconnected world.  Uruguayan Foreign Minister Luis 
Almagro, at the close of the 65th session of the UN General Assembly on 29 
September 2010, affirmed that the current international economic and financial crisis 
marks the closing of a cycle of growth and demands a new way of thinking about 
development.    
 
Africa’s erratic economic performance since the 1990s, along with the political 
turmoil which has plagued or still plagues many countries, has brought into sharp 
relief the need for a comprehensive rethink of the development-related problems of 
the continent and of the region.   Davies, Keet, and Nkuhlu (1993: 1) concur that 
regional economic relations can no longer be an ‘optional extra’:  “The economic 
destiny of a democratic South Africa will be inextricably linked with that of the rest 
of the Southern African region”.  In fact, the country is already deeply involved in a 
range of economic relations with neighboring countries (the context of which is 
unpacked in Chapter 2), with considerable significance for the current economy.  But 
does this constitute transformative development?  
 
The Nobel-Prize winning economist, Amartya Sen (1999: 3), observed that 
“Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as 
tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic deprivation, neglect of 
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public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states.” Indeed, 
issues of poverty and social inequality have become serious points of contestation in 
an era where the prominence of market fundamentalism undermines such 
development imperatives.   South Africa is an apt example of a country torn between 
the seduction of free market capitalism and its concomitant unfettered economic 
growth on the one hand and the appeal of broader human development that prioritizes 
social equities and advancements in quality of life through education, health-care etc 
on the other hand.   This dichotomy between economic transformation and social 
transformation has invariably led to a failure to appreciate the mutual interdependency 
and complementarities between these two forces of transformation.   Recent studies, 
such as the World Bank 2006 World Development Report, entitled Development and 
Equity, acknowledge the synergy between social and economic transformation.   In 
this regard, the World Bank’s Senior Vice President for Development Economics and 
Chief Economist (2003-2007), Francois Bourguignon, observed that “Equity is 
complementary to long-run prosperity.   Greater equity is doubly good for poverty 
reduction.   It tends to favor sustained overall development, and it delivers increased 
opportunities to the poorest groups in society” (http://web.worldbank.org).    
 
Unless South Africa makes fundamental structural changes and shifts its narrow focus 
from competitive economic growth  to inclusive and shared growth, the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion will continue, and further entrench itself at a regional level.   
Currently, South Africa is still trapped in the mode of managing the economy with the 
hope that the surplus derived will be the basis upon which internal social justice issues 
are dealt with and external regional relations are improved.   The country has not 
articulated a developmental strategy to transform the apartheid economy and has 
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failed to acknowledge the systemic institutions in the economy that produce and 
reproduce inequality and poverty.   In this regard, South Africa simply conforms and 
replicates the contested post-Washington consensus concessions, which suggest that 
more ought to be done to address poverty and unemployment, without altering the 
basic architecture of the competitiveness strategy.   The failure to more concretely 
link social development (within the country and the region) to South Africa’s 
economic growth strategy has resulted in it being conceived as a deduction from 
growth rather than as a central feature of the growth strategy.   This is despite the 
reality that such social development is important both in the narrow sense of building 
human capital but also in the broader economic sense by providing skilled labor, new 
markets and new producers, which ultimately contribute to economic efficiency and 
equity. 
 
For the purposes of this study, transformative development represents a development 
path that recognizes that it is not the extent of economic growth that matters but the 
quality of such growth to advance human development within the country and the 
region in a sustained manner.   In this regard, transformative development cannot be 
achieved by simply manipulating outcomes of political processes such as regional 
integration or through the super-imposition of such a process by the preponderant 
regional power(s).   Only by extending opportunity in a process of regional 
institutional and/or capacity building can such a sustainable form of people-centered 
development become entrenched.   In this regard, transformative development is 
about enhancing economic security by bridging the gap between global market 
processes and social justice.    
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For such development to be truly transformative, it has to be sustained on two planes: 
the internal as well as external.   Indeed, Castells (1992) contends that the promotion 
and sustainability of development requires a combination of steady and high rates of 
economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically 
and in external relations.   Interestingly, Landsberg (2005) argues that domestic 
attempts to establish a new socioeconomic model at home, will translate into 
increasing foreign policy pressure to show its contribution to a new development 
trajectory for the country.   Such contribution can manifest itself in three ways: 
• Resources: Transformative development will require massive amounts of 
resources and resource transfers.   In South Africa this is necessary to address 
domestic imperatives such as redistribution that targets current apartheid-
created socio-economic inequalities.   In today’s interdependent world, 
securing such development will require that South Africa extends this 
initiative beyond her immediate borders to the rest of the Southern African 
region, which also suffered under the suffocating aggression and tentacles of 
apartheid.   In addition, these resources should not be confined to finances but 
should extend to more sustainable technological and infrastructure resources.   
Of note is the recent contention by Higher Education Minister, Blade 
Nzimande (2010: 2) that South Africa was still largely perceived as an adopter 
rather than an innovator of technology (ranked 39th out of 162 countries in 
terms of technological achievement):  
 To retain our global-player status, we must do more to augment the 
imported and implanted technologies with technologies developed 
in South Africa.   We must also develop technologies which others 
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are keen to import from us...clearly we need to do more to create 
and sustain competitive advantage in the international marketplace. 
 
• Partnership: Partnership with Southern Africa as well as with other Southern 
partners (South-South relations) is imperative if such development is to be 
sustained.   Such partnership will be critical to ensuring that human security 
and development concerns are prioritized in the global agenda. 
 
• Global Reform: For Transformative development, the exploitative nature of 
the current global order has to be dismantled – root, branch and leaf. 
 
The need for such transformative development stems from the complex web of 
structural, institutional, human capital, technological and infrastructural constraints on 
sustainable growth in Southern Africa which is heightened by the current momentum 
towards the creation of a SADC Free Trade Area.   For trade integration to be viable 
and sustainable: 
• Cross-border infrastructural development will have to be prioritized (to 
support trade in goods); and 
• Cooperation in regional industrial policy to identify complementarities and 
build regional value-addition production chains will be necessary to maximize 
the benefits of each country’s comparative advantage.    
 
In this regard, transformative development will be the basis for economic 
convergence and structural complementarities to emerge within Southern Africa.   A 
more integrated Southern Africa will in turn augment the region’s bargaining power 
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Fig 1-2: South Africa as a key driver of growth and 
regional integration in Southern Africa 
 
South Africa is a hub for growth and regional 
integration in Southern Africa.   It accounts for 71.5% 
of regional GDP and is a key player in NEPAD and 
SADC.   About 70% of intra-regional investment 
flows in the region is conducted by South African 
firms.   South African investment played a large role 
in neighbouring countries, accounting for between 9% 
and 20% of GDP in Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia and Swaziland (IMF: 2005) A number of 
South African financial institutions are also expanding 
their reach across the region.  This, inter alia, 
facilitates production and trade financing, allows for 
goods purchased in one country to be paid for in 
another, and provides a common and accessible 
financial service network.    
 
Source: African Development Bank (September 2010) 
‘Southern Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper’ 
2011 – 2015.   p4 
vis-à-vis the developed North and the emerging Southern (such as Brazil, China and 
India) economies.   The current divisions over the EU EPAs show the importance of 
structuring a common negotiating platform for multilateral trade negotiations on the 
basis of formal cooperation. 
 
Landsberg (2005) contends that 
the nature of the South African 
state (a developing country 
with significant international 
influence) provides the 
country with plenty of scope 
to drive such transformative 
development.   However, 
South Africa has often 
underutilized this authority by 
acting guardedly and warily -- 
even at times when it could 
have pushed the diplomatic 
envelope more insistently.  In 
fact, caught between the 
tensions of, on the one hand, a 
values and a principle-driven 
foreign policy and, on the other, a pragmatist foreign policy that prioritized economic 
growth, transformative development imperatives were often side-lined.   Neither 
approach prioritized transformative development which did little to assuage deeply-
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ingrained regional suspicions.   This study  contends that with the neo-liberal 
‘Washington Consensus’ in crisis(discussed further in Chapter 5), the time is now 
opportune for South Africa to take up the challenge of articulating a truly progressive 
foreign policy, one that would make it difficult to allow others to label it politically 
progressive, but economically neo-imperialist.   
 
1.3 Research Task 
This research study primarily seeks to understand why South Africa’s regional foreign 
policy has not achieved its stated objectives of advancing regional security and 
prosperity.   Although Southern Africa is the key foreign policy priority for the post-
apartheid South African government, it has been difficult to convince Southern 
African states that South Africa’s regional foreign policy is complementary to their 
needs.   Chapters 4 and 5 explore why South Africa’s neighbors remain somewhat 
jittery despite the post-apartheid government’s efforts to assuage concerns about 
South Africa’s hegemonic ambitions.   The implications are far-reaching and the 
study contends that the lack of mutually beneficial partnership has inhibited the 
region’s ability to engineer a process of sustainable transformation and development. 
 
In addition, this study seeks to determine whether South Africa’s political relations 
with Southern Africa dovetails with corporate South Africa’s economic relations with 
the region and whether it can be construed as part of the overall foreign policy 
strategy.   Intersecting concrete needs and interests make it possible, in Robert Davies 
view, “to envisage a mutually beneficial, negotiated restructuring of regional 
economic relations which will address several of the key problems of the inequality 
and longer-term unsustainability of existing relations” (cited in Poku, 2001: 2).   It is 
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axiomatic that the fate of the region as a whole cannot be separated from the fortunes 
of its individual countries and the challenge today is to reshape regional relationships 
in ways that yield mutual benefits.   Currently the dialectic which generates tensions 
between the interests of the actors in this region and the concrete historical 
circumstances that determine the possibilities for action and influence its course 
undermines a mutually beneficial form of integration.  As Hein Marais (1998) 
observes:  
South Africa’s quest for a successful post-apartheid growth path will 
reinforce other SADC countries’ neo-colonial location in the world 
economy and prevent the revision of regional economic relations along 
more equitable lines.   It is not unlikely that the outcome could closely 
resemble regional trade patterns that closely resemble those of the 
apartheid era. 
 
Marais succinctly captures the concern that expectations for South Africa to play a 
positive role in the region are unrealistic given the historical structural imbalance 
between South Africa and its neighbors.   This historical reality is likely to perpetuate 
the country’s regional dominance, regardless of who is in power in Pretoria.   Given 
such concerns, how does South Africa cultivate mutually-beneficial regional 




The defining parameters of South Africa’s regional foreign policy will remain largely 
indeterminate as long as its Southern African neighbors retain their ambivalent 
perceptions regarding South African motives and plans.  On the one hand, the region 
is fearful of South Africa’s economic and growing cultural dominance.  On the other 
hand, it sees South Africa both as a launch pad into, and as a solution to the region’s 
current and growing marginalization within, the international political economy.   
 
1.3.2 Research Objectives 
The intention of this study is four pronged: 
• First, it traces the evolution of South Africa’s contemporary relationship with 
the Southern African region.  The study rationalizes this relationship within a 
broader theoretical framework based on development and hegemonic stability 
theories as well as the middle-power and pivot-state paradigms.   It further 
seeks to make sense of South Africa’s relationship with the region within the 
parameters of discourse theory. 
 
• Second, the study assesses South Africa’s foreign policy options in light of 
both domestic constraints and the perceptions of other countries within the 
region.    
 
• Third, the study analyses the changing South African foreign policy 
environment since the early 1990s.  It does so in order to determine the extent 
to which the policies of the new South Africa could be regarded either as 
catalysts for mutual cooperation and transformative development for Southern 
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Africa or as merely a disguised mechanism for actualizing South Africa’s 
supposed hegemonic ambitions towards the region.    
 
• Finally, the study maps out an optimal policy framework within which South 
Africa’s foreign policy objectives in Southern Africa can best be realized. 
 
1.4 Research Design 
Given the research task, this study adopts a predominantly qualitative approach.   The 
significance of qualitative research consists in the focus on describing and 
understanding complex phenomena.   Such an approach is useful in investigating the 
relationships and patterns among factors or the context in which the activity happens.   
It’s concentration on understanding the many-dimensional picture of the subject of 
investigation makes  qualitative research an appropriate choice of research method for 
this  particular study.   More specifically, the sociological approach termed 
‘triangulation’ was employed to cut across the qualitative-quantitative divide and to 
minimize the inadequacies of single-source research. 
 
According to Cohen and Manion (1986: 254), “in social sciences triangulation is an 
attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human 
behavior by studying it from more than one standpoint.” Altrichter et al.   (1996: 117) 
affirms that it [triangulation] gives a more detailed and balanced picture of the 
situation.   The approach was deemed critical for the deepening and widening of the 
current understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa.   There are 
several types of triangulation (Miles and Hubermann: 1994; Patton: 2002).   In the 
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research process on which this thesis is based, triangulation was achieved mainly in 
two ways.    
 
Firstly, methodological triangulation was reflected in the use of multiple methods to 
understand South Africa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa.   The study primarily 
draws on the vast foreign policy literature on the subject matter and supplements this 
with an analysis of government documents which include discussion papers, annual 
reports and official statements.   The ensuing analysis is verified and subjected to a 
process of deeper reflection (resulting in a more robust understanding of issues) by a 
number of interviews and observations.   As outlined in section 1.2.1, this study 
recognizes Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe as the ten countries that constitute the 
Southern African region.   The broad sample of interviewees, selected randomly, can 
be tabulated as follows: 
 
Table 1-4: Interview Sample 
Countries Embassy 
Reps in RSA* 
Other Govt 
Officials 
Civil Society  Total 
Angola 4 12 7 23 
Botswana 3 2 13 18 
Lesotho 2 8 1 11 
Malawi 2 9 1 12 
Mozambique 2 11 5 18 
Namibia 2 11 9 22 
Swaziland 1 3 1 5 
Zambia 2 9 18 29 
Zimbabwe 3 4 32 39 




62 48 114 











Random selection was necessitated by the desire to gather the broadest spectrum of 
views as possible on South Africa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa.   It also 
addressed the issue of access to the views of the Southern African region.   The 
interviews assumed the form of four standard questions which generally satisfied the 
basics identified by Neuman (1997: 228) in his delineation of  appropriate research 
questions for a survey, including attitudes/beliefs and opinions; characteristics; 
expectations; self-classification and knowledge. 
Fig1-3: Standard Interview Questions 
 
Question 1: How would you characterize South Africa’s relations with Southern 
Africa? 
 
Question2: Assess South Africa’s foreign policy options in Southern Africa. 
 
Question 3: How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the 
region? 
 
Question 4: How would you like to see South Africa managing her regional relations? 
 
 
The structure of personal interviews with more open-ended questions was deliberate 
and based on Neuman’s (1997: 253) contention that they have a higher success rate 
than all close-ended questions. 
 
Secondly, data triangulation was achieved through multiple data collecting and the 
use of a variety of sources.   In this regard, an attempt was made to balance the South 
African perspective (114 interviews) with the regional angle (177 interviews).  While 
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the interviewer’s access to government is reflected in the greater number of interviews 
within this authoritative foreign policy circle, cognizance was given to the argument 
that “…too much reliance on authorities can be dangerous to a democratic 
society…when we have no idea of how the experts arrived at their knowledge, we 
lose some of our ability to make judgments for ourselves” (Neuman, 1997: 3).   
Therefore, some interviews were conducted with members of civil society 
organizations (both in South Africa and the region) comprising of non-governmental 
organizations, business, and academic/research institutions, and the general public. 
 
The research sample which broadly ranged from government to civil society was 
necessitated by the role of such diverse actors in post-apartheid South African foreign 
policy making.   As the nucleus of foreign policy-making, the largest sample group 
was South African government officials, particularly from the DFA.   While cognizant 
of the increasing role of the Presidency, the interviewer acknowledged existing 
findings that even in periods of flux (the DFA had five different DGs - Rusty Evans, 
Jackie Selebi, Sipho Pityana, Abdul Minty [acting] and Ayanda Ntsaluba – in the 
period 1997 to 2003), the DFA was “held together by a cohort of experienced and 
highly professional officials who not only effectively run the day-to-day operations, 
but also make discreet input into policy formulation” (Hughes; 2004:21).    
 
In addition, the wide-ranging civil society interviews were deemed important giving 
the mushrooming role of this community in post-1990 policy thinking.   The 
engagement of civil society in South Africa’s post apartheid foreign policy thinking is 
manifest in their involvement in a number of DFA conferences, workshops, position 
papers and policy documents on rethinking South Africa’s role and positioning in the 
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global environment (the most recent engagement - October 2010 - on a foreign policy 
white paper includes DFA consultations with academic and research institutes as well 
as business).   In addition, there are a number of consultative groups such as the Black 
Business Working Group and presidential advisory groups such as the International 
Investment Advisory Council which impact on South Africa’s foreign policy arena.  
The business voice in South African foreign policy is also heard through the relevant 
parliamentary portfolio committees (although this restricts their role to lobbying on, 
and influencing, foreign policy rather than formulating it).   For example, the South 
African Chamber of Business (SACOB) has a Parliamentary Liaison Office that 
articulates member-interests through input to parliamentary committees.  In terms of 
trade unions, COSATU enjoys institutional input into foreign policy formulation 
principally through ANC party structures.   Of interest, however, is that such input 
(for example, on Zimbabwe) is not necessarily aligned to the position of the party and 
government and has not really been effective.   The role of the media (South African 
and regional) in foreign policy making is equally unbalanced.   Its success in shaping 
the foreign policy thinking of the electorate (particularly during the Mbeki era when 
foreign policy was increasingly centralized) has not been matched by a decisive 
influence in foreign policy formulation. 
 
The Policy Coordination and Advisory Service (PCAS) within the Presidency 
interacts with civil society on matters of policy formulation as well as with 
“international experts” to ensure policy relevance and efficacy.   In fact, the 
opportunities for experts from foreign policy research institutions/“think tanks” has 
increased in post-apartheid South Africa, largely due to the lack of requisite skills 
within departments but also linked to existing relations with the ruling ANC party.   
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For example, the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) (formerly the Foundation for 
Global Dialogue), which was originally founded as an ANC think tank on foreign 
policy, retains close links with the ruling party and enjoys preferred access to South 
African foreign policy formulators.   Such “think tanks” play a role in policy 
formulation through formal government-sponsored research or through academic and 
public engagement with governmental policy makers.  In essence then, this research 
draws significantly from interactions with scholars, researchers, business people, and 
commentators from a broad range of civil society groups and organizations. 
 
1.5 Significance of Study 
Africa is at the cross roads as it redefines itself within a new framework of political 
and economic linkages.   The events of 11 September 2001 illustrate both the dangers 
of reckless foreign policy choices as well as the need for cooperation with regard to 
transnational threats such as terrorism.   Clearly, given South Africa’s legacy of 
aggression, exploitation, and pauperization of its neighbors, (what Black [2001: 86] 
describes as  “South Africa’s historically aggressive and sub-imperial orientation 
towards its Southern African neighbors in particular; and these same countries’ not-
unjustified suspicions of the motives and interests behind the current government’s 
‘renaissance rhetoric’ and regionalist aspirations…”) it cannot pursue a business-as-
usual regional policy with its nervous and distrustful neighbors.  Effectively, its policy 
parameters have been constrained severely by that legacy.  Vale and Maseko (1998: 
12) concur that “South Africa’s leadership of Africa is condemned by its unhappy 
past”, as well as the deep inequalities reflected and perpetuated by its residual power.   
Ironically, although her economic superiority makes South Africa the one country in 
Southern Africa that can contribute most painlessly to regional security, its past and 
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present domestic predisposition have fuelled potent fears by neighboring states.  
Chapter 4 and 5 debate whether such fears are well-founded. 
 
The perception that South Africa’s foreign policy further seeks to advance and 
consolidate that country’s political and economic hegemony not only in the sub-
region but also on the continent as a whole, is compounded by the fear that the 
behavior of South Africa's corporate sector could render the new democratic regime 
more aggressive than its predecessor.   Although South Africa is now a proud member 
of the reshaped SADC, which has replaced SADCC, the rapid invasion of the African 
hinterland by South African corporate capital (arguably to the detriment of local 
Southern African business) is opening it to charges that it is becoming an economic 
hegemon.   There are even references to “the South Africanisation of Sub-Saharan 
Africa” (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998: 165).   
 
The difficulties in wider relations with Africa were brought home starkly to the 
government by the failure of the South African bid to secure the staging of the 2004 
Olympics in Cape Town.  Mills (2000: 281) points out that: 
South Africa picked up just 16 votes in the opening ballot from the 107 on 
offer.   Very few of the promised African votes materialized, illustrating 
to  RSA that notions of African solidarity counted much less than national 
and sometimes personal economic self-interest among the African 
delegates  to the International Olympic Committee, in spite of the South 
African attempt to capture the label of  ‘Africa’s bid’.    
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The failure of the Cape Town bid illustrated that most African countries - especially 
those in the neighborhood - are still suspicious of South Africa.  Moreover, although 
South Africa has been careful to locate its regional political initiatives in terms of 
SADC policies, false moves − such as the bungling of its military intervention to 
shore up the elected government in Lesotho in 1998 − have opened it up to the charge 
from some that it is all too disposed to throw its weight around.   Moreover, the 
leadership of the peacekeeping force by white South African officers from the 
apartheid army (the force commander had been part of South Africa’s destructive 
forces in Angola) further fuelled regional negativity (Adebajo, 2006).   South Africa 
has learnt from experience that “power measured in resources rarely equals power 
measured in preferred outcomes...” (Nye, 2010: 4).   Whether South Africa’s inability 
to achieve its preferred foreign policy outcomes is due to the strategies of regional 
states protecting their national interests or to the belief that South Africa’s foreign 
policy objectives are not very different, in essence, from the foreign policy of the 
previous regime is the basis of Chapter 4’s introspection.    
 
In essence, South Africa remains trapped between a desire to develop the region 
(necessitated by South Africa’s internal domestic imperatives as well as the reality 
that Southern Africa’s problems have domestic repercussions) and not to appear to 
dominate the region.  Enthusiasm for a more visionary regional policy is tempered by 
a cautious approach to the thin line between leadership and hegemony.   However, 
although the ruling ANC is interested in negotiating a regional understanding, not 
dictating one (as discussed in Chapter 5); the pendulum may be swinging from 
domination towards doing nothing.   South Africa’s unwillingness to support regional 
diplomacy with military or other means has nurtured perceptions of it as a toothless 
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bulldog.   It is clear that the hegemonic thrust of South African capital into the region 
has not been matched by a corresponding political intrusion.   
 
South Africa’s ability to play a political Dr Jekyll and an economic Mr Hyde has 
profound implications for its role in the region.  The country’s commitment to 
regionalism and regional integration in southern Africa is fraught with differing and 
contradictory interpretations (see Davies: 1992, K.   Van Wyk: 1994, Adedeji: 1996, 
Aly: 1997, Solomon: 1997, J.Van Wyk: 1997, McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng: 
1998, Mlambo: 2000).   It is worth noting that South African foreign policy analysis 
has been strongly flavored by the ideological bias of the writers.   On the one hand, 
ANC intellectuals and activists portray South African foreign engagements as 
progressive (ANC, 1997).   On the other, some government critics argue that South 
African foreign policy reflected sub-imperialist ambitions (Bond, 2004).   A third 
group of writers explain South Africa’s foreign policy engagements in terms of the 
country’s structural position within the international environment; for example, in 
terms of its middle power status (Le Pere, 1998: 1-2; Schoeman, 2003: 349-367). 
 
Cognizant of these varying parameters which are not necessarily mutually reinforcing, 
this study seeks to comprehensively unpack South Africa’s dilemma in Southern 
Africa and to chart an optimal framework within which the quandary can be 
successfully addressed. 
 
1.6 Overview of Study      
There is definitely a recognition in South African government circles that the way 
regional relations  evolve will have a considerable impact on the growth prospects for 
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post apartheid South Africa and vice versa.   Undoubtedly, South Africa will be 
affected in various ways by the overall regional ambient.  Indeed, as Mathoma (2001: 
31) points out, “Environmental degradation, transnational crime, refugees and 
international drug trade know no borders.  Only by co-coordinating our efforts and by 
acknowledging our interdependence can we effectively forge partnerships to fight 
these destructive tendencies.” Continuing stagnation and crisis in neighboring 
countries would only fuel and possibly exacerbate these trends.  Under such a 
scenario, not only would stagnation in neighboring countries mean lost opportunities 
for trade or cooperation, it could also undercut the possibilities of creating the kind of 
non-militarized and peaceful regional ambience that would be essential to optimize 
the prospects for growth and development.   Davies, Keet, and Nkuhlu (1993: 33) 
maintain that: “Unless there is growth and development throughout the region, not 
only will trade opportunities be constrained but destabilizing shocks from crises in 
neighboring countries could well impact in various ways on efforts to promote growth 
in a democratic South Africa.” Certainly, for South Africa, the benefits of closer 
cooperation with other countries in the region are manifest.   Davies, Keet and Nkuhlu 
(1993: 19) reason that:  
Increased trade with the region (and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa) could 
boost South Africa's manufactured exports, help it escape its status as a 
primary commodity exporter and create sorely-needed jobs.   Energy 
drawn from the region could augment its efforts to develop the economy.   
Regional investments that target viable industrial sectors can boost the 
income earning potential of other countries, thereby sustaining their role 
as markets for South African products and services.   In short, it is in 
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South Africa's own interests to work for a climate of growth and 
development throughout the region and wider continent.    
 Given these dynamics, Chapter 5 unpacks South Africa’s commitment to regionalism 
both in terms of government pronouncements as well as actions (depicted by Figure 
5-1 which illustrates the doubling of South African foreign direct investment in the 
period 1996-2001). 
 
It is widely accepted both within the region (affirmed by the empirical research of this 
study which is captured in Chapter 4) and beyond that the development of new forms 
of relationships between all the countries of Southern Africa could make a significant 
contribution to growth and transformative development in a post-apartheid era.   
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, observed when he addressed the South African parliament 
in Cape Town in October 1997:  
 When we were struggling here, South Africa still under apartheid, and 
you being a destabilize of your neighbors instead of working together with 
them to develop our continent….It was a terrible thing.  Here was a 
powerful South Africa, and this power was a curse to us….We wished it 
away, because it was not a blessing at all….but that has changed….South 
Africa is no longer trying to destroy the others…..What you build here 
because of your infrastructure and relative strength of your economy, you 
are building for all of us here. 
 
However, simply juxtaposing a ‘developed’ South Africa with its ‘underdeveloped’ 
neighbors is simplistic and simply serves to reinforce the paranoia and/or regional 
sensitivities with regard to South Africa’s intentions in Southern Africa.   A post-
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apartheid South Africa could also, unintentionally if not deliberately, send into the 
region what Susan George (1992) has called ‘boomerangs’ – actions or inactions by a 
more developed country with negative consequences for less developed countries, but 
which eventually rebound on the more advanced countries in various negative ways.   
They include the possibility that by reproducing or exacerbating current imbalances, 
or through failing to recognize the importance of acting to promote a more balanced 
regional growth, illegal immigration, arms smuggling and other destructive trends 
could all be fuelled to the detriment of growth and development in South Africa.  In 
addition Mfundo Nkuhlu (interview, 2001: 15) argues that “Development can’t just be 
economic, or just political, it has also got to be social.   Development has to make a 
difference to the conditions of ordinary people”.  Such thinking could inform a 
number of innovative solutions to old problems, for example that of illegal 
immigration.   An alternative to simply policing borders is to employ a developmental 
approach towards other countries thereby negating the need for people to cross 
borders.   There is also a need to strengthen the element of reciprocity given the 
dilemma whereby neighboring countries battle to sustain their own development 
because they are net exporters of the necessary skills to South Africa or passive 
recipients of South African economic benefits (the dilemma of SACU as articulated in 
Chapter 4 is instructive in this regard).    
 
The timing for such a re-evaluation of South Africa’s approach to the region could not 
have been better with countries in the region moving towards consolidating regional 
integration and cooperation under the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP).  Approved in 2003, the RISDP is designed to provide SADC member states, 
their institutions and policy makers with a coherent and comprehensive development 
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agenda for social, political and economic policies over the next 15 years 
(http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/risdp/summary.php?media=print).   The need 
for such strategies is indisputable in a continent that has the lowest development index 
scores.   Unfortunately, South Africa’s ability to effectively contribute to such 
initiatives has been constrained by the fact that the country has always been viewed 
negatively in terms of the military-dominant conception of security.   However, it 
must be argued that countries of the region have reached a stage in international 
relations (as articulated in Chapter 5) which necessitates that they move beyond this 
narrow conception to other forms of security such as human and environmental 
security.  Dan Henk (2001: electronic) argues that:  
The concept of ‘security’ has had a particularly noxious reputation in 
modern Africa.   In part, this is a legacy of colonial administrations, which 
tended to view it in the very narrow sense of ‘establishment and 
maintenance of colonial hegemony’, resulting in extraordinary coercion 
and violence directed against subject populations.   The notion that the 
regime, not its subjects, was the appropriate referent object survived the 
transition into independent Africa.   Here, it combined with the equally 
unfortunate legacy of a state system — the so-called ‘Westphalian model’ 
— that encouraged a ‘military-dominant conception of security’ that held 
the principal challenge to security to be posed by the military forces of 
other nations. 
 
Henk (2001: electronic) also draws on other studies to illustrate that newly 
independent African states did little to “understand or define security beyond 
 44
what was bequeathed to them by the colonialists.”  In this regard, he contends 
that 
The colonial legacy had obvious implications for foreign and domestic 
policy.   Writing from southern Africa about their region, Larry Swatuk 
and Peter Vale argue that the ‘practice of Westphalian state foreign policy 
[tended to entrench] regional elites whose antidemocratic tendencies were 
justified in terms of defending the national interest’.   They conclude that 
this focus ‘has rarely been about people or fostering human security; it has 
always been about ensuring the security of material things’. 
 
The need for a reconceptualisation of  security to incorporate its developmental 
dimension is highlighted by Nadir Mohammed who posits that “the ultimate goal 
of security is to create .   .   .[an] environment conducive to.   .   .   development 
plans”  and by Baffour Agyeman-Duah who argues that “national security 
[should be redefined] in human development terms” (cited in  Henk, 2001).   In a 
prescient article published in the early 1980s, Richard Ullman made a general 
case for broadening the concept of security.   He insisted that national security is 
threatened by the consequences of events that quickly degrade the quality of life 
of state and non-state actors alike, thus narrowing significantly the future range of 
political choice (Ullman, 1983: 130-135). 
 
However, the historic role of South Africa's security apparatus seems to blind some 
foreign policy commentators to the potential role of a post-apartheid South Africa in 
meeting the broad security and development needs of the region.  With the end of the 
policy of destabilization, Southern African countries, especially the member states of 
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SADC, will no longer have to devote a substantial portion of scarce resources to 
military spending, border patrols and repairs to damaged infrastructure.   Such 
resources can now be channeled towards much needed transformative development.   
In addition, South Africa's defense assets could be used to support regional forces in 
peacekeeping roles which would afford resource-challenged, democratizing states the 
opportunity to begin to stand down their engorged military establishments and devote 
greater effort (and resources) to socioeconomic development.   South Africa’s ability 
to play such a role was highlighted by Angela King, who headed the United Nations 
Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) in 1994 and noted that “...   this 
country [South Africa] will soon become a catalyst for the rapid development of not 
only the southern African region but the rest of the continent.” The Mozambique 
flood of February 2000 is illustrative of such capabilities.  The widespread 
devastation wreaked by the floods required an urgent and major operation to save the 
many people threatened by rapidly rising floodwaters.   Coordinated at Government 
level, many operators from around South Africa participated in the early days of the 
emergency before international assistance could arrive.  The South African National 
Defense Force (SANDF) and Denel’s Military Aviation division were integral to the 
success of the operation dubbed ‘Operation Litchi’ which turned out to be the largest 
scale emergency rescue and humanitarian initiative that Southern Africa has seen 
(Africa First, Ministry of Public Enterprises, 2004).    
 
 Like the growth triangles of Southeast Asia, there is also the possibility of South 
Africa contributing its own creative form of regionalism by promoting development 
corridors along with cross-border peace parks.   The most advanced instance of the 
former is the Maputo Development Corridor: an energy, rail, telecommunications, 
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toll-road, and pipeline system between Maputo, Mozambique (especially its port) and 
Gauteng, South Africa, which links provinces, communities, and companies, notably 
the Mozal aluminium smelter mega-project outside Maputo (Parpart and Shaw, 2002: 
302).   Other historical and contemporary examples include the Kgalagadi Trans-
frontier park between Botswana and South Africa’s Northern Cape, as well as areas 
around South Africa’s Kruger Park (with Gaza in Mozambique and Gonarezhou in 
Zimbabwe) (Parpart and Shaw, 2002: 302).   These corridors and transborder parks 
may provide the basis for ‘security communities’ that can advance human 
development as well as security.    
 
Although Pretoria’s economic dominance has the potential to influence regional 
development positively (it could be a driver of transformative development as 
opposed to the negating of regional development during apartheid), its motives, 
especially in the areas of security co-operation, continue to be viewed with profound 
suspicion.   South Africa was never able to convert its military and economic 
dominance into African recognition and acceptance and its forays into the continent 
and the region have not always been met with open arms.   Greg Mills, National 
Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, observes that, “Given 
its dominant economic, political and military positions, South Africa has often been 
expected to take a regional policy lead in Southern Africa, but in turn has been singled 
out for criticism over its perceived hegemony.   A case of damned if it does and 
damned if it doesn't” (IRIN Special Report, 1999).  South Africa has begun to realize 
that it is not always possible to act in a way that satisfies the expectations of other 
countries in the region.   Further complicating the South African role in the region, are 
perceptions that its government is ‘too close’ to Washington.  Perceptions of ‘neo-
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colonialism’, both economically and politically, undermine South Africa’s foreign 
policy and its efforts to achieve sustainable development for itself and the region.  
There remains an understandable aspiration to avoid the stigma of being either an 
outpost of Western capitalism and influence or a peripheral player on the edge of the 
global political system (Spence, 2001: 6).   In this regard, Chapter 5 alludes to various 
attempts by the post-apartheid government to eschew such categorization, the dangers 
of which are discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 3, with the later unpacking the 
implications for South Africa as a regional hegemon, middle power and pivot state. 
 
South African foreign policy makers have, thus, sought to inculcate a sense of   
mutually beneficial transformative development in the region.   It is in this context 
that South Africa’s national stand in the Expo 2000 Hannover in Germany (an event 
where the South African government joined hands with SADC partners and with the 
private sector) was themed ‘Faranani – Towards the African Century’.  Faranani in 
TshiVenda means ‘moving forward together’, and this philosophy encapsulates the 
government’s approach to the African Renaissance (Mathoma, 2001: 31).    
 
While these are lofty ideals articulated by policy makers, the South African 
government has often found it difficult to implement the African Agenda and 
Renaissance doctrine successfully.   For example, while the post apartheid 
government has regarded its domestic and foreign economic policies as a challenge to 
neo-liberalism, critics, including civil society at home and in the region have often 
labeled the South African policies as neo-imperialist (Landsberg, 2008).   While 
South Africa has encouraged free trade and development agreements between 
countries of the region, its economic and trade dominance have lent credence to the 
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accusations of it being an economic imperialist power in the region.   At the same 
time, attempts to addresses this inequity and disequilibrium clash most intensely with 
South Africa’s own domestic challenges.   There is an emerging realization that 
having a progressive all-embracing vision does not necessarily translate into its 
implementation, particularly if such implementation, competes with domestic 
priorities and, undermines the very government that seeks to advance it.   Indeed, 
South Africa as the leading regional power is less important than how it chooses to 
use that power and convince the rest of the region that such power can be used to 








Literature Review  
 
As Neuman (1997: 89) notes aptly, research is not an activity of isolated hermits who 
ignore the findings of others.   Reviewing the accumulated knowledge about an issue 
is an important precursor to studies being compared, replicated or criticized.   In this 
regard, the plethora of literature on foreign policy creates conducive prospects for 
comparative study. 
 
2.1 Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis 
Cross-national comparisons of  foreign policy extends the focus of this study  beyond 
idiographic accounts of  South Africa’s foreign policy processes thereby providing a 
more nuanced understanding of the country’s foreign policy choices and decisions.   
While fully cognizant of historical differences and other country-specific factors, a 
review of Brazil, United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK) under the 
‘New’ Labor Party and African foreign policies were deemed instructive for the 
purpose of this study on the basis that: 
• Brazil’s paradoxical growing international stature and waning regional 
influence parallels South Africa’s own foreign policy dilemma. 
 
• South Africa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa is often perceived as a 
microcosm of USA foreign policy towards the rest of the world. 
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• Attempts by the New Labor Party to pursue a more progressive foreign policy 
for the UK have encountered the same challenges faced by South Africa in 
promoting its vision of transformative development in the Southern African 
region. 
 
• A general review of African foreign policy literature provides the broad 
context within which South Africa’s own foreign policy can be situated. 
 
2.1.1 Brazil: A Review of Recent Foreign Policy Positioning 
Brazil’s return to democracy and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s initiated a 
more diversified approach to Brazil’s international relations.   The shift from the USA 
as the country’s main point of reference was accompanied by the rise of South 
America as the anchor for Brazilian foreign policy.   The prioritization of South 
America was premised on the belief that Brazil’s regional leadership would serve as a 
springboard to global recognition and influence.   The focus on regional relations was 
therefore a common thread that linked Brazil’s presidential leadership of President 
Luiz ‘Lula’ da Silva and his immediate predecessor Fernando Henrique Cardoso.   
Both these Presidents served for two terms, and Hakim (2010: electronic version) has 
attributed Brazil’s expanding international stature to their stewardship.   
 
Under President da Silva, Brazil’s foreign policy has become more assertive: 
presidential diplomacy has dominated an active foreign policy aimed at expanding the 
country’s presence in global economic negotiations, multilateral institutions and 
regional affairs (Hirst, 2009- electronic).   Pushing a ‘south-south’ agenda, Brazil has 
strengthened its ties with other emerging powers such as China, India, Russia and 
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South Africa.  The da Silva government has opened 35 embassies since taking office 
in 2003, most of them in Africa and the Caribbean.   (www.newsweek.com).   In fact, 
Brazil now has more diplomatic missions in Africa than Britain 
(www.economist.com, 2010). 
 
The nominal priority of Brazil's present foreign policy, the promotion of economic 
prosperity and integration in South America, is underpinned by the country’s 
domestic reality: ‘Brazil remains a relatively poor country confronted by pervasive 
poverty and social injustice, widespread political corruption, and rampant crime and 
violence’(Hakim, 2010: electronic version).   Among other factors, the election of 
Luis Inácio da Silva to the Presidency of Brazil can be attributed to the dissatisfaction 
within Brazilian society over the socio-economic performance of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso’s second administration (1999-2002).  Vaz (2004: electronic) affirms that 
“with the gradual fading of the economic dynamism brought about by the successful 
macroeconomic stabilization plan introduced in 1994, and the need to respond to 
mounting financial domestic and external constraints, Cardoso’s government did not 
meet the expectations of large sectors of Brazilian society as to economic and social 
development.” 
 
It is therefore not surprising that President da Silva argued for  trade liberalization to 
go hand in hand with social justice.   The elucidation of this objective by Maag (2005: 
electronic) is instructive: “Seeing foreign trade as an essential instrument for 
economic development and the reduction of external vulnerabilities, Lula’s main 
concern is to achieve a more equitable international order through an active 
engagement in regional and global partnerships.” Regional economic integration and 
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export diversification become key policy targets in a process whereby trade policy is 
used to nurture sustainable economic growth and reducing a country’s vulnerability to 
global financial markets.   The role of South-South cooperation in diversifying 
Brazil’s export markets was also critical to President da Silva’s plan and is  succinctly 
captured by Maag (2005: electronic): 
Lula is promoting third world solidarity because developing country 
markets are increasingly important to an export boom that helps recover 
the Brazilian economy.   Lula needs to fight large income inequalities in 
his own country by increasing Brazil’s GDP.   Therefore, he needs more 
gains from foreign trade.   At the same time, he needs to pay Brazil’s 
substantial debts. 
 
However, the socio-economic thrust of President da Silva’s foreign policy has not 
been without criticism.  Hakim (2010: electronic version) alludes to the argument that 
Brazil’s foreign policy lacks a moral center—that it seems mostly designed to satisfy 
narrow economic interests and the nation’s vanity.   In this view, Brazil has not been 
helpful in advancing international norms or values.   Instead, it is a country that 
avoids taking stands on sensitive issues and has established close and uncritical 
relations with western-perceived pariah countries like Iran, Cuba and Venezuela 
(www.economist.com, 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, with Brazil hosting, both, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, 
President da Silva’s determination in extending Brazil's international footprint is 
undeniable.   There is also a growing acknowledgement that Brazil has gained 
particular influence on international trade issues.   In two major cases in 2004, the 
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World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled in favor of Brazil, ordering the USA to drop 
subsidies to cotton farmers, and directing Europe to end its protection of the sugar-
beet industry (www.newsweek.com).   In 2008, Brazil was also active in the exclusive 
negotiations with the United States, the European Union, and India that characterized 
the end of the Doha Round (Malamud, 2010: electronic).   This dynamic was 
reiterated at the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change in December 2009, at which 
the leaders of China, India, Brazil and South Africa negotiated the final declaration 
with USA President Barack Obama, excluding the European Union, Russia, Japan and 
other global powers.   Brazil has also been included in the Outreach or Plus Five 
grouping (inclusive of China, India, Mexico and South Africa) of the Group of Eight 
(G8 - Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, plus the European Union) which has become an influential voice on 
global economic issues.   Moreover, Brazil is a member of the Group of Twenty 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors from the world’s largest national 
economies plus the European Union (Malamud, 2010: electronic).   This group met 
twice at the heads of government level in November 2008 and March 2009 in the 
wake of the world financial crisis with Brazil hosting the former event.    
 
Arguably, one of the factors that most boosted Brazil’s foreign reputation was its 
sudden promotion as a ‘BRIC’ country (Armijo 2007).   Brazil has been categorized 
as an emergent power at least since 2001, when a Goldman Sachs report defined it as 
a BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China coalition) – one of the four emerging markets 
that are forecast to run the world economy by 2050 (Wilson and Purushothaman 
2003).   The report hinted at the possibility of the four BRIC countries forming a 
‘political club’ and thereby converting their growing economic power into greater 
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geopolitical stature.   Notably, the presidents and foreign ministers of the BRIC 
countries have held exclusive meetings on the sidelines of a variety of fora, especially 
since 2008.   Interestingly, Brazil has also been associated with Russia, India, China, 
and the United States, in a grouping called ‘monster countries’ (Kennan 1993).   
There is also IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), a more limited and ‘principle-
oriented’ grouping (publicized as a South-South initiative) that refers to the trilateral 
developmental initiative between India, Brazil and South Africa.   Brazil convened the 
first trilateral meeting which officially launched, on 6 June 2003, with the adoption of 
the Brasilia Declaration, the IBSA Dialogue Forum.   Malamud (2010: electronic) 
traces the origins of the bloc of twenty-odd developing nations (variously called the 
G21, G22 or G20+) that came together at the fifth ministerial WTO conference in 
Cancún, Mexico (bringing together 60 percent of the world’s population, 70 percent 
of its farmers and 26 percent of world’s agricultural exports) to the  “IBSA foreign 
ministers signing of the Brasília Declaration, which stated that their major trading 
partners were acting to protect their less competitive sectors, and emphasized that 
their goal was to promote the reversal of such protectionist policies and trade-
distorting practices.” 
 
Paradoxically, Brazil’s growing international stature is not matched by a 
corresponding regional standing.   The relationship is, in fact, inverse with Brazil’s 
regional influence even being disputed.   The failure of Brazil to provide effective 
regional leadership has been attributed to both the structural deficiencies of the 
country’s foreign policy implementation and to regional rivalries. 
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In terms of foreign policy implementation, Burges (2008) argues that in the absence 
of hard power instruments to pursue foreign policy goals Brazil has had no choice but 
to resort to instrumental (or ideational) ones.   Sotero and Armijon (2007: 43; see also 
Lima and Hirst 2006; Gratius, 2007) also characterize Brazil as the ‘quintessential 
soft power.’ In contrast to other BRIC countries, Brazil has traditionally devalued its 
military, instead emphasizing multilateral cooperation within international institutions 
and framing its great-power claims in almost entirely economic terms.   Brazil’s last 
major war was fought in 1865-70, when it aligned with Argentina and Uruguay to 
defeat Paraguay.   Although it sent troops to Europe during both World Wars, the 
country never again engaged in military conflicts within its own region.  Brazil's 
military expenditures have remained stagnant at about 1.5 percent of GDP, a quarter 
of China's defense spending and about 60 percent of India's and Russia's 
(www.newsweek.com).  Rather than military might, it is argued that Brazil has 
influenced the region through trade and enjoys a trade surplus with every country in 
the region (www.newsweek.com).   Stewart (2010: electronic version) observes that 
the country’s ‘diplomatic GDP’ is source of pride for its foreign policy makers.   
However, Malamud (2010: electronic) contends that Brazil lacks the economic 
leverage to buy its way to regional or global leadership.   Although it is the largest 
Latin American economy, it is not the richest: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay rank 
consistently higher in terms of GDP per capita and human development, and Mexico 
and Venezuela do so intermittently depending on oil prices (Malamud, 2010: 
electronic).   This makes it virtually impossible to justify to a domestic audience large 
money transfers from Brazil to neighboring countries. 
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At the same time, it has long been argued that regional support was necessary to 
bolster Brazil’s global ascendance (Hurrell, 2000; Almeida, 2007; Lima, 2008).   This 
is consistent with the idea that “it is the neighboring countries which have to sign up 
to the lead of emerging powers …in order to give them the power base necessary for 
regional as well as global power projection and international coalition building” 
(Schirm, 2007: 6).   In this regard, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) has 
been a cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy since its inception in the early1990s.   
Bouzas, Veiga and Torrent (2002: 145) contend that the underlying formula of 
Mercosur has been to obtain “preferential access into the Brazilian market in 
exchange for Argentine support for Brazilian international trade strategies.” In this 
regard, Hakim (2010: electronic version) points out that while Mercosur has helped 
ease some of the political tensions between Brazil and Argentina, it has failed as a 
trade bloc.   The launching of the Initiative for the Integration of South American 
Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA) in 2000, and the creation of a Committee of 
Permanent Representatives in 2003, a permanent Court of Appeals in 2004, a Fund 
for Mercosur Structural Convergence (FOCEM) in 2005, and a common Parliament in 
2006 have not only had little impact but also have actually served to disguise the 
significant shortcomings of the bloc, among them the absence of a  regional budget 
and of an agency that can represent common interests.   The perception that Mercosur 
is becoming a burden rather than an asset has led some senior politicians, among them 
aspiring presidential candidates such as José Serra, to call for it to be downgraded to a 
mere free trade zone (Malamud, 2010: electronic).   The argument is that Brazil will 
be more capable of pursuing its foreign goals on its own rather than depending on 
costly agreements with unpredictable partners.    
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Parallel to the MERCOSUR initiative, in 2000, Brazil’s regional ambitions 
crystallized in a new regional concept: South America (Malamud, 2010: electronic).   
Brazil tacitly recognized that it was unable to exert a significant influence upon the 
Latin America configuration which cut across both North and South America, and 
was thereby ready to focus on a smaller area which excluded Mexico; a Latin 
American giant and potential rival.   Brazil’s elites consider this sub-region to be 
within its natural sphere of influence hence, the Cardoso administration organized the 
first Summit of South American presidents in Brasilia in September 2000 (Lima, 
2008).  President da Silva deepened this strategy, leading to the creation of the South 
American Community (SAC) at the Cuzco presidential summit of December 2004.   
The name was later changed to the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the 
constitutive treaty of which was signed in Brasilia in May 2008.   Mercosur arguably 
constitutes the inner circle of UNASUR which has become an embryonic attempt to 
establish a European style integration scheme, including an economic community, 
core political arrangements, and a mutual defense mechanism.   However, Hakim 
(2010: electronic version) contends that like its predecessors, UNASUR appears more 
of an aspiration than a practical goal. 
 
 Regional rivalries remain the Achilles heel of Brazilian attempts to nurture closer 
regional ties.   Malamud (2010: electronic) observes that there are two countries in 
Latin America that are in a structural position to dispute Brazilian claims to 
leadership: Argentina and Mexico.   Both have sizeable economies, large territorial 
landmasses and populations, rich natural resource endowments, and a record of 
intermittent international activism.   Moreover, both have relentlessly rejected the 
notion that any single country can ‘represent’ the whole region.   Their leading role in 
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the Uniting for Consensus group that disputes the right of Brazil and others to occupy 
a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and their 
participation in the G20 with Brazil (the only Latin American countries in the forum), 
testifies to their international standing as well as their determination not to be left 
behind by their bigger neighbor.    
 
As previously mentioned, one of Brazil’s responses to this has been to exclude 
Mexico from a redefined regional grouping -- ‘South America’-- which naturally 
excludes the geographically North American state.  However, it is not so easy for 
Brazil to similarly dispatch Argentina.  Argentina is Brazil’s main regional integration 
partner although for Argentina this partnership is based on equality of standing rather 
than on Brazilian supremacy.   Indeed, Argentine leaders have even considered their 
country as a legitimate contender for regional leadership, and have promoted 
closeness with the United States or other circumstantial allies(Venezuela most 
recently) in order to counterbalance Brazil’s power (Russell and Tokatlian 2003).    
 
Such regional rivalry has prevented Brazil from achieving, arguably, its most 
enduring foreign policy ambition: a permanent seat in the UNSC (Almeida, 2007).   
Brazil currently occupies one of the council’s rotating, two-year seats—for a record 
tenth time—but this has been a poor consolation prize.  In 2004, a high level 
committee submitted to the UN Secretary General a proposal that called for the 
establishment of new permanent members.  Four countries -Brazil, Germany, India 
and Japan (the so-called G4) –joined efforts in lobbying for the new seats (Stewart, 
2010: electronic version).   However, a large group (called Uniting for Consensus) 
which brought together the regional rivals of the G4 (with Argentina and Mexico 
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among the leaders) formed to oppose the creation of any new permanent seats.   It is 
noteworthy that aspiring Security Council members could not sell to their home 
regions their bids for international recognition.  The fact that Argentina, Brazil’s main 
regional partner, was the staunchest opponent of its main international aspiration dealt 
a heavy blow to the country’s image as a regional leader.   In addition, under the da 
Silva administration, Brazil put forward a candidate for the post of Director-General 
of the WTO.   Early in 2005, there were four contenders: one from France (Pascal 
Lamy, representing the European Union), another from Mauritius, a third from 
Uruguay as well as a Brazilian candidate, Luíz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa (Malamud, 
2010: electronic).   This not only showed that Mercosur was unable to agree to a joint 
candidate, but also that Brazil could not even gather majority support for its position 
(as Argentina supported the Uruguayan candidate).   To add insult to injury, the 
Brazilian nominee was eliminated in the first round, while the Uruguayan made it to 
the last (Malamud, 2010: electronic). 
 
Generally, Brazil’s non-interventionist posture has also limited the country’s regional 
influence.   Malamud (2010: electronic) observes that Brazil has refused to be drawn 
into the acrimonious feud between its fellow MERCOSUR partners: Argentina and 
Uruguay; refrained from any involvement in Chile’s long-standing disputes with Peru 
and Bolivia; turned a blind eye to Venezuela’s meddling in other countries; and 
remained on the sidelines as neighboring countries Colombia and Peru battled 
guerrillas and drug traffickers.   While it could be argued that Brazil’s reluctance to 
influence regional tensions reflects a realistic appraisal that its intervention would not 
always be welcome, Hakim (2010: electronic) maintains that the country’s leadership 
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is constrained by its modest capacity and limited willingness to pay the financial and 
political costs of more assertive involvement.    
 
These challenges notwithstanding, Brazil has been recognized increasingly as an 
emergent global power by the established world powers.   However, it is argued that 
because of regional power rivalries and a relative paucity of resources, Brazil is more 
likely to become a global middle power than an accepted leader in its region 
(Malamud, 2010: electronic).  Perhaps, it is the appreciation of this reality which has 
motivated the shift in Brazil’s foreign behavior from being regionally oriented to 
being globally oriented.   Although sub-regional integration has not ceased to be a 
goal, it is no longer a priority.  Cason and Power (2009) argue that the increasing 
pluralization of actors with a stake in foreign policy may also be making Brazil more 
globally – as opposed to regionally – sensitive.    
 
Although Brazil has not become indifferent to the region, its ambitions are 
increasingly defensive rather than offensive.   Malamud (2010: electronic) affirms that 
“The name of the game is to keep quiet rather than lead the neighborhood…As Brazil 
is not a revisionist power that intends to upset the system but rather a reformist one 
that wishes to enter the system, damage control has become its central task.” As The 
Economist aptly remarked, “it may be the rising power in the Americas but Brazil is 
finding that diplomatic ambition can prompt resentment” (The Economist, 2008: 
electronic).   In terms of Brazil’s foreign policy objectives, global success has proven 





Fig2-1: Brazil’s Foreign Policy - Lessons for South Africa 
Generally, the scant literature on Brazilian foreign policy is skewed towards the analysis of the 
country’s two key but, seemingly, antithetical foreign policy objectives: regional integration 
underpinned by Brazilian leadership and global prominence.   In this regard, contemporary Brazilian 
foreign policy, particularly under the da Silva administration shows a strong congruence with post-
apartheid South African foreign policy.   Some of the most salient features of this similarity include: 
 
• Brazil’s regional strategies were perceived as hegemonic attempts rather than as evidence of 
an enlightened leadership based on the pursuit of shared interests.  Such perceptions, in part, 
also inform South Africa’s inability to achieve her vision in Southern Africa; that is the crux 
of this thesis. 
 
• Argentina and Mexico’s contestation of Brazil’s regional influence is analogous to the 
Southern Africa regional rivalry between Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
 
• Pushing a ‘south-south’ agenda is a foreign policy priority for both Brazil and South Africa. 
 
• Akin to South Africa’s foreign policy objectives in Southern Africa, economic prosperity and 
integration in South America, is underpinned by Brazil’s domestic reality.   Both countries 
have battled to balance trade liberalization with social justice. 
  
However, there are also nuanced differences: 
 
• Unlike Brazil, South Africa’s foreign policy goals are pursued with both hard and soft power 
instruments.  In this regard, it is noteworthy that South Africa’s foreign policy 
implementation is criticized more than Brazil’s.    
 
• Although a source of much debate, South Africa is more willing than Brazil to pay the 
financial and political costs of more assertive involvement. 
 
• While analysts see a shift in Brazil’s foreign behavior from being regionally -to globally-
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oriented, SADC remains a priority for South Africa.   Interestingly, Brazil’s curbing of its 
regional sphere of influence from Latin America to South America is at variance with South 
Africa’s broader prioritization of SADC (inclusive of DRC, Tanzania, Madagascar and 
Seychelles) rather than Southern Africa. 
 
• Brazil’s foreign policy is perceived as lacking a moral center.   By contrast, while South 
Africa’s foreign policy is underpinned by human rights considerations, it is often perceived 
as weak in terms of actual implementation of such considerations. 
 
A study of Brazil’s foreign policy holds critical lessons for South Africa.   The words of Celso 
Amorim (2010: electronic), Minister of External Relations of Brazil (1993-1995, 2003 to present), 
are particularly instructive: 
Good foreign policy requires prudence.   But it also requires boldness.   It should not be 
shy or based on an inferiority complex.   It is usual to hear that countries should act in 
accordance with their means, which is almost too obvious, but the greatest mistake one 
could make is to underestimate them. 
 
 
2.1.2 USA Foreign Policy: Unilateral-Multilateral Fickleness? 
There is no dearth of literature on American foreign policy, which remains one of the 
most widely-studied international relations policy framework of a particular nation 
state.   The centrality of foreign relations to the existence and survival of the USA is 
underscored by the writings of authors such as George C.   Herring (2006) who have 
used foreign relations as the lens through which to tell the story of America's dramatic 
rise from thirteen disparate colonies to a world superpower.   It is a story of foreign 
policy vacillation between unilateralism and multilateralism in the service of USA 
national interests (see box below).   Arguably, the nature and timing of such foreign 
policy vacillation continues to determine both, the way in which USA foreign policy 
 63
is perceived as well as the possibility for successful realization of its objectives.   It is 
therefore, an area of interest to this study. 
Fig2-2: America’s four enduring national interests:  
 
Security: The security of the United States, its citizens, and USA allies and 
partners. 
 
Prosperity: A strong, innovative, and growing USA economy in an open 
international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.    
 
Values: Respect for universal values at home and around the world.    
 
International Order: An international order advanced by USA leadership that 
promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet 
global challenges. 
As articulated in the USA National Security Strategy (2010: 17)
 
The twentieth century marked a major transition in the rationale of American foreign 
policy.  While America’s nineteenth-century wars (except for the Civil War) had been 
largely about territorial expansion or the protection of trade routes its motives in the 
Great War were more idealistic (Prestowitz, 2003: 173).   In this regard, USA 
twentieth century foreign policy centered on three crusades to save the world from 
militarism, genocidal fascism, and totalitarian communism.  In addition, the creation 
of international bodies such as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank after World War II, represented an important evolution of 
American foreign-policy thinking.  The USA, which had long focused on the 
unilateral pursuit of its interests, now began to define such interests in terms of 
improving global economic conditions and establishing a community of nations on 
the basis of global rule of law and due process (Prestowitz, 2003: 174). 
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Of course, the USA retained veto power in all these newly-created multilateral bodies 
and with the end of the Cold War and its bipolar global power configuration, the USA 
emerged as the only global superpower.   Nye (2002) observes that this superpower 
status induced a sense of complacency in Americans and an over-confidence in the 
country’s unsurpassed global military, economic, and cultural power.   In this regard, 
he argues that, “… Americans were largely indifferent and uncertain about how to 
shape a foreign policy to guide this power.  Polls showed the American public 
focused on domestic affairs and paying little attention to the rest of the world...” (Nye, 
2002: ix) 
 
Recall the words of the philosopher Edmund Burke, who said of Britain’s power in an 
earlier era, “I dread our being too much dreaded” (cited in Richie, eds., 1990: 174).   
As with the empires of old, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 
September 2001 illustrated that imperial prestige and glory is not without costs.   The 
attacks occurred eight months into George W.   Bush's (2001-2009) first presidential 
term and brought a rapid change in USA foreign policy; marking a defining moment 
in the so-called ‘Bush revolution’ in foreign policy.   With the subsequent rise in neo-
conservative political ideology (which extols the virtues of American hegemony), the 
USA grew increasingly short-tempered about the international legal norms and 
institutions that seem to come into conflict with its national interests or preferred 
policy positions.  The neo-conservative belief that the USA is a benign empire 
coupled with its schizophrenia towards international institutions and caginess with 
regard to alliances, informed the conviction that preserving USA dominance and 
exercising American power to spread democracy is the best route to long term world 
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peace.  The Bush administration’s “expansion of the ‘unipolar moment’ as far as 
possible in the interests of USA security” was characterized by a global War on 
Terrorism and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Wenger, 2008: 1).  The European 
Union’s External Affairs Commissioner, Chris Patten, noted with concern that the 
USA Administration had switched to what he referred to as ‘unilateralist overdrive’ 
(cited in Kennedy, 2002: electronic).  The Doctrine of Preemption, expressed in 
Bush’s own words, “You’re either with us (USA) or with the terrorist,” encapsulates 
this USA ‘unilateralist overdrive’ (Speech on 20 September 2001). 
 
Jervis (2005: 138) observes that Bush’s policy has left the United States looking 
neither strong nor benign, and with the realization that the only thing worse than a 
successful hegemon is a failed one.  By stressing unilateralism over cooperation, 
preemption over prevention, and firepower over staying power, the Bush 
administration has alienated the United States' natural allies and disengaged from 
many of the world's most pressing problems (Berger, 2004: electronic).  Instead, 
unilateral economic self-defense premised on the protection of domestic economic 
and trade interests has been the preferred strategy and is epitomized by the USA 
refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol.  As the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the 
United States would incur the highest costs in cutting down emissions as mandated by 
the Kyoto Protocol.   Calling the Kyoto Protocol a ‘fatally flawed’ treaty with 
‘unrealistic targets not based on science,’ President Bush explicitly stated that he 
would not comply with mandates that “would have a negative economic impact, with 
layoffs of workers and price increases for consumers” (www.whitehouse.gov).   The 
European Parliament was equally explicit in their condemnation of USA, “We are 
appalled that the long-term interests of the majority of the world population are being 
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sacrificed for short-term corporate greed in the United States” (cited in Prestowitz, 
2003: 112).   Prestowitz (2003: 113) observes that “the Kyoto decision appeared to 
epitomize a profoundly anti-environment spirit within the administration and became 
a metaphor for American profligacy, unconcern, and arrogance.”   
 
Ironically, in an October 2000 Presidential debate, President George W. Bush 
contended that, “if we (USA) are an arrogant nation, they’ll (rest of the world) view us 
(USA) that way, but if we’re a humble nation, they’ll respect us” 
(http://www.pbs.org).  Unfortunately, many non-Americans saw the United States as 
arrogantly concerned with narrow American interests at the expense of the rest of the 
world.  Nye (2002: xii) argues that while effective leadership requires dialogue with 
followers, the United States used consultations for talking, not listening.   Prestowitz 
(2003: 08) affirms that “many people abroad feel that despite all our (USA) talk of 
democracy, human rights, and free trade America’s real aim is to control the destiny 
of other nations in pursuit of its own short-term interests or ideological 
preoccupations.”  The tendency by the USA to establish strong legal rules for other 
states while seeking for itself the right to be exempt from or even above these rules is 
a case in point.  On the one hand, the USA took a leading role in the writing of 
treaties such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the 
United Nations Charter, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Human 
Rights Covenants.  On the other hand, as the histories of the League Covenant, 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and Havana Charter on the International 
Trade Organization suggest, the USA recoiled from adhering to the far-reaching 
obligations of these multilateral treaties.  Moreover, while the USA continues to play 
a major role in encouraging treaty negotiations, it has increasingly retreated from the 
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resulting treaties, usually by refusing to ratify them.  The International Criminal Court 
(ICC), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the amended 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity testify to this reality.  In 2000, Condoleezza Rice (later National 
Security Advisor: 2001–2005 and Secretary of State: 2005–2009) campaigned that 
Americans should “proceed from the firm ground of the national interest and not from 
the interest of an illusory international community” (Speech at 2000 Republican 
National Convention).  The ties that bind the international community may be weak, 
but they matter.  Nye (2002: xii – xiv) affirms that “...   learning to define our (USA) 
national interest to include global interests will be crucial to the longevity of our 
(USA) power and whether others see the hegemony as benign or not.” 
 
In this regard, conscious of the damage to USA international image under the 
Republican Bush administration, President Obama had to review the emphasis and 
approach of the country’s foreign policy.  The Obama administration has adopted a 
more diplomatic foreign policy approach by moving away from the unilateralism of 
the Bush era and through greater cooperation with the UN and other international 
bodies.  However, the Obama administration is continuing the USA 3D strategy in 
foreign policy, in prioritizing Defense, Development and Diplomacy as the three 
pillars of USA foreign policy.  But, in doing so, the administration is adopting a 
‘smart power’ approach by foregrounding diplomacy and development alongside a 
strong defense.  This is different from the previous administrations where defense was 
prioritized with diplomacy and development assumed a lesser role.    
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President Obama’s re-prioritization of foreign policy objectives is not just a response 
to the faux pas of the Bush administration, but also denotes a necessary foreign policy 
readjustment in light of a rapidly evolving international environment.  The USA 
National Security Strategy (2010: 1) recognizes the challenges of advancing 
American interests “in a world that has changed—a world in which the international 
architecture of the 20th century is buckling under the weight of new threats, the global 
economy has accelerated the competition facing our people and businesses, and the 
universal aspiration for freedom and dignity contends with new obstacles.” 
 
Ironically, in December 2007, the USA (the most ardent promoter of the ‘Washington 
consensus’ which determined the neoliberal, free-market ideology of the global 
economic order) entered its longest post-World War II recession.  Such vulnerabilities 
and insecurities are becoming more evident as the curtain of history closes on what 
some commentators (Starobin: 2009, Zakarias: 2008) have identified as the end of the 
‘Age of the America.’ In this regard, USA hegemony is challenged on two fronts:  
• Firstly by rising nations, such as China, that are not only ambitious and able to 
establish themselves as world powers but also strong enough both in economic 
and military terms to present an individual challenge.    
 
• Secondly, by emerging economies forming alliances (such as BRIC and 
IBSA) to assert themselves against American dominance.    
 
The USA’s National Intelligence Council’s, Global Trends 2025: Transformed World 
(2008: vi), notes that: 
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Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) 
indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global 
GDP by 2040-2050.  China is poised to have more impact on the world 
over the next 20 years than any other country.  If current trends persist, by 
2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy…  
In addition, Goldman Sachs projects that China’s economy will surpass that of the 
USA in 2027 (http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/BRIC-Full.pdf) 
 
However, as Nye (2010: 4) argues, “Even if overall Chinese GDP passed that of the 
United States around 2030, the two economies, although roughly equivalent in size, 
would not be equivalent in composition.  China would still have a vast 
underdeveloped countryside...” Moreover due cognizance needs to be given to the 
reality that while the USA is challenged economically and politically by emerging 
powers, the USA far outstrips these countries in military might.  On the military front, 
it is the only country with both nuclear weapons and conventional forces that can act 
quickly in any part of the globe.   Undoubtedly, this will ensure that the USA remains 
an important global player, albeit less dominant because of the shifts in global power 
configurations.  Goldstein (1988: 281) puts it more eloquently:  
If hegemony means being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules 
and arrangements by which international relations are conducted, then the 
United States is hardly a hegemon today.   If hegemony is defined more 
modestly as a situation where one country has significantly more power 
resources or capabilities than others, then it simply signifies American 




However, Nye (2002: 111) identifies a further challenge to American influence in the 
world: 
A nation can lose power as a result of being overtaken by rising nations, 
but …this is not the most likely challenge.  The barbarians did not defeat 
Rome; rather, it rotted from within.  People lost confidence in their culture 
and institutions, elites battled for control, corruption increased, and the 
economy failed to grow adequately...   Could this nation (USA) lose its 
ability to influence world events positively because of domestic battles 
over collapse of institutions, and economic stagnation?  If our (USA) 
society and institutions appear to be collapsing, we will be less attractive 
to others.  If our economy fails, we will lose the basis for our hard power 
as well as our soft power. 
 
His concerns have merit, especially given the effects of the global economic crises 
which has increased domestic pressure on issues such as unemployment and health 
care reform.  In this regard, the latest National Security Strategy (2010: 2) 
acknowledges that: 
•  At the center of our (USA) efforts is a commitment to renew our economy, 
which serves as the wellspring of American power.    
• …what takes place within our (USA) borders will determine our strength and 
influence beyond them. 
 
In essence, “the paradox of American power is that it is too great to be challenged by 
any other state, yet not great enough to resolve global problems such as international 
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terrorism and nuclear proliferation.  America needs the cooperation and respect of 
other countries” (Sebastian Mallaby cited in Nye, 2002: 40).  As Henry Kissinger 
argued, “the test of history for the United States will be whether we (USA) can turn 
our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles 
into widely accepted international norms.  That was the greatness achieved by Rome 
and Britain in their times” (Kissinger, 2000: electronic).  The National Security 
Strategy (2010: 9) clearly articulates a multilateral strategy to achieve unilateral USA 
foreign policy objectives:  
In the past, the United States has thrived when both our nation and our 
national security policy have adapted to shape change instead of being 
shaped by it.  For instance, as the industrial revolution took hold, America 
transformed our economy and our role in the world.   When the world was 
confronted by fascism, America prepared itself to win a war and to shape 
the peace that followed.  When the United States encountered an 
ideological, economic, and military threat from communism, we shaped 
our practices and institutions at home—and policies abroad—to meet this 
challenge.  Now, we must once again position the United States to 




Fig2-3: USA Foreign Policy-Lessons for South Africa 
 
Given South Africa’s sub-regional dominance, its foreign policy in Southern Africa is 
often perceived as a microcosm of USA foreign policy towards the rest of the world.  
In this regard, the following issues necessitate deeper reflection: 
 
• Pre- 9/11 USA’s indifference and uncertainty on how to shape its foreign 
policy to guide its unsurpassed power parallels South Africa’s unpreparedness 
to effectively utilize the unique foreign policy opportunities that its post-
apartheid status presented.  Such policy was underpinned by personality 
(Nelson Mandela) and ideology rather than strategy.    
 
• The USA vacillation between unilateralism and multilateralism is based on 
short-term objectives which are inimical to the long-term interest.  There are 
strong similarities with South Africa’s use of hard (1998 intervention in 
Lesotho) and soft power (quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe). 
 
• As resentment towards their foreign policy choices grow, both the USA and 
South Africa are realizing that effective leadership requires dialogue with 
followers, not an imposition of a unilateral vision.  Effective use of power 
resources requires skillful management of perceptions.  A multilateral strategy 
to achieve unilateral foreign policy objectives is not impossible. 
 






2.1.3 UK: New Labor and the Old Challenge of Ethical Foreign Policy 
The profound changes in the global environment had far-reaching implications for the 
UK’s approach to foreign policy.   Clark (2007: 18) contends that: 
The twentieth century played to the natural strengths of the UK and 
bolstered its international position for the best part of 70 years, even as its 
relative power and capacity in the world declined.  The UK played key 
roles in the world wars and greatly influenced the peace-making and 
economic arrangements that followed.  The country’s imperial and post-
colonial status and its maritime advantages in a world of burgeoning 
international trade gave the UK a central role as one of the pillars of 
international security and world order throughout the century….. 
 
While the traditional security threats of the twentieth century magnified the UK’s 
strengths as an effective military ally and a diplomatic voice of experience, it is clear 
that the twenty-first century with its floating coalitions, decentralized threats and 
transborder flows of all kinds requires a more collective strength.  In this regard, it 
was the New Labor Party (an alternative branding for the Labor Party, derived from a 
conference slogan first used by the Labor Party in 1994, and  later popularized in a 
draft manifesto published by the party in 1996, called New Labor, New Life For 
Britain) which took up the challenge of determining how the UK could contribute to 
and harness such a collective strength.  Wheeler and Dunne (2004: 01) point out that 
the New Labor solution was “to replace the old siren of rule Britannia with a new 
vision of moral Britannia.” 
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Indeed, with global interdependence blurring the distinction between national and 
international security, there was an understanding that “More than ever before, our 
(UK) security now depends on achieving greater security for others” (Wild, 2006).   
The thinking about how Britain should seek to balance the traditional goals of foreign 
policy (national security and commercial prosperity) with broader collective security 
objectives was initiated by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, only ten days into 
New Labor’s term in office.  In May 2007, Cook set out a new mission statement for 
the Foreign Office and for the incoming government.  In introducing the new 
statement, Cook notably asserted that the UK foreign policy should have ‘an ethical 
dimension’ and that the Labor government would “put human rights at the heart of 
foreign policy” (Cook, 1997).  Pilger (1999: electronic) points out that this  
announcement was at odds with the historical record, which shows that since 1945 
Conservative and Labor governments have had almost identical foreign policies, none 
of which have upheld human rights. 
 
 Nevertheless, in addition to the focus on ethics and human rights, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair promoted the notion of a ‘third way’ as a means of marrying together an 
open, competitive and successful economy with a just, decent and humane society 
(Blair 1997).  For Anthony Giddens (1998:26), one of the concept’s main proponents, 
the ‘third way’ 
..   refers to a framework of thinking and policy-making that seeks to 
adapt social democracy to a world which has changed fundamentally over 
the past two or three decades.  It is a “third way” in the sense that it is an 




During his visit to South Africa in 1999, Tony Blair stated that the ‘third way’ not 
only combines economic dynamism and social justice, but also that each depends on 
the other.  In essence, “If a country generates no wealth, it cannot afford social 
justice” (Blair, 1999).  Such views have led New Labor to endorse not only the 
structural adjustment measures advocated by the World Bank and the IMF, but also to 
praise the African National Congress’ shift away from the socialist principles that 
guided its thinking during the liberation struggle towards the neo-liberal economic 
policies it pursues today.  According to Blair, South Africa’s ‘Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution’ (GEAR) strategy has set the country “on a course to tackle the 
needs of the disadvantaged, while retaining the confidence of the market” (Blair, 
1999). 
 
From 1997 to the beginning of 1999, the New Labor government’s ‘ethical’ ‘third 
way’ foreign policy was reasonably well received.  The architects of the policy were 
regularly praised for their substantive policy commitments to combat poverty and 
promote development across the developing world, particularly in Africa, which were 
thought to be progressive.  These included the establishment of a Department for 
International Development (DFID), significant increases to the aid budget  as well as 
establishment of the Commission for Africa, (also known as the Blair Commission for 
Africa) to examine and provide impetus for development in Africa (Wheeler and 
Dunne, 2004: 17).  Notably, the government also used the UK’s presidency of the EU 
and the G8 in 2005 to assert the case for a fairer global deal for Africa (Held and 
Mepham, 2007: 8).  Global interdependence became a recurring theme in New 
Labor’s policy discourse and it was frequently argued that “in an increasingly 
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globalized world, Britain’s ethical and practical commitments can no longer stop at 
the water’s edge” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2002: 309). 
 
However, the New Labor government’s success in ‘branding’ itself and refocusing 
UK foreign policy was not matched by a similar triumph in actual foreign policy 
implementation.  Despite credible attempts to inject progressive ideas about human 
security into the UK’s foreign policy, it was not long before New Labor’s human 
rights-centered policy became mired in accusations of hypocrisy in relation to arms 
sales and was over-shadowed by the debates on the Iraq War.  Such issues starkly 
illustrate how adherence to an ethical foreign policy could necessitate political 
choices that might jeopardize Labor’s prospects for re-election.   
 
The biggest challenge for the New Labor Party was resolving the clash between 
domestic responsibilities and commitments to promote human rights abroad which 
manifested itself in the need to protect jobs in Britain’s large defense industry (the 
country is the second biggest exporter of arms in the world) on the one hand and the 
desire to support peace through arms regulation on the other hand.   Barkham (2000: 
electronic) best captures the dilemma facing the New Labor Party by juxtaposing the 
party’s pre and post election manifesto pledges.   Before its election in 1997, the party 
manifesto indicated that the party would not permit the sale of arms to regimes that 
might use them for internal repression or international aggression.   However, once in 
government the party followed a subsequent manifesto pledge that maintained the 
party’s support for a strong UK defense industry as a strategic part of the country’s 
industrial base and defense effort. 
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The tension between New Labor’s two manifesto promises reached its climax over the 
sale of arms to Indonesia as well as the issuing of arms export licenses to Pakistan, 
which became the source of a serious cabinet dispute (Barkham, 2000: electronic).  It 
was soon apparent that any ethical considerations in the UK’s foreign policy approach 
had been resolutely displaced by domestic considerations.  In fact, under the 
leadership of the New Labor Party, a Defense Sales Organization at the Ministry of 
Defense was established, specifically to boost the arms trade (Pilger, 1999: 
electronic).  Moreover, Pilger (1999: electronic) argues that “arms manufacturers are 
more likely to have their export licenses approved under Labor than they were under 
the Tories.  Fewer than one per cent of applications were turned down between 
August 1997 and August 1998.” 
 
Attempts by the New Labor to instill an ethical dimension in the UK’s foreign policy 
was further derailed by the government’s close military relationship with the USA and 
Tony Blair’s ill-judged support for the war in Iraq and for George Bush’s badly 
executed war on terror.  Under the New Labor leadership of Blair, the UK 
government was embroiled in the controversial invasion of Iraq which was not 
internationally sanctioned.  Moreover, the UK was also extremely muted over the 
human rights violations perpetrated by its American ally, including the abuses 
committed at Guantanamo (Rogers, 2006: electronic).  The fact that the edifice of the 
ethical foreign policy was crumbling was graphically illustrated by Robin Cook’s 
momentous decision to resign from the Cabinet over Blair’s decision to join the USA 
and Australia in the war against Iraq.  In an electrifying resignation speech to the 
House of Commons, Cook argued that the government’s decision to use force – in the 
face of opposition from three permanent members of the Security Council – 
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represented a fundamental challenge to the authority of the UN: “If we believe in an 
international community based on binding rules and institutions, we cannot simply set 
them aside when they produce results that are inconvenient to us” (Cook, 2003). 
 
Cook’s resignation also underscored the manner in which the nature of foreign policy-
making under the New Labor administration further eroded the possibility of a ‘third 
way’ becoming entrenched in UK foreign policy.  Wheeler and Dunne (2004:33) 
contend that Blair preferred to make policy in proximity to a few close advisors and 
there was no significant cabinet involvement in the decision to go to war against Iraq.   
The danger of such foreign policy-making is that of group-think where those around 
the Prime Minister filter information in such a manner that it only serves to reinforce 
his preferred outcome.  With Blair the situation was compounded by the fact that he 
was elected with a landslide 179 seat majority largely based on Labor’s domestic 
priorities and had ‘less knowledge or experience than any incoming Prime Minister 
since the Second World War’(Kampfner, 2003: 9). 
  
Blair’s former foreign policy advisor, Robert Cooper (in his book: The Breaking of 
Nations) claims that governments will not only have to compromise their values in 
diplomacy, they may need to abandon them altogether (Cooper, 2003).   Whatever the 
reasons for compromise or abandonment, the New Labor Party has realized that it is 
easier to ‘talk the talk’ than to ‘walk the walk.’ Foreign policy considerations such 
based on ethics or human rights, become relative values in the face of economically-





Fig2-4: UK Foreign Policy-Lessons for South Africa 
 
Cook’s pledge that the Labor government would “put human rights at the heart of 
foreign policy” is analogous to Nelson Mandela’s assertion in a 1993 Foreign Affairs 
article that “human rights will be the light that guides our (South Africa’s) foreign 
affairs”.   Both, the New Labor administration in the UK and South Africa’s post-
apartheid governments, have since come to appreciate that it is easier to articulate a 
more progressive foreign policy than to implement one.   For example, South Africa’s 
voting patterns during its two-year tenure in the UN Security Council in 2007-2008 
(voted against resolutions on Myanmar, Iran and Zimbabwe) were heavily criticized 
by human rights activists.   In 2009, South Africa’s refusal to grant the Dalai Lama a 
visa to address a peace conference, further elicited accusations from human rights 
activists that South Africa was prioritizing economic interests in China over the 
human rights of Tibetans. 
 
In essence, the success of a progressive foreign policy will be dependent on the 
manner in which the clash between domestic realities and foreign policy ideals is 
managed.  This necessitates a more profound analysis of the dichotomy between:  
• Human rights and economic interests 
• Social justice and market growth 





2.1.4 Review of African Foreign Policy Literature 
There have been relatively few studies of foreign policy activities of African states 
and even fewer in a comparative vein.  Wright (1999: 1) attributes this dearth in 
foreign policy literature to “difficulty in collecting information, a disinterest in 
African studies by many scholars who study foreign policy, and a caution on the part 
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of some African scholars not to move too closely into an area traditionally considered 
by governments to be beyond the bounds of inquiry.” Equally problematic is the fact 
that existing African foreign policy studies are dominated by an analysis that reflects 
a preoccupation with the lack of foreign policy autonomy for African states. 
 
Wright (1999: 3) acknowledges that ‘significant emphasis’ has been accorded to the 
influence of former colonial powers on shaping the foreign policy orientations of the 
newly emergent African states.  Khadiagala and Lyons (2001: 3) affirm that “African 
elites had only tenuous control over postcolonial states, external actors, particularly 
the former colonial powers, retained considerable influence over most facets of 
African life.” Although there are some examples to suggest that a state’s resources 
can influence foreign policy options – as with oil diplomacy  in Nigeria, gold 
diplomacy in South Africa, or diamond diplomacy in Botswana – the resource base of 
Africa has not brought it significant leverage within the global economy.   In addition, 
as a consequence of the need to consolidate power and meet socioeconomic demands 
at home, African governments were shackled by the chains of International Financial 
Institutions which significantly shaped indigenous foreign (and in particular 
economic) policy initiatives.  In this regard, the technocratic prescriptions of the 
World Bank and IMF came to be regarded as a form of neocolonialism that reinforced 
‘dependency’ relationships for developing African states which could not afford to 
de-link from such exploitative ties with the West. 
 
Kaunda (2002) aptly illustrates the effects of domestic political and economic 
circumstances on foreign policy decisions by explaining how underdevelopment and 
external economic dependence constrained Malawi’s capacity to determine 
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autonomous foreign policies.  In this regard, Kaunda draws a link between Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda’s (Malawi’s first President) choice of national development strategy 
and acceptance by Western donors.  He argues that this locked Malawi as a 
subordinate actor in a Western-dominated international economic order which 
“perpetuated Malawi’s economic dependence as well as the influence of Western 
considerations in foreign policy” (Kaunda, 2002: 79).   The example of Banda can 
also be used to show how African foreign policy as the prerogative of presidents and 
prime ministers dovetailed with the postcolonial patterns of domestic power 
consolidation.  In fact, most post colonial African foreign policy studies correlate the 
state’s foreign policies with its president.  Often a Head of State was considered the 
only decision-maker, with one-or no-party systems reinforcing the centralization of 
foreign policy decision-making (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982).  In what is commonly 
referred to as the idiosyncratic big man hypotheses, it is assumed that the state’s and 
the ‘big man’s’ interests are intertwined (McKay, 1966 and Thiam, 1963).  In essence, 
African foreign policies have essentially been regarded as a matter of deliberate 
actions by elites.  Such notions were generally reinforced by Cold War politics which 
created an enabling environment for African leaders to hold on to power by 
promoting a particular foreign policy orientation. 
 
However, it could also be argued that the colonial influence, classic dependency and 
‘big-man’ theory understanding of African foreign policies are simply caricatures of 
more complex and dynamic processes.  As Wright (1999: 4) correctly observes, the 
desire to maintain sovereign control of policy “has remained consistent within the 
continent, though the ability to do so has often been weak.” Nevertheless, Khadiagala 
and Lyons (2001: 2) argue that through the promotion of sovereignty and national 
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identity “African states sought to maximize individual political autonomy, strengthen 
territorial borders and guarantee unilateral advantages from privileged relations with 
external actors.”  The manner in which the Cold War was played out on the continent 
is an apt reflection of how African governments were able to use foreign policy as a 
means for African states to gain some form of leverage in the international arena. 
 
A comprehensive understanding of African foreign policy is also limited by the one-
dimensional focus on Africa and the global system.   The intra-African element has to 
a large degree, simply been ignored in African foreign policy studies.  This lacuna 
undermines the reality that for many African states, “regions are sources of 
authoritative foreign policies, places where power is displayed and exerted” 
(Khadiagala and Lyons, 2001: 2).   It could also be argued that the profound changes 
in the international arena necessitate that intra-African and regional dimensions of 
African foreign policy be given greater prominence.  This is more so since regional 
integration is perceived as a pre-requisite for a ‘United States of Africa’; a continental 
integration project currently underway that would undoubtedly revolutionize the 
nature of foreign policy making in Africa. 
 
Indeed, the current global environment has altered the topography of power and 
institutional arrangements across the continent.  Wright (1999: 1) affirms that the 
foreign policies of African states are “being shaped by rapidly changing international 
and domestic environments to the extent that it is difficult to isolate purely foreign 
policies.” It is an era where common threats such as climate change, spread of 
infectious disease and transnational organized crime magnify the need for collective 
action and where marginalization in global arenas of power necessitate that African 
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countries negotiate internationally as an integrated force to strengthen their bargaining 
power.  Meanwhile, the wave of transitions to democracy in the 1990s and the 
dynamics of globalization have had a profound influence on the structure and process 
of foreign policy-making; expanding the roles played by parliaments, interest groups, 
civic organizations, and the mass media in what Christopher Clapham has termed the 
“privatization of diplomacy” (Clapham, 1996). 
 
In essence, African foreign policies have been witness to several shifts in terms of 
actors (from elitist decision-makers to multiple players), issues (from narrow national 
priorities to broader areas of common concern), and levels (from national to regional 
and global).   Bischoff and Southall (1999: 237) argue that “now more than ever, after 
a decade and a half of neoliberalism and half a decade of post-bipolarity, the 
discredited and diminished African state has no monopoly over foreign relations, 
which are increasingly economic in content and transnational in character.” 
Khadiagala and Lyons (2001: 12) affirm that “Internal and external policy 
environments have become increasingly complex, testing the mettle of policymakers 
and limiting their authority to routinely manage these competing claims.”  They also 
point out that “Ultimately, foreign policy in Africa, as elsewhere, is about 
opportunities and burdens of participating in transnational affairs.” 
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Fig.2-5: African Foreign Policy literature-Lessons for South Africa’s Foreign 
Policy 
 
Although South Africa’s post-independence history took the country down a different 
foreign policy path than her other African counterparts, the following  issues that flow 
from the review of African foreign policy literature necessitate deeper reflection in the 
context of this thesis: 
 
• For many African states, regions are sources of authoritative foreign policies. 
 
• Foreign policies of African states are being shaped by dynamic international and 
domestic environments in a manner that makes it difficult to distinguish 





2.2 Contextualizing South African Foreign Policy Literature: From conflict to 
contested cooperation 
One cannot properly understand the significance of Pretoria’s current Africa policy 
without examining its past destructive military and economic role.   This explains why 
so much of South African foreign policy literature engages with the Republic’s past 
policies of destabilization as well as her perceived attempts to dominate.  
Furthermore, post apartheid writing in this field has been obsessed with how South 
African foreign policy reflects continuity rather than change.   It is this fixation which 
is responsible for the superfluity in versions of South Africa’s diplomatic history at 




2.2.1 Apartheid’s Legacy 
South Africa's struggle to develop cooperative and mutually beneficial relationships 
with states in Southern Africa is not surprising considering the nature of past South 
African visions for the region which were essentially geared towards serving South 
African interests (Davies and O’Meara: 1985, Price: 1984, Minty: 1989, Barber and 
Barratt: 1990, Crawford: 1995, Chossudovsky: 1997, Vale and Maseko: 1998).   The 
notion that South Africa should play an assertive role in African affairs seems to have 
been a constant thread in the rhetoric of successive South African leaders.   Each 
epoch has appeared to open exciting possibilities of engagement across the continent.  
In a speech to the country’s premier agricultural and industrial show in April 1940, 
South Africa’s then Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, urged an adjustment in the country’s 
approach to African affairs:  
If we wish to take our rightful place as the leader in pan-African 
development and in the shaping of future policies and events in this vast 
continent, we must face the realities and the facts of the present and seize 
the opportunities which these offer.   All Africa may be our proper market 
if we will but have the vision...   (Smuts,1942: 250).   
 
Undoubtedly, the most ambitious of these engagement proposals was launched in 
early 1979, when the then Prime Minister PW Botha and his foreign minister, Roelof 
‘Pik’ Botha, suggested a grand scheme of regional cooperation which envisaged a 
constellation of states with South Africa at its centre (see Geldenhuys, 1981).   It was 
a brazen response to the breaching of the formerly impervious white buffer zone 
around apartheid South Africa (a product of the late decolonization of the Portuguese 
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colonies of Angola and Mozambique), and a desperate attempt to woo her Southern 
African neighbors away from Soviet and Western influence and, in particular, to stop 
them giving support and sanctuary to the ANC and South West African People’s 
Organization (SWAPO).    
 
Caught in apartheid’s cross-fire, the Southern African region was devastated by the 
political, economic and military destabilization which constituted South Africa’s 
‘total strategy’.   In its bid to entrench and protect the apartheid system, South Africa 
intervened in the continent not only to safeguard her territorial integrity but also to 
weaken her neighbors.  Southern Africa’s vulnerability to the apartheid state’s 
pernicious regional foreign policy has been well documented (for example, Bienen: 
1985, Davies and O’Meara: 1985, Ajulu and Cammack: 1989, Holness: 1989, 
Johnson and Martin: 1989, Manning and Green: 1989, Barber and Barratt: 1990, 
Jaster: 1992).  The evidence is also patent, both in the uneven (and in most cases, 
deeply stunted) development levels in the region and in the immense devastation 
wrought by apartheid destabilization as Pretoria sought to extend the economic 
dependence of countries that had adopted overt anti-apartheid stances.  The United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has estimated that one million people died as a 
result, while the former SADCC countries suffered losses amounting to about US$60-
billion (see, for instance, Hanlon, J., 1986, Beggar Your Neighbors, James Currey, 
London for an overview of that strategy and its effects).  Moreover, the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) acknowledged that “the majority of the 
victims of the South African government’s attempts to maintain itself in power were 
outside of South Africa” (1998, Vol. 2, Ch.2: 43).   
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Davies and O’Meara (1985) argue that apartheid strategists divided states in the 
region into three categories in the application of their destabilization tactics which 
included direct military action, indirect support for dissident movements, and pressure 
on the state’s economic lifelines, notably the transportation routes, the flow of trade 
and investment, and the migrant labor system.   Firstly, there were conservative states, 
which were seen as active or potential collaborators (for example, Swaziland); 
secondly, there were uncooperative states which were vulnerable to pressure (such as 
Lesotho and Zimbabwe); and thirdly, there were those states whose political systems 
and development strategies were viewed as offering a fundamental challenge to 
apartheid capitalism and therefore incurred the greatest wrath of the apartheid state 
(notably, Angola and Mozambique).  Undoubtedly, “the overriding objective [of 
destabilization] was to bring about a regional détente on terms imposed by South 
Africa….in short, nothing less than a Pax Pretoria” (Jaster cited in Blumenfeld, 1992: 
110).   
 
Mills (1994) acknowledges that the greater part of the existing literature on Southern 
African security has been concerned with Pretoria’s destabilization of its neighbors, 
and has thus assumed a basically conflictual relationship between South Africa and 
the other states in the region.  Wariness and/or cynicism over the post-apartheid 
state’s commitment to regional development therefore needs to be contextualized in 
terms of the country’s history in the region.  The dilemma posed by Southern Africa’s 
political hostility to the apartheid state on the one hand and the region’s economic 
dependence on South Africa on the other inspired the creation of the SADCC which 
had the twin goals of strengthening economic cooperation and development among 
the independent states of Southern Africa and reducing their dependence on South 
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Africa.  It is unfortunate that debates over the success of SADCC as a counter-
dependency strategy (see Maasdorp: 1985, Rotberg: 1985 and Weisfelder: 1989) have 
a tendency to distract from Jaster’s (1992: 19) pertinent observation that “…South 
Africa – whose defense of white rule and sense of siege formed the core of its 
relations with the region – was unable to convert military and economic dominance 
into African recognition and acceptance.” Whilst South Africa’s neighbors have long 
been portrayed as helpless victims of the actions of a regionally omnipotent South 
Africa, the Republic’s overwhelming economic strength in relation to other states in 
the sub-region, has not always translated into significant clout.   One could argue that 
this past failure continues to haunt South African regional foreign policy and has 
important implications for the role of the country in the region.    
 
Jaster (1988: xiii) maintains that South Africa's foreign policy was “essentially 
reactive and defensive”.  This is an area of South African foreign policy that has been 
well documented in the works of, for example, Bienen (1985), Jaster (1988),  Johnson 
and Martin (1989), Venter (1989), Barber and Barratt (1990) and Cawthra (1997).   
Nevertheless, by the mid-1980's it became evident that for South Africa to have 
durable security she would have to bolster the stability of Southern Africa (Bienen, 
1985: 3).   However, given that most literature on Southern African regional relations 
perceived apartheid as the single most important factor in shaping relations and that 
some views of post apartheid South Africa have continued to doubt South Africa’s 
reputedly benign intentions for mutually-beneficial development, it is easy to see how 
the rest of Southern Africa would have difficulty or misgivings about South Africa’s 
regional role.  It has been argued that merely because the government of South Africa 
has changed the color of its skin is no reason to think it will change its spots.  In 
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essence, there is no reason to believe that a black government will be any less 
hegemonic than a white one (Cilliers, 1999).  With the continuing resilience and 
betrayal (domestically and externally) of some vestiges of the apartheid era, many 
African countries – especially South Africa’s neighbors - continue to look at Pretoria 
and its relationship with the region not only through the fog of their bitter past 
relationship but also very wearily.    
 
Negative perceptions of South Africa’s role in the region have also been nurtured by 
the historical patterns of interaction in the regional economy.   Essentially the main 
poles of accumulation were located in South Africa, while the economies of the other 
countries were incorporated into subaltern roles as labor reserves, providers of cheap 
and convenient resources (like water, electricity and some raw materials) and as 
‘captive markets’ for higher priced South African exports.  Keet (1993) notes that the 
deliberate structuring of labor flows from Southern Africa to South Africa, 
particularly to its mines, nurtured interdependencies between South Africa and its 
neighbors as well as dependencies of the latter on South Africa.  The effects were not 
only the development of the South African economy, but also the underdevelopment 
of its neighboring countries.  In fact, it is difficult to overstate South Africa’s 
dominant position in much of Southern Africa, whether it is with reference to 
telecommunications, transport infrastructure, the military, or its successful assertions 
of commercial suzerainty.  This pattern of regional economic interaction established 
an effective South African hegemony and created relations of acute dependency.  
Petersson (1998: 1) maintains that there has  
always been an unhealthy asymmetry between South Africa and the rest 
of the sub region in terms of population size, economic growth and 
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performance, transport, energy capacities and financial resource 
availability.  This unequal relationship has always worked in favor of 
South Africa and at the expense of its neighbors. 
  
Jaster et al (1992: 60) affirms that: 
Throughout most of the 1980s, SA’s relations with its neighbors were 
characterized by the paradox of cross-border violence and business-as-
usual contacts.   With the exception of Malawi, SA had no diplomatic ties 
with the countries of the region.   But it had trade missions in several of 
them, including rhetorically hostile Zimbabwe….   Pretoria encouraged 
the private sector to invest in and trade with its neighboring states.  Its 
motives were mixed.   The expansion of trade demonstrated goodwill and 
brought economic advantages, but it also tied the black states most closely 
to SA and provided Pretoria with a way of evading sanctions. 
 
Misperceptions at the social level also constrain the prospects for more co-operative 
intra-regional relations.  There are xenophobic strains of chauvinism and parochialism 
among South Africans capable of generating a sense of both superiority and hostility 
towards their Southern African neighbors (further explored in Chapter 4).  South 
Africa’s dominance has exacted heavy costs and its legacy is an undeniable challenge 
for any regional project that envisages cooperation and /or integration.  For example, 
the massive disparity between South Africa’s Contribution to Regional GDP and that 
of other Southern African countries in 2009 (as reflected in Annexure 1, Fig.2) is 
revealing.  It is thus not surprising that people from neighboring countries keep 
streaming in.  The South African Police Service, in its 2008/09 annual report, 
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estimated that there could be as many as six million ‘undocumented’ foreigners in the 
country (Mail and Guardian online, 13/11/2009).  However, Nelson Mandela had 
long cautioned his SADC allies that South Africa was not a gold mine or a bastion for 
employment  but was “equally beset with unemployment”(Cilliers, 1999).   Mandela’s 
remarks at the September 1997 SADC summit meeting that he chaired followed only 
two weeks after South African street vendors had attacked ‘foreign’ hawkers in 
downtown Johannesburg.  The issue of South African xenophobia which is at 
variance with the country’s prioritization of the African Agenda is explored further in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Many of the Republic’s neighbors are also highly critical of what they regard as its 
bullish economic policies, accusing South Africa of deliberately dwarfing their small 
economies (Annexure 1, Figures 1 and 3, contain comparative economic data for 
countries in the region).  Le Pere, Lambrechts and van Nieuwkerk (1999) capture the 
severe imbalance of the regional economy by alluding to South Africa’s accounting 
for three-quarters of the region's total gross domestic product and manufactured 
production.   In fact, a former Zambian Prime Minister observed that “South Africa 
would always be an elephant surrounded by chickens” (Economist, 10/03/98).   
Robert Davies (1992) describes the situation as one of negative interdependencies – to 
put it more nonchalantly, when South Africa sneezes the region catches cold.  Not 
surprisingly, South Africa’s economic dominance has created some political tensions 
with regional partners.  At a 1995 trade and investment conference at the Victoria 
Falls in Zimbabwe, speaker after speaker shook metaphorical fists at South Africa and 
urged the governments of the region to raise local tariffs in response to South Africa’s 
penetration of the region (Rotberg, 1995).  It was clear that synergetic effects based 
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on mutual neighborly exchange relations were   difficult to obtain as the strength of 
the South African economy enabled the pursuit of parasitic policies that fed off 
regional economies whilst protecting itself from those areas where it found itself at a 
competitive disadvantage.  A post apartheid South Africa is likely to remain the 
dominant force in the region, on the one hand capable of contributing in a decisive 
fashion to its security, but on the other perpetuating the existing fears of neighboring 
states about South African regional pre-eminence.  Most literature in this regard 
catalogues the asymmetrical relationship between South Africa and other states in the 
region and portrays the countries of Southern Africa as so completely dependent upon 
the South African economy that politically they are ‘hostage’ states.   The net result of 
such folly has been an underdeveloped political analysis of South Africa in Southern 
Africa.    
 
A number of post apartheid, post-Cold War scholars, such as Keet (1993), Vale 
(1991), Mills and Boulden (1997), and Bischoff (1995) have stressed that it is 
advantageous for South Africa to develop relations with her neighbors as it was 
strategically important to improve her bargaining position in the global economy: as 
part of a broader region, she would be in a stronger position to negotiate the terms of 
her integration into the international economy.   However, considering that “…the 
chaos, wars and economic failures in the continent were used by the South African 
regime to justify the maintenance of white rule in her attempt to dominate the 
continent from the South on behalf of her western allies”, there is much fear and 
hostility regarding South Africa's motives (Brittain, 1988: 4).   Similar convictions are 
explored in the work of Spence (1994), Tjonneland and Vraalsen (1996), van Aardt 
(1996) and to an extent Davies (1996).   There is a general fear that Pretoria would 
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start to relish a role as a 'regional giant' and thereby use her position to promote her 
own political, diplomatic, and economic power (Venter, 1996: 169).   Tjonnelan and 
Vraalsen claim, as do Calland and Weld (1994: 9), that South Africa's hegemonic 
status in the region, as well as Southern Africa's fear that South Africa might 
dominate sub-regional politics, have worked to restrict South Africa's ability to play a 
meaningful role in Southern Africa.   Nonetheless, Calland and Weld (1994) warn that 
this should not culminate in a complacent attitude since regional cooperation is not 
very likely to occur in the absence of overt leadership.   While it is clear that South 
Africa has the muscle to drive such regional cooperation, the new government's bid to 
redefine its approach to foreign relations has only succeeded in leaving ‘confusion’ 
amongst observers as to the direction and shape of South Africa's foreign policy 
(Alden, 1993: 63).  Critics claim that since 1994, South Africa's policy towards the 
continent has become ‘ambivalent’ and that Pretoria appears to be distancing itself 
from Africa (Vale, 1994: 83; Adedeji, 1996: 231-233; Diescho, 1996: 2; Hanekom, 
1997: 7; Gwexe, 1999: 105).  Cilliers and Malan (1996) insist that the country's 
foreign policy is 'schizophrenic' and 'lacks focus', causing the country to 'flounder and 
rapidly squander the goodwill and prestige' it enjoyed after the 1994 elections.  
Moreover, scholars such as Nkuhlu (1995: 53-54) and Mills (1997: 3) assert that 
Pretoria can ill afford to have a 'rainbow policy' or follow a policy shaped by 
'universality' due to the cost of internal restructuring. 
 
2.2.2 Post-apartheid paradox 
It is evident that most South African foreign policy scholars have viewed and 
continue to examine regional relations from the perspective of South African 
hegemony.  They have patently ignored the positive aspects of southern African 
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relations with South Africa and have instead generally perceived such ties as 
detrimental to their developmental goals.   As Poku (2001: 5) observes:  
…the region’s economic ties were evaluated in terms of how they 
strengthened the South African state.  There were no considerations given 
to how these ties might weaken the regime; equally, there was no 
consideration given to how they might strengthen other states in the 
region. 
 
However, it is interesting to note that the Southern African regional economy has 
been substantially integrated since the latter decades of the 19th century, with South 
Africa acting as the hub and main beneficiary of these economic ties.   Dan O’Meara 
(1991) expounds:   
competing European colonialisms fashioned a Southern African region 
marked by a fairly high degree of what can be called skewed integration - 
an essentially regional economy in which the central pole of accumulation 
was the mining and later the agricultural, industrial and service sectors of 
the South African economy.  All other economies in the region, except 
that of Angola, were locked into this regional economy as suppliers of 
cheap migrant labor, certain goods and services (water, energy, transport, 
etc.) to the South African economy, and as markets for its manufacturer 
and capital. 
Moreover, six of the twelve countries are landlocked, integrated physically within and 
dependent on their neighbors.   Equally, if not more fundamental are the structural 
interdependencies: even at the height of apartheid destabilization, rail, road, and air 
links were truncated but never sundered completely; historic ties were downplayed 
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but never successfully denied; and commercial ties between southern African states 
and South Africa were weakened, but never broken.  Ranging from hydro-electric 
projects such as Cahora Bassa in Mozambique, to water initiatives in Lesotho, and 
mining and natural gas projects in other countries of the region, there is a history of 
interdependence and cooperation between South Africa and the Southern African 
region.   In fact, a 2005 book by Roger Pfister, Apartheid South African and African 
States: From Pariah to Middle Power, 1961-1994, effectively details the extensive, 
secret contacts between South Africa and her neighbors during the apartheid years. 
 
While the legacy of conflict and shadow of South African dominance have tainted 
sub-regional co-operation, the fall of apartheid and the end of the Cold War have 
made conceivable an unprecedented level of cooperation on a wide range of issues.  
The South African government is cognizant of the dangers of isolating its regional 
neighborhood in an interdependent international system, where countries are easily 
affected by each other’s actions.   Patrick Lekota, a former South African Minister of 
Defense, noted that: “It is a given fact that we need to secure and stabilize our own 
country.  But we cannot do that without also participating in the stabilization of the 
region as a whole” (South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2000/01: 133).   
Nevertheless, interdependence is not the magic wand that levels the playing field in 
Southern Africa and one needs to appreciate that “interdependence does not exclude 
asymmetrical  relations of dependence” (McGowan, 2002: 5).  The Keohane and Nye, 
Jr (1989: 10 -13) distinction between two dimensions of interdependence is useful in 
this regard: 
Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy 
framework—how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes 
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in another, and how great are the costly effects? The vulnerability 
dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and 
costliness of the alternatives that various actors face….In a sense, it 
focuses on which actors can set the rules of the game. 
 
One can infer that while South Africa is sensitive to choices made in the rest of the 
region, the region is vulnerable to decisions taken in South Africa.  Countries in 
Southern Africa share what is called ‘mutual vulnerability’ (McGowan, 2002: 282).   
Although South Africa dominates the region economically, issues such as water and 
small arms proliferation have transnational consequences and give countries within 
the region some bargaining strength.    
 
Oden (2001: 91) alludes to the development of “increased South African dependency 
on resources from the rest of the region.” Obvious examples are water and 
hydropower energy.  The South African government also has a strong interest in 
increasing cooperation in order to control organized crime involving drugs, cars, and 
arms.  Issues with regional security implications such as migration, environmental 
issues, AIDS and other diseases, illustrate that the interdependence between South 
Africa and its neighbors is not as unbalanced as elsewhere.  South Africa is 
particularly dependent on neighbors for water and this vulnerability is expected to 
worsen.  It is therefore not surprising that the South African government has made 
strenuous efforts to develop cooperation in this field.  The protocol on Shared 
Watercourse Systems was the first SADC sector protocol to be agreed upon in 1994.   
Moreover, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project launched by Mbeki in March 2004, 
underlined the mutual interdependence between the two countries, thus undermining 
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deep-seated Basotho fears of South African dominance (Mda and Hammerstad, 2004: 
46). 
 
Shaw (2001: 115) points out that about a quarter of the 800 criminal syndicates 
identified by the South African Police Service as operating in South Africa has a 
regional focus.   It becomes apparent that the problems and challenges to security are, 
to varying degrees, shared by every country in the region and across national borders.  
The countries in the region are increasingly interdependent and problems and threats 
to security transcend national borders.  A coordinated response is therefore 
imperative.   Regionally, it would be in the interest of South Africa to help create the 
conditions that will accelerate less polarized economic development and a more 
democratic political environment throughout the region.  Significantly, the South 
African government has been negotiating an 'asymmetrical' free trade agreement with 
the rest of SADC - South Africa will therefore eliminate existing tariffs on imports 
from the rest of SADC much faster than the latter is required to do in return (Le Pere, 
Lambrechts and van Nieuwkerk, 1999).  There is a realization that if the whole region 
fails economically, these problems will threaten not only social order and social 
services within South Africa, but also the security of states and communities within 
the region.   Cheru (1996: 70) observes that “electrified fences, which failed to halt 
mass movements of people to the Republic under apartheid, will not in future prevent 
poverty-induced migration from countries north of the Limpopo.” It is therefore in 
South Africa’s national interest to make her relatively advanced facilities and 
resources available for the regional good such as improving border controls, 
monitoring territorial waters, and providing maritime air patrols and sea rescue 
operations.   So whilst apartheid South Africa destabilized the region to suppress the 
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internal opposition who sought refuge there, interdependencies in a post apartheid 
world necessitate that South Africa play a role in supporting the region or risk being a 
magnet to those escaping destabilization.   This reflects the paradox of South Africa’s 
relations in the region, and the shift from apartheid South Africa and weak regional 
neighbors to post-apartheid South Africa and a strong regional neighborhood. 
 
2.3 Current Assessment: Post-apartheid South African Foreign Policy Literature 
In his extensive writings on South African foreign policy, Peter Vale (1991) has 
highlighted the need for more comprehensive study on South Africa's post apartheid 
foreign policy.  The mushrooming interest and concomitant proliferation of literature 
in this field attest to the robust manner in which academics and scholars have engaged 
and continue to engage with Vale’s proposition.   In this regard one can discern three 
broad patterns of writing. 
 
The first batch of post-apartheid foreign policy writing was estimative.   Between 
1990 and 1993 scholars, notably Mills and Baynham (Changing the Guard: South 
African Foreign Policy Into the 1990s: 1990), Vale (Starting Over: Some Early 
Questions on a Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: 1990, Points of Re-entry: Prospects 
for a Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: 1992), Evans (Continuity and Change in South 
Africa’s Present and Future Foreign Policy and Myths and Realities in South Africa’s 
Future Foreign Policy: 1991), Geldenhuys (Towards a New South Africa: The 
Foreign Policy Dimension: 1991), Davies (Integration or Cooperation in a Post-
Apartheid Southern Africa: Some Reflections on an Emerging Debate: 1992), Du 
Pisani (Post-Settlement South Africa and the Future of Southern Africa: 1993) and 
McGowan (The ‘New’ South Africa: Ascent or Descent in the World System?: 1993), 
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focused on the prospects for South Africa’s future foreign policy.   However, it was 
the seminal paper South Africa's Future Foreign Policy by Nelson Mandela in 1993 in 
Foreign Affairs that gave post apartheid South African foreign policy its most 
distinctive albeit most criticized and controversial characteristic: its adherence to 
moral values such as a commitment to human rights. 
 
The second wave of foreign policy writing rode on the crest of the new dispensation 
in South Africa.   Of note were the assessments of Du Pisani (South Africa and the 
Region: 1994), Mills (From Pariah to Participant: South Africa’s Evolving Foreign 
Relations, 1990-1994: 1994), Bischoff (Democratic South Africa One Year After: 
Towards a New Foreign Policy: 1995), Davies (South African Foreign Policy Options 
in a Changing Global Context: 1995),  Carlsnaes and Muller (Change and South 
African External Relations: 1997), Landsberg (Selling South Africa: New Foreign 
Policy and Strategic Ambiguity or Ambitious Strategy? Foreign Policy Since the 1994 
Election: 1995),   Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (Mission Imperfect: Redirecting South 
Africa’s Foreign Policy: 1995), Shubin (Flinging the Doors Open: Foreign Policy of 
the New South Africa: 1995), Vale (Continuity Rather Than Change: South Africa’s 
‘New’ Foreign Policy: 1995), Evans (South Africa in Remission: The Foreign Policy 
of an Altered State: 1996) and Spence (The Debate over South Africa’s Foreign 
Policy: 1996) which centred on the evolution of South Africa’s foreign policy  from 
“a pariah to a participant” (as Mills put it) in the international system. 
 
The third genre of writing beginning in 1997 and which continues today has tended to 
institutionalize the idea of an ambiguous South African foreign policy.   Such cyclic 
evaluations of South Africa’s foreign policy provided somber reflections on the clash 
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between principle and practice.  Articles by Mills (Leaning All Over the Place? The 
Not-So-New South African Foreign Policy: 1997), Ryall (Caught Between Two 
Worlds: Understanding South Africa’s Foreign Policy Options: 1997), Solomon (In 
Search of a South African Foreign Policy: 1997), Henwood (South Africa’s Foreign 
Policy: Principles and Problems: 1997), Le Pere, Lambrechts and Van Nieuwkerk 
(The Burden of the Future: South Africa’s Foreign Policy Challenges in the New 
Millennium: 1999), Vale and Taylor (South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy 
Five Years on – From Pariah State to ‘Just Another Country’?: 1999) were overtaken 
by more comprehensive studies in the post 2000 period.   There are four noteworthy 
contributions in this regard.  Taylor’s (2001) Stuck in Middle Gear: South Africa's 
Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations zeroes in on the contradictions and ambiguities 
within South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy while Apartheid Past, 
Renaissance Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1994-2004 (Sidiropoulos ed: 
2004) as well as South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era (Adebajo et al eds: 
2007) broadly analyses some of the challenges faced by South Africa’s foreign policy.   
Despite its superfluous conclusions (in comparison to the studies of Sidiropulos and 
Adebajo et al as well as the findings of this thesis) one of the most interesting 
evaluations can be found in In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after 
Apartheid (Carlsnaes and Nel eds: 2006) which assesses the conduct of South African 
foreign policy since 1994 against the background of the six principles articulated by 
Nelson Mandela in 1993.   
 
In addition, one can also differentiate four favored areas of focus that cut across the 
three broad patterns of post-apartheid foreign policy writing.  The first and most 
prolific area of focus is with regard to South Africa’s regional foreign policy.   Post-
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apartheid writing in this field grappled with the prospect and possibilities of South 
Africa’s role in regional integration, cooperation and development.  The works by 
Davies (South Africa joining the SADCC or SADCC joining South Africa? Emerging 
Perspectives on Regional Economic Cooperation after Apartheid:1991, Integration or 
Cooperation in a post-apartheid Southern Africa: some reflections on an emerging 
debate: 1992, Approaches to regional integration in the Southern African context: 
1994), Maasdorp (Economic Prospects for South Africa in Southern Africa: 1992), 
Vale (Hoping Against Hope: The Prospects for South Africa’s Post-Apartheid 
Regional Policy: 1992), Muller (South Africa and its Regional Neighbors: Policy 
Options for Regional Cooperation: 1992, South African Regional Policy in 
Perspective: 1997), Leistner (South Africa as a Regional Economic and Political 
Power: 1995, Regional Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa, with Special Reference to 
Southern Africa: 1997), Oden (Regionalism in Southern Africa: South Africa - The 
Benevolent Hegemon?: 1995, Southern Africa Futures: Critical Factors for Regional 
Development in Southern Africa: 1996), Aly (Post-Apartheid South Africa: The 
Implications for Regional Cooperation in Africa:1997), Simon (South Africa in 
Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region: 1998) and Hentz (South Africa and the 
logic of regional co-operation: 2005) are worth mentioning in this regard. 
 
The second area of interest for post-apartheid foreign policy scholars is linked to 
regional issues and pertains to trade and investment.   What began  with assessments 
of South Africa’s economic prospects (see Leistner [Post-Apartheid South Africa’s 
Economic Ties with Neighboring Countries: 1992], Keet [International Players and 
Programmes for and Against Economic Integration in Southern Africa: 1994] and 
Kuper [Trade Issues in South Africa’s Foreign Policy in 1996:1997]), has now 
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evolved into a growing study of post-apartheid corporate expansion (see Daniel et al: 
The South Africans have arrived: Post-apartheid corporate expansion into Africa, 
2003) and a new focus on trade diplomacy (see Draper: Reconfiguring the Compass: 
South Africa's African Trade Diplomacy, 2005). 
 
The third area of interest for post-apartheid foreign policy scholars is also linked to 
regional issues but is centered on security dynamics.  RSA’s post-apartheid foreign 
policy focus on collective security and the implications for a more active role in peace 
keeping/brokering is the key tenet of the writings of Solomon and Cilliers (Southern 
Africa and the Quest for Collective Security: 1997), Cawthra (Securing South Africa’s 
Democracy: Defense, Development and Security in Transition: 1997), Neethling (The 
Defense Force and Peacekeeping: linking policy and capacity: 2004) and Hughes 
(Composers, Conductors and Players: Harmony and Discord in South African foreign 
policy making: 2004). 
 
The fourth and, arguably, the most dominant area of focus for post apartheid foreign 
policy scholars has been the preoccupation with what type of role a post apartheid 
South Africa should be playing.  The arguments for South Africa as a middle power, 
as articulated by Solomon (South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power 
Leadership: 1997, Middle Power Leadership vs.   Cooperative Leadership : Some 
Reflections on South Africa’s Foreign Policy: 1998), Le Pere (South Africa: An 
‘Emerging Power’:1998), Van der Westhuizen (South Africa’s Emergence as a 
Middle Power: 1998), and Schoeman (South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 
2000) are tied  to the post apartheid government’s affinity for multilateral initiatives 
which is well captured in Nel et al (Multilateralism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy: 
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The Search for a Critical Rationale: 2000) and Lee et al.   (The new multilateralism in 
South African Diplomacy: 2006).   However, the notion of South Africa as a hegemon 
(Habib: Hegemon or Pivot: Debating South Africa’s role in Africa, 2003), a benign 
hegemon (van Wyk: South Africa in Southern Africa: the Case for Benign Hegemony, 
1997) and as a pivot state (Landsberg: Hegemon or Pivot: debating South Africa’s 
role in Africa, 2003) have also been debated. 
 
In fact, one would argue that the number of options and alternative paths open to 
South Africa in the construction and re-construction of her relations with the rest of 
the Southern African region has been a particular obsession of post apartheid foreign 
policy writers.  Foreign policy scholars have contemplated both the possibility that 
South Africa’s economic power would render it even more interventionist and 
imperialist than its apartheid predecessor as well as the prospect of an already 
hegemonic South Africa becoming a driving partner in the region.  Whatever their 
preoccupation, there was consensus that each of these possible paths would involve 
some trade-off between potential benefits and costs.  There have been a number of 
scenario-building exercises (most notable the 1992 article by political economist Rob 
Davies) which sought to define post-apartheid South Africa’s behavior in Southern 
Africa.  The many contours of South Africa’s presence in the region can, crudely, be 
summarized into four scenarios for the country: 
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Table 2-1:Scenarios on RSA’s presence in the region  
Scenario Assessment Prognosis 
Fragmentation South Africa is the pioneer of a 
regional cooperation and integration 
project largely shaped by its own 
narrow interests and aspirations to 
regional hegemony.  Southern Africa 
represents a regional political 
economic system centred on South 
Africa with structural imbalances in 
the latter's favor.  McGowan and 
Ahwireng-Obeng (1998) posit that 
this position allows South Africa to 
behave as a regional hegemon rather 
than a mutually beneficial partner 
within Southern Africa, engendering 
possible marginalization and 
fragmentation of the region and lop-
sided regional development.   One 
could argue that this reflects the 
current ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ policy 
of asymmetrical integration under 
which Pretoria engages in African 
Renaissance rhetoric while South 
African companies pursue a 
rapacious policy of self-enrichment 
in collaboration with local elites in 
select African countries – much like 
other firms from Europe, North 
America, and Asia. 
 
While this strategy may 
have enormous short term 
benefits, its medium and 
long term value appear 
questionable given the 
resultant hostilities as well 
as the risk of undermining 
Pretoria’s regional and 
global political goals and 
ambitions.   
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Exploitation The South African state and business 
pursue narrow economic interests at 
the expense of the region.   This neo-
mercantilist path  involves South 
Africa promoting its own partisan 
interests while remaining resistant to 
the needs and demands of the rest of 
the region, and indifferent to the 
longer term implications of 
reproducing or exacerbating existing 
imbalances or inequities.   Davies, 
Keet, and Nkuhlu (1993, 61) predict 
that the main policy thrust would 
involve South Africa one-sidedly  
seeking to ‘penetrate African 
markets’ and gain access to 
profitable contracts or ventures in 
neighboring countries, while being 
resistant  or lukewarm to admitting 
additional imports from or 
addressing other concerns of the rest 
of the region. 
 
This is the least compatible 
path in creating the kind of 
regional environment 
conducive to growth and 
development in South 
Africa.   The immediate 
benefits that would accrue 
would not be sustainable in 
the long term. 
Partnership The South African state pursues a 
policy of symmetrical integration 
and partnership under which South 
Africa allows itself to integrate with 
the sub-region in a way that enables 
other states to benefit unevenly in 
the short term in the hope of mutual 
benefits for all parties over the 
longer period.  The goal here would 
be to build sub-regional capacity and 
This dovetails nicely with 
the rhetoric of current 
government officials,  
“…we address our own 
problems as part of a 
family of Southern African 
nations, our destiny 
inextricably linked by 
geography, history and our 
huge collective potential” 
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nurture an enabling political and 
economic environment for 
autochthonous transformative 
development and prosperity over the 
medium and long terms.   
 





There has been a shocking 
unwillingness among most foreign 
policy analysts to contemplate a 
fourth option of South Africa not 
playing any major role in the region.  
Given her huge domestic 
responsibilities, limited resources, 
suspicions by neighboring countries 
about intentions (intervention in 
Lesotho) and commitment (non-
intervention in Zimbabwe), it is 
plausible that South Africa could 
channel her energies elsewhere.  
South Africa could focus on its trade 
links with Europe, North America, 
and Asia but make no effort to 
engage the rest of the sub region in 
close collaborative endeavors such 
as integration schemes.   
While this may work in the 
short term, the long-term 
implications for South 
Africa would be highly 
negative and cost 
ineffective.   Cheru (1996) 
explains that a “selfish 
hegemonic relationship 
will facilitate South 
Africa’s integration into 
the world economy but will 
undermine the possibility 
of reversing the century-
old structure of dependence 
and marginalization and is 
unlikely to bring 




These four scenarios provide a useful, albeit basic, framework for examining what 
South Africa’s role in the region is, what it can be, and what it should be.  However in 
doing so, it constricts South African foreign policy analysis in a way that undercuts it 
attempts to go beyond conventional categories and assumptions about sovereign states 
and their interrelationships.  As Henry Kissinger (1994: 62), the former USA National 
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Security Advisor and Secretary of State, observed: “What no leader must ever do is 
suggest that choice has no price, or that no balance needs to be struck.” 
 
2.4.   Towards a more robust South African foreign policy literature 
South African foreign policy literature is not indigent.  The voluminous collection of 
books, articles and discussion papers in this field of study attest to this.  However, I 
would argue that it is a deceptive literary cache: quantity is no substitute for strategic 
analysis.  The literature survey on South Africa’s foreign policy supports Adam 
Habib’s assertion that “post-apartheid South Africa has not taken kindly to critical 
scrutiny.” While this in itself should be a cause for concern, perhaps even more 
worrying is what  O'Meara (1996: 26) and Williams (2000: 7) identify as a tendency 
toward ‘intellectual inertia’ in relation to foreign affairs within the ruling ANC.   
Despite the plethora of post-apartheid foreign policy literature, which one is able to 
trace back to 1990, South Africa’s foreign policy continues to best be described as 
‘ambiguous.’ The extent to which critical foreign policy studies have been able to 
influence policy formulation is minimal.  Where foreign policy has been influenced 
by particular studies, it can be traced to ‘think-tanks’ and writers that uncritically 
rationalize post-apartheid foreign policy in terms of the ruling party’s early idealist 
foreign policy objectives. 
 
The country’s commitment to regionalism and regional integration in southern Africa 
continues to be fraught with differing and contradictory interpretations.   In the words 
of Winston Churchill, foreign policy operates “… in strange paradox, decided only to 
be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-
powerful to be impotent” (cited in James, 2008: 4).   In this regard, South Africa 
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remains unable to engineer a process of transformation and development in the 
region.   
 
This thesis attempts to reinvigorate the foreign policy lassitude identified by O’Meara 
and Williams.  Its strategic value lies in the original research gathered from South 
Africa’s regional neighbors as well as its ‘Allison–model’ (a theoretical paradigm for 
understanding decision making developed by American political scientist, G.T.   
Allison) assessment of South Africa’s foreign policy making.  The insight gained 
from the interviews with policy-makers within South Africa and the region 
qualitatively supplement the existing South African foreign policy literature which 
has for long been dominated by the quantitative analysis from a motley collection of  
academic and policy institutions (almost all concentrated in Johannesburg and 
Pretoria).  The timing is equally opportune, coinciding with the fourth post-apartheid 
elections in South Africa (April 2009).  As South Africa reviews its internal values 
and priorities, there is no better time to assess how these are translated onto the 











African Renaissance or Consolidation of South African Hegemony? 
 
Robert Cox has argued (1995: 31) that “theories follow reality in the sense that they 
are shaped by the world of experience.   But they also precede the making of reality in 
that they orient the minds of those who by their actions reproduce or change that 
reality.”  In this regard, theories are useful constructs for understanding the shifting 
dynamics of international relations.  This chapter uses development and hegemonic 
stability theories as well as the middle power and pivot state paradigms to understand 
South Africa’s foreign policy vacillation between promoting the African agenda and 
consolidating South African hegemony in Southern Africa.  It deviates from 
traditional international relations theoretical frameworks such as the realism, idealism 
and globalism, which have long been the primary lenses through which South African 
foreign policy is understood.  The idea is not to dispute the relevance of these theories 
for South African foreign policy (indeed, aspects of the thesis still draw on the core 
assumptions of such theories: the discussion on Allison Models in Chapter 4 is rooted 
in realist theory while the discussions on dependency and dependent development in 
this Chapter touch on globalist thinking).   The intention is to provide an alternative, 
more nuanced theoretical understanding of   South Africa’s foreign policy dilemma in 
Southern Africa. 
 
3.1 Development Theories 
Many development theories are premised on the belief that the foreign policy of states 
is dictated by the structure of the international system.  This is supported by the 
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writings of development economists such as Myint (1954) and Myrdal (1957: 7) who 
alluded to the growing sense of political urgency concerning the promotion of 
economic development in the underdeveloped regions in order to maintain 
international stability after World War 2.  In this regard, South Africa’s post 1994 
foreign policy in Southern Africa parallels Rostow’s An American Policy in Asia 
(1955: 43), “The United States must develop a more vigorous economic policy in 
Asia.  Without such a policy our (American) political and military efforts in Asia will 
continue to have weak foundations…”  While this school of thought focuses on an 
unequal international system and links development to broader political goals such as 
stability, pluralists contend that the structure of the international system reflects an 
interconnectedness and interdependency which impels development.  A number of 
development initiatives in the Southern African region, particularly in the areas of 
transport, water and hydropower energy such as the Maputo Corridor project linking 
South Africa’s Mpumalanga province and Mozambique as well as the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Scheme between Lesotho and South Africa mirror such thinking.   
Nevertheless, the mushrooming cooperation among countries in Southern Africa has 
not been able to dispel fears over the large degree of uneven development and unequal 
relations between the supposed interdependent ‘partners.’  Dependency theory and the 
flying geese paradigm are useful explanatory tools for analyzing such a dilemma. 
 
The primary concern of dependency theory is the pattern of dominance and 
dependence that characterizes the unequal relationship between the world’s rich and 
poor nations.   If one accepts the analysis of dependency theory, then the questions of 
how poor economies develop become quite different from the traditional questions 
concerning comparative advantage, capital accumulation, and import/export 
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strategies.  The success of the advanced industrial economies does not serve as a 
model for the currently developing economies.   Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s there 
was a paradigmatic consensus that growth strategies were universally applicable, a 
consensus best articulated by Walt Rostow (1960) in his book, The Stages of 
Economic Growth.  Dependency theory suggests that the success of the richer 
countries was a highly contingent and specific episode in global economic history, 
one dominated by the highly exploitative colonial relationships of the European 
powers.  A repeat of those relationships is now highly unlikely for the developing 
countries of the world.   Dependent states, therefore, should attempt to pursue policies 
of self-reliance.  Contrary to the neo-classical models endorsed by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, greater integration into the global economy is 
not necessarily a good choice for poor countries and is perceived as an endorsement 
of autarky.  The failure of such experiments as was the case with China's Great Leap 
Forward and Tanzania's policy of Ujamaa dispute autarky as a preferred option.   
Instead it is argued that developing countries should only endorse interactions on 
terms that promise to improve the social and economic welfare of the larger citizenry.    
 
While generally directed to an analysis of the North-South nexus, dependency theory 
also reflects South Africa’s pre-1994 relationship with the region.   According to Dos 
Santos (1970), dependence is a situation in which the economy of certain countries is 
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the 
former is subjected.  Dependency theorists such as Gunder Frank (1978) maintained 
that because of the hierarchical and unequal global division of labor and the various 
political mechanisms that maintain it, including collaboration between metropolitan 
and satellite comprador elites, Southern countries could never escape 
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underdevelopment unless they cut their ties with the North and underwent 
revolutionary change internally.   Such thinking continues to shape the perceptions of 
Southern African governments which remain suspicious of South Africa’s attempts to 
play a transformative role in the region. 
 
The flying-geese economic development model also has important lessons for our 
Republic given that Japan’s role in Asia’s regional development has strong parallels 
with the role expected of South Africa in the Southern African region.   The model 
(see Akamatsu: 1962, Kitamura and Tanaka: 1997) was based on a V-shaped 
technological formation where, as ‘head of a flock of flying geese’, Japan played the 
leading role as the technology designer and delegated work to other countries in the 
region in different layers according to their level of development  (for example, the 
immediate followers behind Japan would be technologically advanced countries such 
as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore; and the next layer would be 
Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia).   Walter Hatch (1998: electronic) 
argues that “together these countries became the surrogates of Japan, building up their 
manufacturing bases in a network to support the Japanese keiretsu, an integrated web 
of finance, production, trading and services…” He attributes the economic woes in 
Asia to a breakdown in this ‘flying geese’ pattern of regional development and 
maintains that the crisis is not likely to abate as long as the region’s political 
economies rely so heavily on Japanese capital and technology.  Such correlation 
between dependency and development is very much in line with the body of literature 
that developed in the 1970s  based on the thesis that not only is dependent 
development possible and, in some countries, occurring, but that this may also lead to 
the new form of  dependency relations.   Berberoglu (1992: 26) in an argument 
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supported by the work of Cardoso and Faletto (1979) as well as Warren (1973 and 
1980), posits that:  
The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and 
between these and world trade assumes the form of dependence when 
some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-starting, 
while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection 
of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on 
their immediate development. 
 
In this regard, a South Africa that unconsciously promotes dependence rather than 
independence risks stifling development in neighboring countries which is the key to 
its long-run commitment to the region.  On the other hand, if the South African profile 
was so low that neighboring countries could neither obtain the assistance they needed 
nor rely on South African investment, it could undermine development, creating still 
more dangerous choices. 
 
Dependent development suggests that some nations are able to impose unequal 
exchanges on others and thus retard the economic development of these nations or 
make their development dependent on stronger or more economically advanced 
nations.  Theorists such as Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 22) move beyond the 
dependency theory contextualization of dependence as an external imposition to 
examine the internal social struggles which define the structure of dependent nations.   
Economic relations, including the impetus for development, are a product of the 
different class struggles to change or preserve interests (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 
14).   One could argue that the lack of significant change in South Africa’s economic 
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relations can be attributed to the dominant class preserving their interests by 
accommodating elements of the marginalized class.   This tallies with studies on the 
emergence of a ‘black’ elite in the country and as Iheduru (1996) pointed out, there 
are no guarantees that the foreign policy of a black government would be friendlier 
than its white counterparts when the interests remain the same. 
 
Although dependency theorists argue that quite often the interests of transnational 
capital can cause the ‘development of underdevelopment’, they do not see the solution 
as nations dividing economic labor and interacting as equal partners.  Warren (1973: 
4) argues that the obstacles to periphery country development are internal as the core 
countries’ policies and their overall impact on the periphery actually favor its 
industrialization.  Development in newly industrializing countries such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, Mexico and Brazil confirmed that under certain conditions capitalist 
development can be forged in the periphery.  Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 199) 
rationalize such development in terms of the accords and alliances between the state 
and business enterprises which exclude the majority.  They point out that friction 
between the state and big business are not as antagonistic as the contradictions 
between the dominant and marginalized classes.  The sections on domestic challenges 
in Chapter 4 and on post apartheid corporate expansion in Chapter 5 attest to the 
validity of such contentions.  In addition, Peter Evans (1979: 10-12) as well as 
Cardoso and Faletto (1979) insist that the new form of development is an associated 
or dependent type of capitalistic growth, which is fundamentally different from core-
country development.   In this regard, the marginalization or exclusion of the masses 
from participation in development which characterizes classic dependence 
relationships remains pervasive under dependent development as does the substantial 
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financial and technological dependence by the peripheral state.  While such arguments 
support the reservations of Southern African countries over the ability of South Africa 
to play a transformative role in the region, such static assumptions about the 
continuing validity of the centre-periphery paradigm preclude further questions about 
the forms of reciprocal influence the ‘peripheral’ economies may exert (or have 
already exerted) on the core countries as the former become relatively more powerful 
economically than they were previously.   Angola is a case in point. 
 
3.2 Theory of Hegemonic Stability 
The asymmetries which are at the centre of the core-periphery paradigm and which 
the development theories decry have always been negatively construed.  However, the 
theory of hegemonic stability goes beyond such normative arguments to appreciate 
that such asymmetries could also be utilized to provide a degree of stability.  
Theorists of 'world society' from different approaches agree on the necessity of 
hegemonic power to maintain a liberal world order.  The central tenet of such 
arguments is that the stability of the international system requires a single dominant 
state to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among members.   In this regard, 
security efforts are perceived as more likely to be successful when they are dominated 
by a preponderant power that can establish multilateral security regimes that provide 
collective goods, reduce transaction costs among members, engender trust among 
states, and check rogue state leaders.   Such cogitations are consistent with the general 
arguments of Keohane (1984) and Gilpin (1987) which posit that the presence of 
asymmetries in the distribution of material and economic capabilities among states in 
a region is often more conducive to regional stability, a product of the preponderant 
power's (or hegemon's) establishment and maintenance of international regimes to 
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coordinate interstate activity in some issue area(s).   In other words, even though the 
burden of providing the public goods will disproportionately fall on the hegemon (in 
the most extreme cases, the hegemon may assume the entire costs of the public good), 
it still is better off with the provision than without the provision of these public goods. 
 
Furthermore, Krasner (1976), Gilpin (1987), and other scholars from the realist 
tradition have identified the distribution of power among states as a central factor in 
explaining the openness and stability of the international economy.   Their arguments 
parallel that of Charles Kindleberger (1973: 305) who in the 1970s, was among the 
first to propound the theory of hegemonic stability.   The theory explicated that the 
overwhelming dominance of a country (the hegemon) ensured an open and stable 
world economy since it served to coordinate and discipline other countries so that 
they could feel secure enough to open their markets and avoid beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies.  Conversely, the theory associated the decline of a hegemon with economic 
closure, instability, and the creation of competing regional blocs.   In this regard, 
theorists were able to use Great Britain in the 19th and the United States in the 20th 
centuries to illustrate how changes in the distribution of capabilities affect the world 
economy.  During the nineteenth century, Britain’s hegemonic status sustained the 
globalization of markets, the openness of international trade and capital movements, 
the rise of multinational corporations, and the general economic and political stability 
that characterized Europe.  World War I brought an abrupt end to both British 
hegemony and the conditions that it had promoted, replacing the latter with economic 
instability and the depression.  Although the US was, at the end of World War I, the 
world's strongest economic power, it steadfastly refused to assume the leadership role 
that Britain could no longer play.  Instead, the United States closed its markets to 
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foreign goods while the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930) raised the average tax 
on imports to the United States by about 40 percent.   The unwillingness of the United 
States to coordinate its monetary and currency policies with other countries propelled 
the world economy into a downward spiral.  Learning from the negative consequences 
of such an isolationist posture, the US was quick to don the leadership mantle after the 
end of World War II by underpinning the creation of an open international trade 
system based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well as a 
stable monetary system founded on the Bretton Woods system.  Moreover, the United 
States’ Marshall Plan was a direct antithesis of the Smoot-Hawley tariff and initiated 
the conditions responsible for the steady economic growth and development 
experienced by the industrial countries up to the 1970s. 
 
However, scholars such as Robert Keohane (1989) and David Lake (1993) dispute the 
relationship between hegemony and an open, stable world economy.  While, the 
arguments advanced thus far are premised on the idea of a hegemon as a preponderant 
power, one of the difficulties of evaluating hegemonic stability theory is the absence 
of agreed criteria for measuring hegemony.  The theory was developed against a 
backdrop of a perceived decline of American hegemony and a dramatic rise in 
Japanese power.  Since the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union and the prolonged recession in Japan has forced many scholars to re-evaluate 
their estimates of hegemonic decline.  Moreover, as US behavior during the interwar 
period illustrates, the possession of superior resources by a country does not translate 
automatically into greater influence or beneficial outcomes for the world.  Such 
scholars view the role played by international institutions as mitigating why the 
distribution of power among countries is not the exclusive factor shaping the 
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international economy.  Keohane acknowledges that hegemony might be necessary 
for initiating such institutions but maintains that once begun, they take on a life of 
their own.   Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, IMF, World Bank and 
WTO provide information to states about each others' behavior, reduce the cost of 
negotiating agreements, and can expose, and sometimes even punish, violations of 
agreements by states.  The claim is that without these institutions the international 
economy - and international politics - would be much more unstable, less open, and 
more conflictual.  However such claims are debatable given the current impetus for 
reform of such institutions based on their control by a few powerful hegemons.   
 
Hegemonic stability theory emphasizes the need for hegemonic underwriting of 
cooperative efforts.  In this regard, one can argue that there is a symbiotic relationship 
between multilateral institutions and hegemons.   No institution evolves and functions 
on its own.   Institutions are driven by key actors and reflect their interests.   Such key 
actors (often with hegemonic attributes) shoulder a disproportionate  share of the 
immediate costs of maintaining the institution– from which, in a much less explicit 
and less easily quantified way, they also stand to gain the greatest benefits.   
Multilateral institutions absorb some of the responsibility for stability from 
hegemonic powers, preventing their ‘relative decline in global power’ as articulated 
by Paul Kennedy (1987).   Kennedy (1987: 438–9) contends that military over-stretch 
and a concomitant relative decline is the consistent threat facing powers whose 
ambitions and security requirements are greater than their resource base.   
 
Such arguments justify South Africa’s use of multilateral forums such as the African 
Union to promote her broad objective of peace and stability.  However, given the 
 119
Fig 3-1 AU CHALLENGES 
 
The AU Peace and Security Council is reactive 
rather than proactive: at the beginning of 2010, it 
had convened 226 sessions, all of which were 
dedicated to deliberations over existing conflicts.   
The situation is further compounded by the AU’s 
reliance on member-states for troops to enforce 
decisions, the problem of which is epitomised by 
the current situation in Somalia. 
deficiencies of the AU’s security 
architecture, it does not explain 
why South Africa does not rely on 
like-minded strategic partners 
such as Nigeria to advance broad 
continental objectives.  Gill 
(1993) affirms that in the absence 
of an obvious hegemon (as is the 
case with the African continent) states form coalitions to make up for their 
shortcomings in certain respects, implying that hegemony may be shared.  Alden and 
Veira (2005: 1080) also refer to a situation where the international community confers 
the status of regional power on a middle power to shepherd weaker states into 
acceptance of the regional pecking order.  However, caught between the international 
and regional contexts and needing both to garner legitimacy, the regional power’s 
ambivalent identity impedes its ability to consolidate its hegemony.   South Africa is a 
case in point. 
 
This brings one to the issue of legitimacy which John Ikenberry views as the primary 
gains from multilateral institutional cooperation.  In explaining why a hegemonic 
power may still seek multilateral cooperation despite uncertain returns and loss of 
autonomy, Ikenberry posits that ‘material dominance alone is unlikely to last in the 
absence of a social framework that legitimizes the power and leadership of the 
hegemon’ (Milner, 1998: electronic).  Multilateral institutions provide a potent avenue 
for such legitimacy.  Through them, hegemonic powers consent to ‘bind’ themselves 
to specified restraints in dealing with their weaker partners, in return for the latter’s 
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acceptance of their primacy (Milner, 1998: electronic).  Robert Cox (1986), in fact, 
defines international hegemony as the formation of a coalition of top-down forces 
activated by a common consciousness in which those at the bottom are able to 
participate.  International orders that ensure such ‘institutional-binding’ last longer 
and are generally more stable than those which are simply based on unilateral or 
bilateral relationships between the hegemon and the weaker states.  Wohlforth (2004: 
199) affirms: 
Legitimate hegemonies are far cheaper and safer to maintain over the long 
run than illegitimate ones.  Institutionalized hegemonies are far cheaper 
and safer to maintain than over the long run than non-institutionalized 
ones.  And hegemonic powers that find ways to accommodate the status 
drives of lesser states face fewer costs over the long run.  Aggressively 
unilateral policies undermine legitimacy, corrode institutions and heighten 
status anxieties, generating higher costs and greater instability over the 
long run. 
The difference between South Africa’s bilateral efforts in Zimbabwe and her SADC-
mandated mediation role is instructive in this regard.   It was the latter effort that was 
credited with facilitating conditions for the 2008 elections.    
 
Any serious evaluation of the role played by a hegemon or the ability of a hegemon to 
play such a role needs a deeper understanding of the source of such preponderance.   
Hedley Bull’s (1977:214) delineation of the three forms of preponderance provides a 
useful starting point:  
(i) Dominance: […] characterized by the habitual use of force by a great 
power against the lesser states comprising its hinterland […].                                                    
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(ii) Hegemony: The great power prefers to rely upon instruments other 
than the direct use or threat of force, and will employ the latter only in 
situations of extremity [..] 
 (iii) Primacy/Leadership: A great power’s preponderance in relation to a 
group of lesser states takes the form of primacy when it is achieved 
without any resort to force or the threat of force [..].The position of 
primacy or leadership which the great power enjoys is freely conceded by 
the lesser states within the group concerned [..]. 
 
Such delineation is useful in exposing the manner in which such concepts have been 
abused through interchangeable use.  Schoeman, for example, confuses the concepts 
of dominance and hegemony.  She (2002: 228) notes that “hegemons are considered 
to be ‘natural leaders’ within particular international systems, such as a region and/or 
sub-region and this position of leadership is based on their relative strength (economic 
and in some instances military) vis-à-vis other states in the same system” but  later 
argues that a “hegemon in the pejorative sense belongs more to the idea of a 
behemoth: a big and powerful state (militarily and economically) that has very little 
sense of, or shows little care for, the effect of its actions on other states (2007: 93).” In 
this regard, one could understand hegemonic stability theory as a variant of 
international relations realism, where the emphasis is placed on the role of power 
(Guzzini 1998: 142-60).  Preponderant power allows those possessing it to coerce 
those who do not, but it is becoming less and less clear wherein such power resides 
(Holsti 1977: 164-82).  Kenneth Waltz (1979: 131), for instance, refers to size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, 
political stability and competence, as “aggregate capabilities” (although he does not 
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clarify the formula for aggregation).   Michel Foucault (1980: 39), on the other hand, 
draws a clearer distinction between domination and hegemony: 
It differs from simple domination by being based on consent and 
legitimacy and thus presupposes a certain commonality of values.   A 
prospective hegemon needs to behave in a manner deemed acceptable by 
those actors whom it wishes to lead, and it has to present its own 
objectives and strategies as furthering the public good.   Such an ability to 
persuade is not so much an antithesis of power, but rather an integral 
element in power... 
 
 
Equally noteworthy is the link between hegemony and leadership that is drawn by 
Habib and Selinyane (2004: 54):  
a hegemon is a global or regional leader in military, political, economic 
and often cultural affairs.  Hegemons not only aspire to leadership, and are 
not only endowed with military, economic and other resources: they have 
a political and socio-economic vision for their transnational environments, 
and a political willingness to implement it.  If that vision is one of 
security, stability, and development, as is often the case, then the hegemon 
will underwrite the implementation of those goals.  Again, that does not 
mean that a hegemon does not have partners in this enterprise.  It often 
does, but it takes responsibility for ensuring that the contents of its vision 
are given concrete form in the region it sees as its sphere of influence. 
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A hegemonic status can also constrain the hegemon, as it cannot afford (to be seen to) 
behave too selfishly, but must show concern for the common good, or at least appear 
to be doing so.   In essence, one can conclude that to be a hegemon, a state must have 
three attributes:  
(i) Capability to enforce the rules of the system based on a large growing 
economy, dominance in a leading technological or economic sector and 
political power reinforced by projective military power.    
(ii) Will to do so based on commitment to a mutually beneficial system. 
(iii) Ideology acceptable to others in the system. 
Janis van der Westhuizen (2010: 20) affirms that “effective hegemony requires 
consent among weaker states – or their elites – constructed around the norms 
and ideas espoused by the leading regional power and expressed in collectively 
based institutions.” 
 
Evaluating South Africa’s hegemonic potential against such criteria shows that the 
country possesses palpable capability, schizophrenic commitment and will to act but 
lacks the all important acceptance by others in the system.  A quick survey of the 
latest statistics allows one to gauge South Africa’s economic and military strength in 
relation to the rest of the region (see annexure 1).  Its ability to enforce the rule of the 
system is undeniable.  In terms of commitment to a mutually beneficial system, the 
post apartheid South African government has worked tirelessly in the building of 
institutions for regional and continental integration as well as in representing regional 
and continental interests on the world stage.  President Mbeki has played a leading 
role in lobbying for NEPAD to the G8, the EU, and the UN.  South Africa has also 
used its position in the UNCTAD, NAM, and the international finance institutions to 
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advance third world and African concerns over the international political and 
economic order.  However, this commitment has on occasion been displaced by 
national interest  as seen in its rejection of demands for reparations for slavery, 
colonialism and apartheid at the World Conference Against Racism in 2001; and in 
breaking ranks with the Third World against the 'Washington Consensus' at the UN 
Conference on Development Finance in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002.  Perhaps the 
most tangible example is the tension felt between Zimbabwe and South Africa over 
the latter’s use of its economic muscle in trade negotiations – a tension which was all-
too-often portrayed as a simple personality clash between Robert Mugabe and Nelson 
Mandela.  Currently, there have even been perceptions of rivalry between South 
Africa and Angola, which is seen as harboring strong regional ambitions of its own.   
South Africa’s wavering commitment underscores the concerns of the Southern 
African region that a hegemonic South Africa would use its role to further narrow 
national interests.   However, Habib (2003) points out that “…as the US relations with 
Western Europe in the post World War II period indicate, national interests of 
hegemons can under certain circumstances coincide with those of particular regions.”  
In this regard, Habib (2003: electronic) argues that “…a hegemonic role has to be 
undertaken by South Africa if we are committed to the realization of stability, 
security, and development in South Africa, in Southern Africa, and in Africa.   
Lesotho is the example we need to learn from.  Zimbabwe is the example to avoid.” 
One could counter that the examples used by Habib in fact justify South Africa’s 
reluctance to assume a hegemonic leadership role: The country was heavily criticized 
for the Lesotho intervention while its quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe was more 
productive in engaging the Mugabe government than the confrontational position 
adopted by Britain.  Although South Africa’s quiet diplomacy was slated as 
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ineffective, it allowed the country the space within which to engage Zimbabwe right 
until the signing of the Global Political Agreement in 2008.  The South African 
President, Jacob Zuma (in a 2008 interview with Patrick Smith: 23) affirmed that: 
People who have criticized South Africa have done nothing – they can’t 
say they have done anything that has succeeded…We needed to engage 
the Zimbabweans on both sides; it would not have been prudent to 
criticize them.   How would we have engaged them on both sides if we did 
so… 
 
Nevertheless, the post-apartheid South African government has slowly and painfully 
learnt that the country’s preparedness to drive the regional agenda clashes with the 
region’s willingness to have South Africa play this role.  The central paradox of 
leadership – that it requires followership – explains why, however desirable it might 
appear for South Africa to undertake the responsibilities of a regional leader, it cannot 
and dare not do so.  One has to draw a distinction between hegemony (the capacity of 
a powerful state to dictate policies to other states) and leadership (the capacity to 
engage less powerful states so that they adopt the goals of the leading state as their 
own).  While South Africa’s status in the region is often described as ‘hegemonic,’ 
this has not enabled the country to deliver on its Southern Africa vision.  Marais 
(1998) observes that South Africa’s hegemony is literally true to the extent that the 
country economically dominates much of the region, but in the Gramscian (Gramsci 
1971: 323-77) sense of the term -- that of winning the active consent of other actors – 
South Africa dominates, but neither controls nor enjoys hegemony in the region - a 
state of affairs that inhibits its ability to drive regional development initiatives.   One 
could even argue that South Africa is more a primus entre pares than a leader in the 
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region.   Indeed, traditional attributes of power such as economic and military strength 
are necessary but not sufficient to become a hegemon.  Although these aspects of 
power undoubtedly contribute to the creation of hegemony, sufficiency would seem to 
lie in the acceptance of the hegemon’s goals, objectives, rules and values.   Unless the 
‘hegemon’ is accepted as such within its sphere of influence, it is doubtful that its 
strategies and tactics of achieving its goals will be successful.   Evans and Newnham 
(1998: 221) put this well when they stress that “a hegemon’s ability to lead is derived 
as much from what it stands for as from how it seeks to achieve its goals.” In this 
regard, the ‘appearance’ of being a hegemon is often wrongly associated with a state’s 
ability to necessarily act as a hegemon.  Once again, the furor over South Africa’s 
policy towards Zimbabwe is instructive.  South Africa’s perceived failure to take 
more decisive action against the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe has been criticized 
severely by both domestic and international observers.   Alden and Schoeman (2004: 
electronic) rightly conclude that ‘obvious hegemony’ (being a much more powerful 
country than Zimbabwe in terms of tangible indices such as military strength and 
economic power) does not mean ‘genuine’ hegemony and that unless the dominant 
country’s values are acceptable, it cannot exert its influence on weaker neighbors.   
This was also reflected in South Africa’s inability in 1995 to convince the SADC 
Summit (which it had called for) to take collective action against Nigeria, following 
the brutal hanging of Nigerian activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight of his Ogoni  
campaigners by the Abacha regime.   Adebajo (2006: electronic) points out that even 
the then President, Nelson Mandela’s, “iconic status failed to rally a single southern 
African state to take action against Nigeria.” Notably, it was Pretoria that was accused 
by many African leaders of becoming “a western Trojan horse sowing seeds of 
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division in Africa and undermining African solidarity” (Adebajo, 2006: electronic).   
Adebajo contends that  
It is probably not an exaggeration to say that this single incident greatly 
influenced Mbeki’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe.   
African efforts to depict Pretoria as a western stooge over Nigeria were a 
painful experience that Pretoria was determined never to repeat. 
 
There are other alternatives.  However, in seeking to be politically correct, policy 
makers have eschewed the hegemonic possibilities as envisaged by scholars such as 
Ikenberry (discussed above).  Habib (2003: electronic) draws on the 1992 article by 
Rob Davies (which maps three scenarios of South Africa’s role in the region: a South 
Africa first approach, an integration under South African hegemony, and a non-
hegemonic and regional cooperation approach) as well as a two-part article by 
McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (which rationalizes South Africa’s option as 
between hegemony and partnership) to highlight the common assumptions that 
hegemony and partnership are mutually exclusive options, with the latter often being 
romanticized.   He astutely observes that “any careful study of hegemonic behavior, in 
both global and regional contexts, would demonstrate that partnership is as much a 
modality of engagement as other, more aggressive interventions” (Habib, 2003: 
electronic).  Nevertheless, Habib and Selinyane (2006: 175-194) emphasize that South 
Africa’s aggregate capabilities in terms of economic, diplomatic and military 
capacities, in relation to other African nations, automatically defined it, at least for 
now, as a regional power or hegemon.   This status imparted to it a set of privileges, 
obligations and responsibilities that separate it both from its African counterparts and 
other middle powers.  Just as importantly, it progressively defined South Africa's 
 128
foreign policy agenda and practice.  One could concur that as a benign hegemon, 
South Africa could sustain equitable regional development on the condition that 
regional actors are prepared to voluntarily accept South Africa's leadership.   The 
long-term dividend could be mutually beneficial regional partnership leading to 
sustained development. 
 
However, one could also argue that Habib’s vision is based on a gross caricature of 
South Africa’s abilities.  Any hegemonic-driven regional system will be shaped not 
only by South Africa’s posture but also by other regional members.   An issue paper 
produced by the Inter Africa Group and Justice Africa schematizes four different 
responses to hegemony:                                                                                                                         
1.   Smaller states may seek to contain the hegemon within a wider 
system, thus diluting its power and obliging it to act according to a set of 
wider rules.  The dominant power thus becomes the core of the regional 
system.  (One could argue that this explains the current status of South 
Africa in Southern Africa, particularly with regard to SADC.)                                
   
 2.  Smaller states may align with a dominant power in order to obtain 
some of the benefits of its hegemonic status, including security protection 
and/or economic band-wagoning.  (Lesotho’s relationship with South 
Africa is a case in point.)            
                                                                                                       
 3.  The dominant power may itself see a wider coalition as a means of 
sharing the burden of its role, distributing the economic, military and 
diplomatic costs among other members of the community.  (South 
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Africa’s support for multilateral rather than unilateral peace initiatives is 
indicative of such thinking.)          
                                                                 
 4.  Smaller states may mobilize an alliance to provide a counter-force to 
the hegemonic threat.  In this case the dominant power is outside the 
regional system. (The Southern African response to apartheid South 
Africa is a prime example.) 
 
In essence, hegemony does not translate into unbridled power.  States in a system may 
acquiesce to or resist a hegemon, depending on the form and nature of that hegemony 
as well as their own interests.  For example, South Africa’s diplomacy in the DRC 
was undermined by Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola which sent troops to the country 
in 1998.   Moreover, Adebajo (2006: electronic) contends that with states such as 
Angola and Zimbabwe harboring their own regional leadership aspirations, South 
Africa will be unable to assert leadership effectively in Southern Africa.  He attributes 
South Africa’s need for alliances outside its own sub-region (such as that with 
Nigeria) to the failure of its regional leadership ambitions. 
 
3.3 Of Pivot States, Middle and Emerging Powers 
Hegemonic stability models preclude preponderant powers from leading roles other 
than a hegemon.  In this regard, an alternative model, one that has been relatively 
unexplored in theoretical musings, is that of a pivot state (what the Germans refer to 
as ‘anchor’ states).  According to Landsberg (2003: electronic),  
A pivot state is one that in comparison to its neighbors is, ipso facto, a 
powerful state.  From such relative powerfulness flows the capability to 
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influence other states, events and regions.   The pivot state is influential in 
a region because internal developments in such states or lack thereof, are 
so significant that it typically holds major implications for states in its 
immediate region. 
 
It differs from a hegemon in the sense that “while a regional hegemon is a powerful 
state that sees itself as capable of laying the law down to others through its 
dominance, the pivot state is one that acts in the regional interest in collaboration with 
others” (Landsberg, 2003: electronic).  In this regard, Landsberg falls into the trap 
identified by Habib, where hegemonic leadership is perceived as excluding 
collaborative work and partnership-building.  Such consideration leads one to the 
realization that in its broad conceptualization, there is not much difference between 
Habib’s hegemonic leadership and Landsbergis pivot state.  Habib and Selinyane 
(2004: 54) even suggest that every hegemon is a pivot state but needs to be more.  A 
more nuanced analysis shows that the key difference between a hegemonic and pivot 
state is the latter’s inherent vulnerability.   Landsberg (2003: electronic) notes that:  
the pivot state is delicately poised between potential success and possible 
failure: it has the potential to work a significant beneficial or harmful 
effect on its region.  While such a state might be stronger and more 
developed vis-à-vis others, it also suffers from its own significant socio-
economic challenges, such as deep inequalities and massive levels of 
poverty. 
It is such internal impediments which inform the pivot state’s reluctance to assume 
the leadership role that is so critical for a hegemon.   In this regard, the pivot state 
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paradigm is most useful in explaining South Africa’s preference for multilateral 
action rather than a unilateral exercise of its power. 
 
However, as noted earlier, the concept of pivot state has been relatively unexplored.   
This is not surprising given the extensive literature on middle and emerging powers 
(Spence, 2004: 42-45; Cooper et.al, 1993: 402; Habib and Selinyane, 2004: 51) which 
is grounded on similar conceptual underpinnings: 
 
Table 3-1: Differentiating between Middle and Emerging Powers 
Middle Power Emerging Power 
eg.   Canada, Norway, and Sweden, eg.   India and Brazil. 
 
Economically well developed and 
democratic states whose governments 
aspire to a role in international politics. 
Reasonably secure stable domestic base, 
military capability and sizeable economic 
capability with sufficient resources to 
deliver on goals. 
 
Use their standing as good citizens to 
influence outcomes in areas such as the 
protection and assertion of human rights; 
peacekeeping; mediation.  For example, 
Norway and the Oslo Accords. 
 
Usually have a moral dimension to their 
foreign policy which strikes a positive 
chord with their electorate.   For example, 
Sweden's anti-apartheid record.    
 
Middle-powers rely on multilateralism 
and networking to advance a vast array of 
Have proactive, assertive foreign policies 
that sanction a leading role in initiatives. 
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common issues where they believe they 
cannot act alone effectively, but may be 
able to have a systemic impact as part of 
a small group or through international 
institutions. 
 
Do not necessarily seek to be regional 
hegemons or to exert influence on a 
global scale or to transform the global 
political system.   
 
They focus on particular issues, choosing 
appropriate arenas where their 
intervention can make a difference, or 
support the initiatives of likeminded 
colleagues.    
 
They do not pursue over-ambitious goals.  





They seek an effective and constructive 
regional role, and possibly, in some 
instances a global one.   
 
 
Aspire to be great powers.    
 
  
Often plays the role of catalyst in 
providing intellectual and political energy  
to trigger initiatives and build coalitions 
as well as facilitator in developing 
agendas for action, cementing coalitions 
to leverage power, planning, convening 
formative meetings and setting priorities 
 
 
Role is more managerial, assumes the 
lead in building institutions and 
undertaking initiatives. 
 
Traditional middle powers of the Cold 
War chose the global arena as their plane 
of action and were not regional powers. 
Emerging powers are regional and they 
shoulder responsibility for stability and 




Scholars such as Schoeman (2003) maintain that South Africa may not meet all the 
criteria of being an emerging power.  They posit that the internal dynamics in the 
country are not stable, and there is no indication of willingness and a capacity to take 
on the role of an emerging power.   Furthermore, South Africa’s lack of credibility as 
a leader in the region contrasts with an emerging power’s acceptability to its 
neighbors.   South Africa’s inability to assume the mantle of emerging power has also 
often been rationalized in terms of the country’s broader geopolitical status.   Chase et 
al (1996, 44-46) argue that: 
in global geopolitical terms, South Africa is a rather small country.  For 
example, its total GDP is about the same size as Ford Motor Company’s 
global sales.   It has variously been labeled as insignificant, at worst and 
as a middle power or pivotal state, at best. 
 
Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2002, 254-255) concur that while South Africa 
dominates the Southern African region economically, in global terms it is a middle-
income economy which maintains a medium human development ranking on the UN 
Development Programme’s index, placing it below Cuba and next to the Dominican 
Republic and Sri Lanka.  McGowan (1993, 37) affirms that South Africa is semi-
peripheral in the world system but, because of its regional dominance, is often 
compared to Mexico and Brazil in Central and South America, Indonesia and 
Malaysia in Southeast Asia, and Israel and Iran in the Middle East.  Thomas Scott 
(cited in Marais, 1998) goes even further by describing the country as “a pedestrian 
middle income developing country which does not add up to a great deal in global 
economic league tables.”  Annexure 2 which provides a comparative perspective of 
BRIC/IBSA countries’ Foreign Direct Investment Outflows and Inflows is instructive 
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in this regard.  The evidence advanced decry the possibility of South Africa being an 
emerging power and instead allude to its suitability as a middle power. 
 
Robert Cox (1989:827) notes that middle powers are to be found in the middle rank of 
capabilities, both military and economic, and they seek to bolster international 
institutions for co-operative management of common problems.  In this regard, there 
is a close affinity between middle powers and multilateralism.  Essentially, the 
concept of middle-power diplomacy provides a central role to multilateral institutions 
(see Cooper et al, 1993: 19; Nel et al, 2001).   It is an anti-hegemonic approach to the 
conduct of international relations and focuses on a collaborative instead of a 
competitive world.  Keohane (1969: 296) affirms that “a middle power is a state 
whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a 
systematic impact in a small group or through an international institution.” South 
Africa’s involvement in multilateral diplomacy is therefore a function of its realistic 
assessment of its limited power resources, but also its desire to contribute to a 
collaborative world order.  Interestingly, it was precisely in this area that the pre-1994 
apartheid regime was weakest: having withdrawn from the Commonwealth in 1960, 
and having been prevented from occupying South Africa's seat in the UN General 
Assembly and most specialized agencies of the UN from 1974, the South African 
state was unable to impact on the majority of global (and even regional) issues for 
over 20 years. 
 
Multilateral diplomacy has since become the biggest growth industry in South 
Africa’s foreign policy.  A former South African Director-General (DG) of Foreign 
Affairs, Jackie Selebi, noted in 1999 that “South Africa attaches immeasurable 
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significance to its multilateral engagements.  Indeed, multilateralism is the corner-
stone of this country’s foreign policy” (cited in Nel et al, 2001: 1).   Since 1994 South 
Africa has joined, re-joined, or acceded to some forty-five inter-governmental 
organizations and multilateral treaties (see Van Der Westhuizen: 1998; Nel, et al: 
2001; Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk: 2002; www.gov.za).   In addition, the country 
accepted a wide range of multilateral leadership responsibilities at a global, 
continental and sub-regional level.  The most notable of these leadership positions are 
the Chair of the Southern African Development Community from 1995 to 1999, the 
Presidency of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development between 
1996 and 1999, the Chair of the Non-aligned movement from 1998 to1999, and the 
Chair of the Commonwealth, 1999-2002.  South Africa has also chaired the Oslo 
Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines; 
the 1998 Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights; as well as accepted 
election to the Executive Boards of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).   Furthermore, in 
1999 South Africa was also appointed to the G20, a multilateral body of eighteen 
finance ministers and central bank governors of leading countries of the world, the EU 
and the Bretton Woods institutions, created by the G7 most industrialized nations.   
The country  has also played a key role in a number of multilateral initiatives such as 
the re-negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, the multilateral 
ban on the production, stockpiling and distribution of anti-personnel landmines 
(1997), and the signing of the Rome Statute in 1998 which created the first-ever 
International Criminal Court.  In addition, South Africa’s name has consistently 
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appeared on the Secretary-General’s ‘Roll of Honor’ of countries that pay their dues 
timeously.  South Africa’s assessed contribution to the regular budget of the UN for 
2010 was US$ 8, 141, 212 or 0,385% of the total budget 
(http://pfcmc.com/en/ga/contributions/honourroll.shtml). 
 
Nel, Taylor, and van der Westhuizen (2001: 5) aptly summarize South Africa’s 
multilateralism as characterized by: 
• high levels of activism in multilateral institutions in general, an 
increasing use of such institutions to achieve broader foreign policy 
goals, and an endorsement of multilateralism in general as a preferable  
institutional form in global interaction; 
• attempts to revive or further strengthen existing multilateral 
institutions, both on the continent of Africa and globally, that are 
supposed to look after the interests of the developing countries;  and 
• concerted efforts to institute some changes in the way institutions of 
global governance deal with and handle the concerns  of the 
developing countries, and to off-set, in particular, the marginalization 
of Africa. 
 
At the ministerial meeting of the Co-coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-
Aligned Countries in Colombia, the former South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Alfred Nzo,  committed South Africa to “...   a global system of social security that is 
created and operated through the vehicle of multilateralism” (cited in Cilliers, 1999: 
electronic).  This sentiment was echoed most notably by President Mbeki in his 
budget address to the National Assembly on 13 June 2000, when he justified South 
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Africa’s engagement in multilateral affairs (which he termed global governance) as 
being the main contribution that the country could make to off-setting the negative 
impact of globalization on the poorer nations of the world.   As chair of the G-20 of 
Finance Ministers, South Africa has played an increasingly important role in 
shaping the political discourse and policy discussion on reform of the 
Bretton Woods institutions — the World Bank and the IMF — as well as 
improving the institutional underpinnings  of the global financial 
governance architecture.   In addition to its active participation in such multilateral 
bodies, South Africa has committed itself to the reform of the UN and to the 
possibilities of South-South cooperation in the framework of the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for Regional Cooperation and the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the 
South Atlantic.   In a speech about multilateralism in South Africa’s foreign policy, 
Mr Jackie Selebi noted that: 
It is a known fact that multilateralism allows for gains to be equitably 
shared amongst all in the world, whilst also equitably spreading the risk 
associated with it.  It empowers the weak, whilst constraining the 
untrammeled ambitions of the powerful and greedy (Nel et al, 2001: 12). 
 
In this regard, promoting the developmental agenda of the South has been a key 
element in President Mbeki’s participation in a number of meetings such as the OAU-
EU Summit in Egypt, the meeting of the Nordic Prime Ministers in Denmark, the G-
77 Conference in Cuba, the Berlin meeting on Progressive Government in the 
Twenty-First Century, the EU Summit in Portugal, the G-8 Summit in Tokyo and the 
UN Millennium Summit in New York.  Commenting on President Thabo Mbeki’s 
emerging role at the end of his first year in office,  a journalist, Howard Barrell, 
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claimed that “as a result of his recent interventions, Mbeki has emerged over the past 
six months (January – June 2000) as the developing countries’ single most important 
voice in the world economy” (Van der Westhuizen et al, 2001: 111). 
 
Black (1997: 1) notes that middle power leadership is often based on implicit or 
explicit assumptions of moral superiority.   In this regard, RSA qualifies as a middle 
power because of the 'moral thrust' of its foreign policy, with its emphasis on Third 
world economic and social deprivation.  However, a critical examination of middle 
power foreign policies, including South Africa, often contradicts these assumptions of 
occupying the moral high ground.   For example, reluctance on the part of middle 
powers to take a stance in a conflict situation (while sometimes related to their 
national role conceptions of mediator) has often led to the charge of ‘fence-sitting’ 
leveled against them.  Cooper et al (1993: 17) effectively illustrate this moral 
relativism of middle powers by comparing Australian and Canadian rhetoric on 
Kuwait's sovereignty in the Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 with their silence on 
Indonesia's invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975.   South Africa is viewed 
in a similar light.  The examples provided illustrate the danger of conceptualizing 
middle powers in benign terms and in equating their national interests with the 
general interest.  Instead, such examples confirm that national self-interest and 
realpolitik concerns still largely influence the foreign policies of middle powers.   
While middle powers seem to be committed to collective interests, at least at the 
rhetorical level where such interests conflict with the national interest, it is the latter 
which prevails (see Solomon, 1997).   Cox (1989) and Black (1997) agree that middle 
powers are not simply middle powers because of their participation in mediation or 
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cooperation but because it suits their long term interest vis-a-vis world order, the 
world economy, and the pursuit of dominant societal values and interests. 
 
 Van der Westhuizen et al (2001: 116) observe that whilst Pretoria has been a 
foremost proponent of a system of global governance that would be more 
accommodating towards the interests of the South, its (albeit reserved) support for 
trade liberalization serves to strengthen its own hand in Southern Africa as well as the 
rest of the continent.   In addition, Naidu (2004: 217) alludes to the perceptions that 
South Africa's role in multilateral forums like the WTO, G8, Bretton Woods 
institutions, and even within continental initiatives like NEPAD is based on a sub-
imperial agenda: “South African authorities are negotiating to further their country's 
national agenda and to advance market access for their corporates into Africa and the 
developed markets, with little concern for their neighbors and the continent”.   
Furthermore, Keet (2003:12) argues that: 
it is...not lost on other African countries that South Africa - with its banks, 
private companies, and even parastatal corporations keenly looking for 
investment opportunities in Africa and elsewhere - has its own 'national 
interests' in promoting the kind of  'global rights' of corporations in all 
countries and (almost all)sectors that an investment agreement in the 
WTO is aimed at.    
 
In this regard the dilemma that South Africa faces in its multilateral engagement is 
very similar to the quandary facing another middle power, Australia: John McKay 
(2004: 401) uses the issue of Australian solidarity with the USA war on terrorism to 
show the disjuncture between the government position that it is ‘punching above its 
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weight’ in the international arena and the broader perception that Australia is in fact 
‘shooting itself in the foot’ by destroying many of the key regional relationships that 
have been carefully nurtured over several decades.   In essence, South Africa’s middle 
power status proves just as contentious as that of emerging power or hegemon as the 
country’s multilateral diplomacy could easily be perceived as maintaining a 
fundamentally flawed global order instead of contributing to its transformation.   This 
reinforces the perception of South Africa as a selfish hegemon, maintaining a system 
that advantages it.   
 
3.4 Discourse Theory 
The analysis of hegemonic, middle power, emerging power and pivot state statuses 
illustrate that states may have many different social identities which can be 
cooperative or conflictual, and that state interests vary accordingly.   Adler (1997) and 
Wendt (1999) are both proponents of such thinking which advocates that the 
international system consists of social relationships as well as material capabilities.   
In this regard, the identities and interests of states are tied to how states relate to one 
another.   Collins (1986: 6-8) points out that: 
When social actors acquire resources, they seek to convert them into 
something that has more value to them than the mere possession of 
material things: social status.  When this conversion process is blocked, 
the tension builds and status hierarchies become unstable. 
 
This provides useful insight into the South Africa-Southern African relationship and 
the inability of South Africa to successfully implement her transformative 
development agenda.  Turner (1988) uses the term ‘status dissonance’ to describe 
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such a situation where the inability of actors to sort out their rank in a prestige 
hierarchy is due to the fact that on some dimension of status they are peers but not on 
others.    
 
In essence, this is the importance of discourse theory to the study being undertaken: 
such issues of status, identity formation, and the structuring of societies by a plurality 
of social imaginaries are central objects of investigation of discourse theory.   
According to Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 6), “discourse theorists are not just 
concerned with the way in which social actors understand their particular worlds, but 
attention is focused more on the creation, disruption and transformation of the 
structures that organize social life.” The construction and experience of social 
antagonisms are central for political discourse theory.  As Howarth and Stavrakakis 
(2000: 4) put it, “antagonisms show the points where identity is no longer fixed in a 
differential system, but is contested by forces which stand outside or at the very limit 
of that order.” Social antagonisms occur because social agents are unable to achieve 
fully their identity.   This,  it could be argued is at the root of South Africa’s inability 
to find a niche for herself in the Southern African region which in turn has inhibited 
her ability to promote transformative development in the region. 
 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) attribute the failure to fully achieve one’s identity to 
‘dislocation events’ which on the one hand threaten identities and on the other, are the 
foundation on which new identities are constituted.   In other words, as Howarth and 
Stavrakakis (2000: 13) observe, “if dislocations disturb identities and discourses, they 
also create a lack at the level of meaning that stimulates new discursive constructions, 
which attempt to ‘fix’ the dislocated structure.” Chapter 5 of this thesis explains how 
 142
the dislocatory effects of the external environment along with post-apartheid internal 
dynamics provoked a temporal suspension of South Africa as a selfish hegemon in 
Southern Africa (the dominant discourse during apartheid).  Both these factors 
brought the limitations of the dominant discourse to the surface, allowing a space for 
the search for alternatives.   The lack of consolidation of other new forms of political 
identification such as partner is attributed to the inability of Southern African 
countries to alter their perceptions of South Africa (Chapter 4), a situation that is not 
helped by the self-seeking activities of South African corporates in the region.   To an 
extent, the discrepancy between South African pronouncements (very reconciliatory 
with regard to regional relations) and practice (with regard to economic and domestic 
interests) accounts for the transitory nature of post-apartheid South Africa’s identity 
discourse.  Moreover, in the absence of a viable post-apartheid identity, South Africa 
was unable to sell its vision of transformative development to a region that was still 
suspicious of its intentions. 
 
Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 9) also contend that discourses and the identities 
produced through them are inherently political entities that involve the construction of 
antagonisms and the exercise of power.  This is particularly true for the study being 
undertaken in this thesis which illustrates that identity plays a significant role in how 
South Africa is perceived by the region and how the region is perceived by South 
Africa.   During the apartheid years, the region drew an antagonistic shield by which 
the minority white government in South Africa was radically excluded from the 
domain of the legitimate.  The side beyond the shield was more and more discursively 
constructed as a source of domination and exploitation fuelling a regional identity 
molded by resentment and resistance.  The period that marked the end of the Cold 
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War and the dismantling of apartheid constituted a ‘dislocation’ opportunity for the 
region’s antagonistic shield to be removed and for South Africa to forge a new more 
affable identity.  Discourse theorists regard new identities as important elements in 
terms of establishing (or not) equivalent chains with other groups or organizations.   
The equivalential identities created, express a clear negation of a discourse system 
(the existing discourse system in this case being apartheid).  In this regard, discourse 
theorists also highlight the role of leaders and political entrepreneurs who, during the 
dislocation moments, are identified to build new identities and equivalential chains 
between antagonistic groups.  One could argue that the discourse on the African 
Renaissance, as articulated and promoted by Mbeki, represented such an attempt to 
craft a new post-apartheid identity that linked South Africa more closely with its 
neighbors and the rest of the African continent (as opposed to apartheid which was 
isolationist in nature).  It was the ambiguities of this and other initiatives (such as 
NEPAD) coupled with domestic challenges (as captured in Chapter 4) which 
prevented a more conciliatory South African identity from taking root and forming an 
‘equivalential chain’ with the region.  In fact, many countries in Southern Africa 
remain suspicious of what they perceive as old apartheid dominance clothed in new 
post-apartheid rhetoric.  This clearly constitutes a failure by the South African state to 
unequivocally negate (or convince its regional neighbors that it has negated) the old 
discourse which shaped its regional relations.  Herein lies the current challenge facing 
South Africa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa. 
 
However, one could also argue that political discourse theory as an alternative 
approach to understanding the structuration of socio-political spaces provides South 
African policy makers with a means to address this challenge.   According to Howarth 
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and Stavrakakis (2000), the articulation of a political discourse can only take place 
around an empty signifier that functions as a nodal point: “nodal points are those 
privileged signifiers or reference points through which the rest of the elements of a 
discourse acquire their meaning.” In this regard, it is the contention of this study that 
the building of a sustainable ‘equivalential chain’ that links South Africa to Southern 
Africa rests on the promotion of transformative development as an ‘empty signifier’ 


















 Beyond the rose-tinted glass: Constraints in cultivating a more efficacious 
Southern Africa foreign policy 
 
Undoubtedly, efforts to reconfigure South Africa’s foreign policy towards Southern 
Africa in the post apartheid period has brought with it exciting possibilities as well as 
serious problems and challenges. Increasingly, foreign policy analysts and 
government officials alike have called for the country to take a leadership role in 
Southern Africa — to move beyond the consultation and consensus-seeking patterns 
of engagement that have stymied progress in the region thus far.  Yet, there are clear 
limits to the ability of South Africa to impact upon the region.  One could argue that 
South Africa’s potential leadership of the region is condemned by its unhappy past.   
The idea that ‘what is good for South Africa is good for Southern Africa’ revisits a 
series of uncomfortable historical encounters between the country and the region.   
Herbst (1995: 148) cautions against the assumption that the ANC regime has a ready 
largesse for SADC and Africa, since this is based on the familiar cliché that the old 
South Africa was destabilizing and the new South Africa will therefore be an 
unmitigated good.    
 
The country’s residual power, particularly its economic muscle and military strength, 
skew (not balance) the prospects of sustainable and equitable development in southern 
Africa.  Given its dominant economic, political and military positions, South Africa 
has often been expected to take a regional policy lead in Southern Africa, but in turn 
has been singled out for criticism over its perceived hegemony.  Mills (1994) aptly 
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sums up South Africa’s dilemma regarding any regional action as “a case of damned 
if it does and damned if it doesn't.” South Africa’s response to the Zimbabwe crisis is 
a fitting reflection of this ‘lose-lose situation.’ While the Republic has been lambasted 
for not doing enough, a decisive military intervention (even if SADC-mandated as in 
Lesotho in 1998) would have been criticized as an exercise of bully-boy tactics.   
Such contradictions hint at the unrealistic hopes and ambivalent expectations on 
South Africa’s revamped foreign policy.    
 
Despite South Africa’s newly avowed commitment to the sub-region, the reality on 
the ground remains that of lingering reservations or hostilities about the actual South 
African objectives and intentions in Southern Africa.  As has been illustrated, despite 
scholarly analyses to the contrary, the fear and antagonism toward South Africa 
continues to be driven by justifiable concerns about the latter’s predatory policies and 
perceived lack of tangible commitment to collective sub-regional agreements.  For 
example, South Africa’s SADC-mandated mediation in Zimbabwe was undermined 
by the unilateral action of President Mbeki: his announcement at a press conference 
that there was ‘no crisis in Zimbabwe’ (captured in most newspapers, for example see 
telegraph.co.uk as well as Harper and Mkhabela, 2008) was premature and preceded 
his meeting with the SADC Chair who publicly averred otherwise.   The then-chair of 
SADC, the now late President Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia openly criticized Mbeki 
for not briefing him on his meeting with Robert Mugabe and further stated that: “It’s 
scandalous for SADC to remain silent on Zimbabwe…The current political situation 
in Zimbabwe falls far short of the SADC principles…” 
(http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/1085). It would be safe to 
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assume that the putative diplomatic snub that this entailed would have been duly 
noted in other SADC capitals.   
 
In this regard, the chapter unpacks the disjuncture between theory and practice within 
South Africa’s foreign policy (as recognized by Diescho: 1996, Evans: 1991, Mills: 
1997, Williams: 2000, Le Pere, Lambrechts, and Van Nieuwkerk: 1999).  Drawing on 
interviews with various internal and external foreign policy players, it exposes the 
controlling domestic shackles, the yoke of reality-distorting perceptions as well as the 
conflicting interests and needs of other regional states which inhibit South Africa’s 
ability to craft an efficacious foreign policy.   In doing so, the chapter responds to the 
question raised by Adebajo et al.   (2007: 17) in the introduction of South Africa in 
Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era: “To what extent has South Africa been liberated to 
play a leading role in Africa, and to what extent is it still crippled not only by the past, 
but by the widely varying priorities of its 47 million people?” 
 
4.1 Domestic Constraints  
Selebi (1999) once pointed out that “foreign policy is nothing other than the pursuit of 
domestic policies and priorities internationally.” One can infer that the cleavages of 
domestic politics often color the foreign policy agenda and to a considerable extent 
dictate the constraints upon, and opportunities open to government.   In this regard, 
South Africa’s pursuit of transformative regional development has been tempered by 
a realistic assessment of her domestic limitations.  Makoa (2001: 40) concurs that 
South Africa’s inability to weave a clear, unambiguous and coherent foreign policy 
towards Africa “seems to be neither a deliberate strategy nor an accident…the 
domestic context limits RSA’s policy choices, suggesting that the country’s role in the 
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continent’s affairs may be confined to addressing sporadic political episodes and ad 
hoc mediation efforts.”  Indeed, Hamill (2001: 43) observes that the “sheer scale of 
the domestic challenge – addressing the backlogs bequeathed by four decades of 
apartheid – served as a sobering backdrop to all discussions on future regional 
policy.”  With social and economic reconstruction within South Africa competing 
with regional ventures for the same scare resources, it was often argued that such 
resources should not be used beyond South African borders until the lives of South 
African citizens, who had so long been denied are improved.  Such internal 
development imperatives remain a huge challenge more than a decade after the end of 
apartheid.   According to the Southern Africa Labor and Development Research Unit, 
seven out of 10 South Africans are poor….the poor represented 72% of the population 
in the last year of apartheid in 1993…it now stands at 70% (cited in Pressly, 2010: 1). 
 
There is broad consensus (see Oden: 1996, Spence: 1998, Ralinala and Saunders: 
2001) that any aspiration to play a role in the development (encompasses both 
economic investment and peacekeeping) of Southern Africa will be accompanied by 
costly responsibilities.   One could add that this is irrespective of whether that role 
assumes the form of a benign foreign policy god mother or a regional hegemon.  Mills 
(2000:1) underscores the cost of foreign policy forays by drawing on the example of 
Zimbabwe’s military deployment to the DRC – in 1998: “Zimbabwe’s annual rate of 
real economic decline of 0.7% during the 1990s was exacerbated by its military 
operations in the DRC, involving more than one quarter of its 40,000-strong armed 
forces and costing an estimated US$1million per day”.  Neethling (2004: 139) 
attributes South Africa’s preference for the role of diplomatic peacekeeper (to that of 
military peacekeeper) to the fact that the South African National Defense Force has 
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seen many consecutive years of cuts in defense allocations since the end of the 1980s 
which has produced a discrepancy between peacekeeping requirements emanating 
from national policy and the capability of the SANDF to meet such requirements.  
Neethling (2004: 146) further alludes to suggestions that “South Africa’s leadership is 
letting its enthusiasm outrun its military capacity.”  This line of thinking finds support 
in a report (carried by BBC International), by the military analyst and Jane's Defense 
Weekly correspondent for South Africa, which argues that the SANDF is seriously 
overstretched due to its peace support obligations in Africa and that it faces the danger 
of becoming a ‘hollow force’ without the capability to conduct sustained operations.   
It contends that while the defense force's operational commitments have steadily 
expanded since 1998, its operating budget has steadily declined in real terms over the 
same period, affecting the military’s ability to train and recruit personnel and to 
maintain equipment and infrastructure.   It is a situation compounded by the reality of 
the usual drain of technical and other skilled personnel that all armed forces suffer in 
times of peace and economic growth, a situation that has been aggravated by the 
affirmative action policies of the government.  The much publicized protests by 
SANDF over conditions of service, in August 2009, are indicative of the problems 
highlighted.    
 
Such problems have also led to various initiatives to re-evaluate South African 
participation in continental peace missions.  In this regard, one of the most stimulating 
discussions took place during an inter-departmental workshop on the outcomes of a 
research project on ‘Best Practices and Lessons Learnt during South Africa’s 
Participation in International Peace Missions.’  Three pertinent observations during 
the 17 November 2008 workshop in Pretoria were: 
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• It is unclear what informs South Africa’s involvement in conflict 
areas on the continent.   
• The deployment of troops should be preceded by strategy 
formulation.  The challenge is that countries request RSA troops 
and pledge resources but often do not live up to their commitment.   
Consequently, South Africa ends up bearing the costs, without 
budgetary provisions.    
• There should be coordination between political diplomacy, peace 
missions and economic diplomacy in order to avoid a situation 
whereby South Africa bears the costs of the peace mission and 
stabilises a country, but withdraws thereafter.   Coordinating these 
three components as well as developing an economic engagement 
strategy will prevent foreign powers and other external players in 
the conflict from benefiting economically through investments.    
 
The last observation in particular is a sore-point among most South African foreign 
policy-makers interviewed who lament the resources poured into the DRC with no 
visible benefit to South Africa.  Such policy-makers are cognizant of the prioritization 
of national interest given the pressures from the electorate for their basic needs to be 
met; pressures which have even resulted in the government being taken to court over 
its socio-economic responsibilities.   The Grootboom judgement (see http://www.escr-
net.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=401409) on the state’s failure to comply 
with its housing obligations and the Treatment Action Campaign's successful court 
case against the government for its delays in providing effective measures to cut 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV are notable examples in this regard.   Dlamini 
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(2004:2) points out that those who advocate for minimum foreign engagement 
reinforce their position with the argument that, “Pretoria would serve itself well by 
sorting domestic socio-economic problems and perfecting democracy and governance 
at home, so that it can be a role model for others to emulate.”  In addition, Le Pere and 
van Nieuwkerk (2002:260) question:  
whether the government can draw on the required domestic strengths  that 
will allow it to play an activist regional and international role, especially 
as far as continental peacemaking and peacekeeping, and the reform of  
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the UN Security Council are 
concerned.   Conditions of continuing and rising poverty, unemployment, 
slow economic growth and increasing xenophobia among its population 
act as a damper on these ambitions.    
As Greg Mills (2000: 263) puts it, “the need to develop common positions in harmony 
with African and other developing nation groupings was rhetorical rather than a 
blueprint for action.”  
 
One would recall that former South African President, Thabo Mbeki’s various 
continental trips were often accompanied by criticism that  domestic socio-economic 
challenges should be addressed first rather than wasting time and scarce resources on 
issues that have no direct and immediate connection to ordinary South Africans, who 
want jobs, housing, health care and education.  It underscores the reality that one of 
the biggest challenges facing South Africa was ‘domestic under-reach’ rather than 
‘regional overstretch.’  In a perceptive analysis report, Jonathan Clayton (2008) 
pointed out that “at the moment of his greatest diplomatic triumph (a reference to the 
power-sharing deal in Zimbabwe which was facilitated by Mbeki), a man often 
 152
accused of being more interested in foreign than domestic affairs faces political ruin 
at home” (a reference to Mbeki’s removal from office by the ANC following his 
replacement at the party helm by Jacob Zuma in December 2007).   In a sense, the 
power struggle between the politico-ideological blocs of Mbeki and Zuma was 
symptomatic of the growing divide between the elite and masses within the ruling 
ANC’s own constituency which further translated into strains in the Tripartite 
Alliance (ANC, COSATU, and SACP) over macro-economic policy.   Taylor (2001) 
affirms that the accession by leading fractions of the ANC to the ongoing discourse of 
neo-liberalism has led to the policy making elite playing to two distinct audiences: its 
leftist-inclined constituency and externally oriented domestic and international 
capital.    
 
The shift from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy to the Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) bears testament to the 
vacillating economic priorities within the ANC.   These various economic policies 
also affirm Mkandawire’s (1999: 2) contention that South Africa is not a ‘choiceless 
democracy.’  The changing policies reflect the South African government’s choices in 
responding to the difficult task of balancing economic growth and redistribution.   
Gumede (2005: 82) observes that the apartheid government had built its economy on 
cheap black labor and a modern South African economy would have to be constructed 
around a highly skilled workforce which was problematic since the vast majority of 
blacks had been prevented from acquiring such skills due to the inferiority of ‘Bantu 
Education.’  While the initial RDP attempted to combine measures to boost the 
economy with socially-minded social service provision and infrastructure projects, it 
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did not last long and within two years was abandoned in favor of open markets and 
privatization.  RDP delivery targets could not be met and in 1995, the country was 
engulfed in strikes by students, nurses and municipal workers.   This manifested in the 
change towards a more neoliberal economic strategy, which was introduced by 
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel in June 1996, to achieve sustained annual real GDP 
growth of 6% or more by the year 2000 while creating 400,000 new jobs each year 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa).   
 
So for much of the first decade of South Africa's democratic transition, its 
macroeconomic agenda was captured in the policy programme of  GEAR which was 
defined by conservative neo-liberal principles that emphasized containing government 
expenditure, low fiscal deficits, low inflation, privatization, deregulation, minimal 
state intervention, and a stress on the importance of foreign capital inflows for 
development.  Although the Asian Financial crisis had opened up the space for 
developing countries to pursue alternate strategies, Mbeki and his allies defended 
GEAR by insisting that South Africa had no choice but to play by the rules of the 
globalised economy.   ANC members and critics on the left were told that GEAR was 
a stabilization package that the government was forced to adopt following the collapse 
of the rand in early 1996 (Marais, 2002: 90).   Joel Netshitenzhe (2004: 12) affirms 
that: 
GEAR was a structural adjustment policy, self-imposed, to stabilize the 
macroeconomic situation (to deal with) the realities of an unmanageable 
budget deficit, high interest rates and weak local and foreign investor 
confidence. 
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In November 1996, (at the annual President’s Award for export achievement) Mbeki 
told business leaders: 
The policies and objectives embedded in GEAR are a pragmatic balance 
struck between our domestic economic demands and the realities of the 
international context.   These policies and objectives emerged after a 
thorough analysis of global trends and the specific conditions in our 
economy. 
However, Gumede (2005: 88) points out that “in the end, GEAR was remarkably 
similar to the National Party’s Normative Economic Model, released in 1993”.   
While GEAR brought greater financial discipline and macroeconomic stability, 
formal employment continued to decline and the country's wealth remained unevenly 
distributed along racial lines.  With the realization that economic growth was not 
enough to eradicate poverty and inequality in South Africa, the challenge became how 
to share the fruits of economic growth more equitably while combating the unfair 
manifestations of structural poverty, underdevelopment and marginalization that 
continued to characterize post-apartheid society. 
Of note is that this redirection of economic policy thinking within South Africa, from 
a neo-liberal economic perspective towards a more developmental orientation, did not 
extend to the region.   Government rhetoric in term of broader regional development 
priorities was undermined by the unregulated march of South African corporates on 
the continent (an issue that is unpacked in Chapter 5). 
 
The subsequent launching of ASGISA in 2006 was premised on the selective funding 
of programmes that were supposed to act as catalysts for economic development, 
aimed at promoting the country’s capacity to meet its development objectives with 
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respect to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): namely, halving poverty and 
unemployment by 2014.  In this regard, ASGISA is expected to drive the economy at 
a higher rate of growth (4.5% from 2006 to 2009, and 6% from 2010 to 2014), while 
expanding its redistributive benefits towards the majority of South Africans (Media 
Briefing by Deputy President, 6 February 2008).   It is clear that ASGISA was 
introduced as a pragmatic strategy to confront binding constraints and not as a 
development strategy.   In this regard, ASGISA does not link social development and 
poverty eradication to growth; instead they are conceived as deductions from growth 
rather than central features of the growth strategy.   Bodibe (2007: 77) affirms that 
continuing on such a trajectory is unlikely to halve unemployment and poverty in 
2014; at best, it can stabilize levels of poverty and unemployment.  Political analyst 
Steven Friedman concludes that while the dominant language of the government is 
left-leaning, the reality is very different: “…we are witnessing the emergence of 
social conservatism…there is no turn whatsoever to the left” (quoted in Mabotja and 
Cullinan, 2009: 36).   Undoubtedly, the South African government’s continued failure 
to provide a developmental strategy to transform the country’s apartheid-colonial 
economy will impede any effort to promote transformative development in the wider 
region. 
 
Indeed, from 1994, the South African government’s political commitment to a more 
equitable framework for sub-regional relations clashed with its attempts to revive 
economic growth within the country itself.  David Ryall (1997) sums it up as a 
competition between two visions for supremacy: the ANC’s internationalism and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs’ neo-realism.  It is the net-effect of such competing 
visions which is ultimately responsible for the ambivalence that characterizes South 
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African foreign policy.  The contradictions emanating from the very department 
responsible for such foreign policy is illuminating:  
In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 23 June 
1994, Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo stated: “Uppermost in our 
minds…are the responsibilities which our Government of National 
Unity has towards the people of South Africa.  Our primary goal is to 
strive to create a better life for all our people ...   [as a result] South 
Africa will have extremely limited resources for anything which falls 
outside the Reconstruction and Development Programme.” 
 
This view was further entrenched by Pierre Dietrichsen (1994: 212), a 
senior Department of Foreign Affairs official, who wrote that “South 
Africa is a medium military power with limited resources at its 
disposal for use in the international arena, for example, for 
peacekeeping operations.   Although South Africa's foreign debt is low 
by world standards, the country's own development needs are such that 
South Africa could not become a substantial donor of development 
assistance.” 
 
At the same time, Mr Aziz Pahad, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister 
(1994-2008), was quoted as saying that a leadership role was being 
thrust upon South Africa, and South Africa could no longer sit on the 
sidelines (cited in Solomon, 1997). 
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Despite the contention of Pahad, the assertions by Nzo and Dietrichsen reflect a 
growing realization among foreign policy makers that the expectation of South Africa 
as the region’s benefactor ignores the structural weaknesses of a South African 
economy which is itself still recovering from the isolationist trauma of apartheid.   
DFA, as the primary implementer of the country’s foreign policy, has accepted that 
the nature and orientation of the South African economy is a key determinant of the 
parameters of the country’s engagement in the region (a realization that came out 
strongly in interviews conducted).   Foreign policy needs to be formulated against the 
background of what South Africa can realistically hope to achieve and budgetary 
issues will ultimately influence South Africa's membership of international 
organizations, the number of embassies the Department is able to establish abroad and 
the number of personnel assigned abroad.   Nzo (cited in Mills, 2000: 264) noted the 
dangers of being stretched too thin in trying to meet expectations:  
I often think that our successful domestic transition has created 
perceptions that we are capable of miraculous interventions which would 
instantly solve the many conflicts in our region and beyond.  The reality is 
more complex and demands more painstaking commitment rather than 
instant quick-fix solutions. 
 
 
In fact, Landsberg (2003) best captures the argument by attributing South Africa’s 
pivot state (rather than hegemonic) status to the country’s precarious domestic 
characteristics.  He contends that South Africa remains a deeply uneven society with 
significant development challenges: it has both first world and third world 
characteristics.  He further underscores the serious disparities that exist in the society, 
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marked by one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world (measured by 
the Gini coefficient), as well as the gross discrepancies in terms of access to basic 
services such as clean water, sanitation, education, health and welfare, employment 
and economic opportunities.  It is a concern echoed by South Africa’s Deputy 
President, Kgalema Motlanthe, who spoke in 2010 of two economies in South Africa 
embracing ‘a First World and a Third World’: “The rural areas tended to be 
underdeveloped while the urban areas, particularly the metros, were a magnet for 
development...” (cited in Pressly, 2010: 17)  
 
Barber (1994: 46) aptly underscores South Africa’s straddling of both first and third 
worlds with his assessment that “in global terms South Africa is a small/medium-
sized state.  In Southern Africa it is a giant.” Interestingly, he argues that the 
combination of economic weakness and conflict has left several of Southern Africa’s 
states with fragile and unstable governments, creating a setting that exaggerates South 
Africa’s wealth and strength, and which produces unrealistic expectations about its 
capacity to stimulate regional development.   Stoneman (1994: 44) concurs that South 
Africa's pre-eminence is exaggerated: 
Although its higher per capita income in principle gives some room for 
maneuvering (thus redistribution is a theoretical option, even though most 
thinking seems to be going into how to avoid it), it is far below that of the 
newly industrialized countries (NICs) and barely a tenth that of developed 
industrial economies.  Furthermore, its internal inequalities are amongst 
the worst in the world, so that it is not clear that the average figure has any 
significance because few people receive it.  Rather there is a minority, 
predominantly white, of course, but in principle increasingly multiracial, 
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who earn about US$10,000 annually, and a majority who have income 
levels more typical of the rest of the region. 
 
In addition, Stoneman (1994: 44) contends that even references to South Africa 
as a distinct geographic entity is misleading:  
..over 70 per cent of its GDP is produced in the PWV region.   Rather than 
referring to `South Africa and the rest of the region', it makes as much 
sense economically to talk about the (Pretoria-Witwatersrand-
Vereeniging) PWV region and the rest of South Africa, with the Western 
Cape or Natal being entities of rather similar population, wealth, size and 
problems to those of Zimbabwe. 
 
In short, the feasibility of South Africa shouldering the costs of furthering economic 
development in one of the world’s poorest regions when it suffers from some of the 
same socio-economic problems including substantial poverty among most of its 
citizens, is questionable.  In 1997, cognizant of domestic pressure to improve the 
imbalances that beset South Africa, Nelson Mandela cautioned his SADC allies that 
the country was not a gold mine or a bastion for employment: “We are equally beset 
with unemployment’ and illegal immigration into the country is ...   sensitive and 
needs to be tackled with caution ...” (cited in Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998: 
188-189).  Significantly, the remarks made at the September 1997 SADC summit 
meeting that he chaired, followed only two weeks after South African street vendors 
had attacked ‘foreign’ hawkers in Johannesburg.  Audie Klotz’s (2000) analysis of 
such issues is interesting and pertinent.  She maintains that (as in the apartheid era) 
South Africans presume their superiority to the rest of the continent, in both economic 
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and political terms.  In this regard, domestic debates over employment, crime and 
migration still demonstrate a near consensus on the need to keep the rest of the region 
at bay.  This is particularly problematic in a region that is characterized by high 
mobility such as Southern Africa: It is estimated that there are between one and three 
million cross border migrants in South Africa or 3% of the total population (Parker, 
2010: 17). 
 
In contextualizing the May 2008 xenophobic attacks that swept across South Africa, 
Dr Adrian Hadland (2008: 2) alludes to the “nearly 6000 protests” that took place 
during 2004 and 2005 “…around service delivery, several of which became violent , 
mainly in Mamelodi, Khutsong, Alexandra, Phumelela and Embalenhle near Secunda, 
all sites of xenophobic conflict…”  From Gauteng to the Cape Peninsula, the link 
between service delivery protests and xenophobic attacks were palpable.  The key 
findings (as captured in The Star supplement, 2008: 5) of the Human Sciences 
Research Council in the hotspots where the May 2008 violence occurred are 
instructive:  
• A lack of faith in the government’s capacity to deliver services; 
• Unhappiness over migration policy that is ‘corrupt, unregulated and 
out of control’; 
• Competition for housing and jobs with a staggering unemployment 
rate among 16-30 year olds; 




The Star supplement on the May 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa highlighted 
a number of other interesting statistics:  
Fig4-1: Xenophobia Statistics  
 
In a Southern African Migration Project Survey carried out in 1997: 
• 25% of South Africans wanted a total prohibition of immigration; 
• 22% wanted the government to repatriate all foreigners living here; 
• 45% called for strict limits to be placed on foreigners; 
• 61% believed foreigners were putting strain on the country’s resources 
 
In a 2006 survey: 
• 66% said foreigners were using up basic resources; 
• Two thirds believed that foreigners were guilty of crime; 
• 49% say they bring diseases such as HIV into the country. 
 
In a 2007 survey (Independent Newspapers): 
• 76% of respondents said they want to see the influx of foreigners restricted. 
 
 
The 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup which was hosted for the first time on African soil 
in South Africa further typifies the clash between foreign policy objectives and 
domestic priorities.   In his 2006 State of the Nation address, the then South African 
President Thabo Mbeki pointed out that the World Cup would make a huge 
contribution, not only to South Africa's socio-economic growth, but also to the 
development of the continent as a whole.   Standard Bank economist, Goolam Ballim, 
affirmed that “there will be a big direct injection for the economy, but the indirect 
impact may be more meaningful for a sustainable economic lift in subsequent years ...   
it will help change the perceptions that a large number of foreign investors hold of 
Africa and South Africa.”  However, South Africa which is still grappling to provide 
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adequate housing, health and educational facilities (issues which are notably covered 
in the government’s Medium Term Strategic Framework and recent outcomes based 
approach to governance) is expected to spend an estimated R5-billion on building and 
renovating 10 World Cup stadiums, R5.2-billion on upgrades to the country's airports, 
and R3.5-billion on improvements to the country's road and rail networks.  COSATU 
has further expressed concerns over the reality that with the manufacture of T-shirts 
and the Zakumi mascot outside the country, the use of public funds to build the 
stadiums cannot be justified as citizens are not benefitting from the promised 
economic spin-offs such as the creation of jobs. 
 
In summary, the domestic issues highlighted are an integral part of the foreign policy 
cycle which shapes our relations with the Southern African region.   It is in the quest 
to address her domestic challenges that South Africa strives to improve her economic 
competitiveness.  This escalates the demands for it to contribute to regional 
peacekeeping efforts and the country increasingly finds itself the locus for people 
seeking jobs or fleeing regional conflicts.  These external challenges then compete 
with domestic issues for the very resources that are the product of the latter’s 
initiation.  The situation is compounded by the fact that more often than not, the 
state’s ambitions clash with the systemic operations of the market.  For example, 
global economic pressures make redistributive policies increasingly difficult as such 
pressures undermine the ability of states to provide both security and welfare to their 
populations.   Given these dynamics, it is tempting to argue that domestic interests are 
so immediate and pressing that the government has no choice but to put South 
Africa’s interests first at the expense of its neighbors.  Schoeman’s (2007: 104) 
conclusion that “in order to attain and maintain credibility and legitimacy and to 
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mobilize the resources necessary for acting as both a hegemon and a partner, the 
greatest challenge lies in South Africa’s domestic transformation” is echoed by 
Adebajo et al (2007) who maintain that an effective post-apartheid South African 
foreign policy can only be built on a strong domestic base.  However as  Barber 
(1994: 48) and a number of South African foreign policy makers have argued, South 
Africa’s domestic interests are best served by a stable, flourishing region. 
 
 
4.2 Perceptions from the rest of Southern Africa 
“The prestige of a nation is its reputation for power…What others think   
of us is as important as what we actually are.”  
(Hans Morgenthau cited in Mills, 2000: 299).   
 
The assertion by Morgenthau aptly captures the dilemma faced by South Africa in the 
Southern African region.  In this regard, the pronouncements and activities of the 
post-apartheid South African state (captured in Chapter 5) have not been successful in 
addressing the perceptions of its regional counterparts which continue to be 
negatively colored by their experience with the old apartheid state.   In essence, this 
thesis argues that the failure of the South African state to implement its 
developmental agenda in the region is rooted in its inability to convince its 
neighborhood that such a vision is complimentary to their needs. 
 
A senior South African foreign policy maker explained his understanding of South 
Africa’s role in the region using the analogy of an owner of a large and expensive 
mansion surrounded by more modest homes who pays to have security guards 
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patrolling the street.  The presence of security guards will serve to protect the 
neighboring houses as well, even though their owners contribute nothing to the costs 
of the guards.   South Africa was likened to the owner of the mansion, bearing the 
security costs of the neighborhood.  One could argue that the very analogy used 
justifies the latent regional resentment towards South Africa that is at the heart of the 
country’s predicament in Southern Africa. The analogy likens Southern African 
countries to the modest homes which begrudge the wealthy owner of the mansion and 
regards the security guards as a symbol of power over them.  Countries such as 
Angola and leaders such as Mugabe would, understandably, not take kindly to being 
portrayed as so unexceptional in a regional context.  The sentiment reportedly aired 
by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe that neighboring countries are treated like 
‘a province of South Africa,’ is widely shared in the rest of the region and aptly attest 
to such resentment (Marais, 1999: electronic version).  Basically, the inability to 
reconcile what the region thinks of South Africa’s intentions with South Africa’s 
actual intentions renders the Republic’s foreign policy goals in Southern Africa 
problematic. 
 
Barber (1994: 47) affirms that South Africa’s post-apartheid ‘respectability’ may 
attract increased international aid and private investment at the expense of its 
neighbors and this could be a source of deep resentment.   Not surprisingly, South 
Africa’s economic dominance has created some political tensions with regional 
partners.  A major source of the tension stems not from the trade imbalance per se, but 
from a perception within the region that South Africa’s economic dominance is being 
achieved on the back of unfair trade practices.  For instance, South Africa stands 
accused of economic closure and resistance to SADC liberalization measures that 
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place its businesses at comparative disadvantage.  In the words of President Mugabe 
(cited in McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998), “South Africa cherishes the notion 
that because it is the most developed country in the region it can use other SADC 
countries as receptacles for its goods while protecting its own industries.” Indeed, 
many of the Republic’s neighbors are highly critical of what they regard as its bullish 
economic policies, accusing South Africa of deliberately dwarfing their small 
economies (Landsberg and Kornegay, 1998).  In an interview in 1997, Namibia’s then 
Trade and Industry Minister, Hidipo Hamutenya accused South Africa of hampering 
industrial development in the neighboring states by deliberately pursuing policies that 
sabotage industrial production plants in these states, and sticking to a protectionist 
industrial policy that made it difficult for these countries to penetrate her market.  At 
the same time, South Africa was perceived as dumping her manufactured goods in 
Namibia using ill practices, including the selling of goods at unfair price advantages, 
often ignoring profit, transport and other costs in order to conquer and dominate the 
Namibian market (Mail and Guardian, 2 August 1997). 
 
One could argue that this is not deliberate but emerges by default due to South 
Africa’s export and investment drive into the rest of Southern Africa.  Oden  (2001: 
84) attributes it to: “The pressure on South African firms to expand, the devaluation 
of the Rand, the lifting of sanctions and trade boycotts, and the lowering of trade 
barriers (as demanded by the WTO) have created a situation where South Africa’s 
regional dominance was probably even greater in 1996 than a few years earlier.” In 
this regard, South Africa's foreign policy objectives are viewed as not being very 
different in their essence, from the foreign policy of the previous regime as it remains 
marked by a desire to further consolidate and advance its political and economic 
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dominance.  For clear historical reasons, the old regime could not exploit the vast 
market of the rest of the continent, except indirectly and in the few client states it 
cultivated.   The new South Africa has been far less inhibited in this regard.   Iheduru 
(1996), Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan (1998), and  Oden (2001) focus on the 
historical irony that what the apartheid state failed to achieve through its political and 
military designs from 1974 to 1990, is currently being accomplished economically 
through the structural power of South Africa’s finance, industrial and merchant capital 
in the  post-apartheid era.  However this translates into a regional ‘love-hate’ attitude 
toward Pretoria, driven by a resentment of the dependence on South Africa’s 
economy and infrastructure as well the reality that there is no practical alternative to 
even more trade and investment with South Africa, as long as the region wishes to 
develop its countries and businesses.  Even the most casual conversations with foreign 
policy makers of other African countries bring out this wariness, if not antagonism, in 
respect of South Africa in the rest of the region. 
 
Not surprisingly, the negative attitudes have had the net effect of demonizing, 
isolating, and casting aspersions on South Africa’s intentions in Southern Africa.  
This has led to the emergence of alliances and pacts aimed at isolating South Africa 
politically and having a prevailing counter-balance to South Africa's perceived 
strength.  A senior South African government official recalled the 1995 trade and 
investment conference at the Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe where the governments of 
the region were urged to raise local tariffs in response to South Africa’s penetration of 
the region.   Furthermore, neither President Mandela nor Deputy President Mbeki was 
invited to the August 1998 Victoria Falls meeting of SADC on the crisis in the DRC.   
Even beyond the continent, South Africa’s resentment by its peers is a source of 
 167
interest.   For example, The Hindu (10 July 1999) reports that at the official reception 
hosted to mark the inauguration of the South African President, Mr.   Thabo Mbeki, 
the Angolan President, Dr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos was a notable absentee.   
Schoeman (2000: electronic version) argues that such ostracism and weariness about 
South Africa can seriously undermine South Africa’s ability to play a positive or 
leading role in managing conflict or pursuing peace and security in the region.  This 
was clearly evident when the then President of the DRC, Laurent Kabila, not only 
accused South Africa of duplicity but also remained resolute in his opposition to 
South African attempts to broker a peace deal with rebel forces 
(www.dispatch.co.za/2000/01/24/southafrica/ITIS.HTM). 
 
Given such sensitivities throughout the region about South Africa’s alleged unfair 
dominance, the country is often forced to adopt a modest approach in its regional 
foreign policy (as evidenced by its approach to Zimbabwe as well as the skewed 
SACU arrangements which are supposed to address past imbalances).  In this regard, 
Landsberg and Kabemba (1998: 2) pose a crucial question: ‘how modest can Pretoria 
afford to be?’  Before attempting a response one should also consider the alternatives.   
For example, Habib (2003: electronic) has long maintained, in no uncertain terms, 
that South Africa should stop pussy-footing in the region and assume a vibrant 
hegemonic role.   Du Plessis’s (1995: 37) delineation of the country’s strength lends 
credence to Habib’s position:  
South Africa has the economic power and military capability that would 
probably enable it to exercise influence over the continent and its political 
direction.  Its Defense Force is the best equipped in Africa.  It has wealth 
and the biggest and most developed economy in the continent, accounting 
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for about 79 per cent of the GNP of Southern Africa and 60 per cent of 
that of subequatorial Africa in 1994.’ Former Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Aziz Pahad (cited in Kabemba and Landsberg, 1998), also warned 
of the possibility that, ‘if RSA continues to hide behind the rhetoric of not 
wanting to play a leadership role, Africa will indeed suspect a hidden 
agenda.    
 
Nevertheless, one could point out that such arguments ignore the reality that 
leadership roles for South Africa have not been generally welcomed, accepted or 
solicited by the region.   Economic and military dominance has not been enough to 
endear South Africa to the broader Southern African region: South Africa has not yet 
found a way to harness these resources so as to lead and serve the region decisively 
and with the support of its neighbors.  As Van Nieuwkerk (1998) puts it: “South 
Africa’s preparedness to lead Africa clashes with Africa’s willingness to be led by 
South Africa.”  The central paradox of leadership – that it requires followership – 
explains why South Africa’s regional developmental vision has been fraught with so 
many implementation obstacles.   Landsberg maintains that despite attempts to assert 
its dominance in the region, in reality South Africa is a regional hegemon without 
much power: “it has limited influence in the region and its international profile as an 
emerging power is largely based on its economic strength relative to its very small 
neighbors not relative to other emerging powers” 
(http://www.worldpolicy.org/epowers/southafrica/papers/).  It would be profoundly 
misleading to assume that the country’s economic and military muscle automatically 
translates into political clout.  Many foreign policy makers and analysts refer to the 
unsuccessful efforts to have Cape Town endorsed as the host city for the 2004 
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Olympic Games as a critical test of Africa’s failure to follow South Africa’s lead.   
Although the campaign was championed as the ‘African Bid’ and was frequently 
presented as integral to the African Renaissance (Mbeki argued that the time has 
come for the rest of the world to demonstrate its commitment to the African 
Renaissance by awarding the Games in the year 2004 to the African Continent) it 
appeared that Cape Town lost the bid because, in the first round of voting, African 
delegates failed to support South Africa (Southern African Report, 1997: 10).  It 
illustrated typical power politics play where smaller states may seek to contain the 
hegemon within a wider system by diluting its power and obliging it to act according 
to a set of wider rules.   
 
Such wariness of Southern African countries towards South Africa can also be 
attributed to lack of trust of a perceived ‘puppet of the west.’ Landsberg (2000: 107) 
notes that Pretoria has been accused by African leaders of “pursuing a Western 
project and, in fact, of being little more than the West’s lackey on the southern tip of 
Africa.”  Interestingly, it is rumored among South African foreign policy makers that 
President Mbeki’s motives for not criticizing Zimbabwe are based on his fears of 
being labeled ‘The George W. Bush of Africa’ and that he might become alienated 
from other continental leaders.  Makoa (2001: 47) affirms the same points: “deeply 
distrustful of RSA and competing for regional influence, the Zimbabwean 
government believes that the South African government is not just a US surrogate but 
has misconceived Africa’s political agenda.”  In this regard, the ideology of  the 
North-South struggle dovetailed neatly for Mugabe with a nationalist-liberation 
ideology that portrayed his rule as continuing the liberation struggle against Western 
forces (at present the British government and international financial institutions) bent 
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on thwarting and destroying the gains of liberation.   With its unsuccessful balancing 
act of capitalist economic growth and social redistribution needs, South Africa 
became an easy target for being branded a traitor to such a ‘struggle’.    
 
Based on a history in which apartheid’s leaders defined the country as a European 
outpost, it is clear that South Africa still struggles to shake off the identity as a 
western Trojan horse in Africa (Adebajo, 2006).  This is not surprising given the 
impact of the USA, World Bank and other Western powers on the economic policy 
debate in South Africa.   It is noteworthy that by 1994, the year of the first democratic 
elections, the USA had become South Africa’s largest bilateral donor of political aid 
(Davis, 1997: electronic).  In 1993,  the USA Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, 
George Moose, reported to Congress that “over the past several years we have 
provided training and information to the ANC and others on various aspects of free 
market economics” (Davis, 1997: electronic).   By 1995 USAID reported that funding 
for private-sector initiatives had achieved a decisive effect on ANC economic policies 
and “have led the Government of National Unity leadership to endorse pragmatic 
economic policies and a fiscally conservative approach to the RDP, contrary to prior 
expectations that an ANC-dominated government would opt for statist [government-
run] solutions and fiscally unsustainable social programs” (Davis, 1997: electronic).   
Indeed, corporate pressures within South Africa and from the USA and other western 
governments led to the elimination of a separate RDP office in 1996.   South African 
writer, Daria Caliguire, concluded that such a move will in effect downgrade the 
importance of reconstruction and development in government policy discussions.   In 
essence, the dismantling of the RDP office was an indicator that economic growth, 
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rather than redistribution, had become the primary national tool for driving post-
apartheid change. 
 
In this regard, it is argued that South Africa is ill-placed to canvass for progressive 
regional development.  Instead, South Africa's neo-liberal economic orientation is 
seen as having the potential to undermine a developmental agenda from emerging in 
Africa.   Without the trust and confidence of its counterparts, South Africa will find it 
difficult to achieve any progress in terms of regional developmental goals.   
Undoubtedly, South Africa’s renaissance diplomacy, along with other regional 
projects, and attempts at leadership, faces serious public relations challenges in 
convincing Southern African states that its interests and needs run parallel. 
 
4.3 Southern African interests versus South African interests 
At an academic workshop on formulating a draft white paper on South African 
foreign policy, hosted by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
in October 2010, Ambassador Mo Shaik (Head of the Foreign Branch, State Security 
Agency) noted that “our survival depends on us being less South African and more 
Southern African.”  He was making the point that in an era of mutual vulnerabilities, 
South Africa’s interests should not be seen as merely complimentary to Southern 
African interest; these interests should converge.  However, the weight of the 
apartheid state’s baggage continues to impede South Africa’s interaction with the 
region.  A critical element of the new South Africa’s policy in reducing the apartheid 
baggage was to confirm and emphasize its African identity – that it was part of the 
region, not simply an appendage of Europe or the West.   Barber (2004: 173) points 
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out that the continent treated the new South Africa in the mid-1990s with a degree of 
suspicion because the implication was that  
[…] despite its claims to a common identity, the new South Africa 
accepted Western values and interests, to the detriment of its African 
heritage.   Having a foot in different camps was an asset as an 
international bridge-builder, but in Africa it could be interpreted as having 
split loyalties.    
 
Schoeman (2003: 364) explains that South Africa’s adoption of liberal democratic 
values that are usually associated with the West is perceived as contrary to the African 
way.  Instead it is argued that the nature and structure of South Africa’s macro-
economic policy compels it to compete with its African counterparts and locks it into 
the very global capital system that it purports to reform.   South Africa is perceived as 
a willing captive of its white business sector and as such, an agent of international 
financial institutions, including the IMF and World Bank.   As Paul Williams (2000) 
observes: “In spite of some enticing rhetoric, South Africa has demonstrated little 
practical solidarity with countries outside of what Selebi referred to as a G-8 of the 
South.”  These perceptions are reinforced by the exclusive status accorded to South 
Africa by the West which has the indirect effect of isolating the country from the 
region.  President Yeti Boni, at the opening ceremony of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism Extraordinary Summit on 26 October 2008, condemned Africa’s absence 
from the global summit on the international financial crisis on 09 November 2008 in 
New York, observing that South Africa was the only African country invited to the 
meeting.  Part of the dilemma for South Africa arises from its neighbors wanting to 
reap the benefits of its leadership role (a voice for Africa in critical international 
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deliberations determined by the current global power configuration which generally 
accords Africa a marginal role) but resenting when South Africa attempts to speak or 
intervene on their behalf.   
 
South Africa thus set out to reaffirm its Africanness and its prioritization of the 
consolidation of the African agenda was at the heart of this project.  This included 
strengthening Africa’s institutions regionally (SACU and SADC) and continentally 
(the AU); supporting the implementation of Africa’s socio-economic development 
programme, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); and 
contributing towards post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa and 
towards peace, security and stability more generally (as contained in the 2008/9 
International Relations, Peace and Security Cluster Programme of Action).   The idea 
of consolidating the African agenda has its roots in the South Africa-driven African 
Renaissance which has, ironically, turned out to be one of the most contested foreign 
policy issues.  South Africa’s emergence as a post-apartheid champion of African 
issues has clashed with the waning stars of its regional neighbors (particularly 
Zimbabwe), who’s leading role in fighting the apartheid state was abruptly eclipsed.   
Moreover, the limited extent with which other Southern African countries have 
embraced the concept of African renewal is linked to their belief that it is not integral 
to their interests.  Van Nieuwkerk (1998) infers that the African Renaissance is 
perceived as an empty policy vessel; its essential features remain deliberately vague – 
high on sentiment, low on substance:  
like Roosevelt’s New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, it exists 
as an unsettled policy goal propounded by a political leadership which 
faces a particular set of challenges...   Simply put, the African Renaissance 
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seeks to maximize South Africa’s foreign policy options in 
Africa...similar to Bisschoff and Southall's judgment, namely that it (the 
African Renaissance) is a foreign policy in search of suitable allies and 
partners. 
 
In this regard, many have questioned the motivation behind South Africa’s 
championing of an African Renaissance given that its economic interests on the 
continent were not always in harmony with its neighbors.’  Among the more cynical 
interpretations, it is seen as a veiled attempt by South Africa to impose its hegemony 
on the continent.  Landsberg and Kornegay (1998) underline the suspicions that  it is 
“a Pax  Pretoria thinly disguised as a Pax Africana” by arguing that “the much 
publicized African Renaissance is seen in some circles as a Hitler style ‘lebensraum’ 
coercive expansionism in which South Africa endeavors to establish her hegemony in 
the African continent.” Vale and Maseko (1998) surmise that the enthusiasm with 
which South African capital has embraced the African Renaissance may explain the 
deepening nervousness over the country’s goals in the region.  Mandaza (1998: 28) 
calls the use of the African Renaissance as a foreign policy tool under the guise of a 
new developmental vision, an ‘ideology of self-deception’ which refuses “to 
acknowledge the current realities that parameter even our own political space as 
Africans – nationally, regionally, and globally.” He also quotes Jonathan Moyo’s 
argument that the term poses the danger of masking realities in South Africa itself 
while also speaking to a kind of exceptionalism that sets South Africa apart from the 
rest of the continent.  This kind of conduct only serves to conjure up feelings of 
dissension and grudge.  It portrays South Africa as arrogant and insensitive and 
affirms the limitations of an elite-centred construction of African cooperation. 
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Programmes such as NEPAD have been similarly contested, more so since the 
NEPAD secretariat has been based in South Africa.   Habib and Selinyane (2004: 72) 
allude to the efforts made by South African officials to emphasize that NEPAD is a 
continental programme rather than one led by South Africa.   However, Habib and 
Selinyane concede that much of the administrative structure as well as precepts; 
commitments and programmes presented by NEPAD reflect the concerns of South 
African foreign policy.   While this inspires a greater sense of responsibility towards 
ensuring the success of the programme, it could also be destabilizing if viewed as 
hegemonic imposition as it does not reflect the foreign policy concerns of other 
countries.   Patrick Bond (2004b) has censored that imperialism is facilitated in Africa 
by the Pretoria-Johannesburg state-capitalist nexus, in part through Mbeki’s NEPAD 
and in part through the independent (though related) logic of private capital.  Indeed, 
the perception that NEPAD is simply an ‘Africanisation’ of South Africa’s macro-
economic policy of GEAR has made it difficult for South Africa to convince states to 
integrate NEPAD into their domestic policy regimes.  In addition, Landsberg 
(2007:203) points to the need to urgently address the anomaly that “to date, 
partnership between NEPAD and the outside world has been much stronger than that 
between NEPAD and African people.”  In fact, the Southern African region perceives 
partnerships with South Africa as exploitative rather than beneficial: “South Africa 
consumes 80% of the water resources of Southern Africa yet accounts for only 10% 
of the renewable water sources of the region” (Landsberg, 2007: 202). 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has long dismissed Nepad as a neo-colonial 
strategy (Ndayi, 2010:2).  Such regional perceptions are even more difficult to 
overcome when South Africans themselves are not united in terms of foreign policy 
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programmes.  For example, socio-economic development activist, Trevor Ngwane, 
also refuted the notion that Africa’s development would be facilitated by an 
integrationist and renegotiated relationship with the international community.  So 
despite policies based on principles of equity and mutual benefit,  
many actors in the region (as well as some critics within the country) regard South 
Africa as an imperialist regional power and a stumbling block to accelerated 
integration. 
 
South Africa’s history has also colored its foreign policy outlook in a very parochial 
way.   It can be argued that South Africa has tried to export its model of conflict-
resolution based on its political settlement (i.e. the transitional government or 
government of national unity) without trying to understand the realities in other 
countries.  This reinforces the impression of South African ‘hegemonic imposition’ or 
‘bullying’ and shows that South Africa is out of touch with the rest of the region’s 
needs.  The controversy over the South African-led mediated Government of National 
Unity in Zimbabwe is a case in point.   A more telling example is the response by the 
Swaziland Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mabili Dlamini, to the offer of assistance to 
Swaziland contained in the ANC manifesto (released prior to the 2004 elections): “the 
Swazis are capable of formulating their own system of democratic governance, which 
does not have to be similar to the South African model” (www.irinnews.org).   There 
is a definite rejection of the myth (in many academic and media circles) of South 
Africa as Africa’s messiah (Makoa: 2001; Evans: 1991; Vale and Maseko: 1998).  
There is little doubt that the turbulent history of South Africa in Southern Africa has 
scarred the region’s political psyche. 
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Black (2001) concludes that  the Mbeki government’s ‘African Renaissance’ project 
to promote ‘democracy’, ‘good governance’ and ‘growth’ on the sub-continent is 
premised on what might be described as a ‘limitationist’ conception of both 
democracy and governance, which above all serves transnational hegemonic interests 
and those of related, dominant fractions of capital in South Africa itself.   Schoeman 
(2002) concurs that South Africa’s attempts to promote investment by South African 
business in neighboring countries is not really the ideal solution to the region’s 
economic woes as banking, supermarket and other service and commercial oriented 
investment activities, do not necessarily promote industrial development and 
production capacity in the recipient countries and therefore do not stimulate economic 
growth and development.   In essence, the stated goals of South African foreign policy 
have not matched the reality of how these goals have been implemented and received 
by the rest of the region.   
 
The fact that the region has not been consistent in its position towards South Africa’s 
regional projects further heightens the conundrum facing South African foreign 
policy-makers in understanding the regional psych.  The SADC Early Warning Centre 
is a case in point.   Although it is a project that has long been on the regional radar, it 
is largely through the lobbying and financial contribution of South Africa that the 
Centre was finally launched in 2010.  In March 2010, during a briefing on the 
International Cooperation, Trade and Security (ICTS) Cluster’s plans for the year, 
Lindiwe Sisulu, Chair of the Cluster, noted that: 
We are mindful that the prosperity we seek in the region can only be 
achieved by providing the necessary security guarantees.  In this regard, 
we have been at the forefront of the conceptualization, establishment and 
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operationalization of the SADC Early Warning Centre in Gaborone, 
Botswana. 
 
On 12 July 2010, Mozambican President Armando Guebuza inaugurated the Regional 
Early Warning Centre of SADC in Gaborone.  He acknowledged that setting up the 
centre took a long time and was fraught with difficulties.  Nevertheless, in celebrating 
this important step towards strengthening mechanisms to prevent, manage and solve 
conflicts, the region was silent on the contribution of South Africa which galvanized 
what had become a fading regional objective. 
 
 
4.4 Data Presentation and Analysis 
As many as 291 interviews (114 from South Africa and 177 from the Southern 
African region) were conducted with government officials and civil society over a 
period of three years.  The South African officials interviewed include former and 
current Ambassadors to various countries on the continent, senior officials from DFA, 
DTI, and intelligence services as well as the secretariats of various government 
committees.   In addition, senior members of several large South African corporates 
that are active on the continent as well as academics, activists and ordinary South 
African citizens were interviewed.   The 177 Southern African interviews comprise of 
Embassy representatives in South Africa, government officials and intelligence 
officials with knowledge of the respective country’s foreign policy positions as well 
as academics, journalists, activists, business people  (formal and informal) and 




The interviews affirmed Neuman’s (1997: 253) contention that open-ended questions 
generate better success (as noted in Chapter 1 discussion under research design).  
Open-ended questions facilitated more expansive discussions on responses provided 
by interviewees as well as fruitful engagement on characterizations provided by 
interviewees with regard to hegemony, partnership and domination.   Given the wide-
range of interviews conducted and diversity of opinions expressed, the data has been 
collated under the four key questions that guided the engagement of the interviewer.   
This allows for a structured analysis of the general data obtained from the interviews.  
The overarching assessment of the interview data is that it provides concrete 
affirmation of the contention of Chapter 4 that domestic realities and regional 
perceptions constrain South Africa’s cultivation of a more effective Southern African 
foreign policy. 
 
4.4.1 How would you characterize South Africa’s relations with Southern Africa? 





Director of a South African NGO: Have you ever been to Windhoek’s city centre? It 
is like you have not crossed any border! Do you know that in Maputo you can pay in 
rands? Of course, South Africa is hegemonic, and not just politically and 
economically, I would argue increasingly culturally too... 
 
South African academic: ...if  it is a partnership, it is a partnership of elites. 
 
Zambian citizen: Go to the Shoprite and see for yourself...do you sell expired products 
in South Africa? There are different standards for South Africa and for us, maybe you 
think we are so poor we will not care...I don’t know hegemonic, South Africa is just 
bad. 
 
Angolan government official:  Our relationship with South Africa has matured over 
the years.   But being partners does not preclude dominance in certain areas, for 
example South Africa is very prominent in the region’s interaction with the 
international community. 
                                         
Zimbabwean reporter:  A partner in lots of areas and a hegemon in others.   I guess it 
also depends on which side you belong.   South Africa has supported the ZANU-PF’s 
calls for less western pressure but as MDC argues, the resultant prolonging of the 
Zimbabwean crisis serves the interests of the South African business community well.   
My own opinion is that the current state of the country opens it up to South Africa’s 
hegemonic tentacles.   I don’t believe this is necessarily the fault of South Africa... 
 
Botswana government official: 100% hegemonic.  If you attend SADC meetings, you 
will see what I mean.   They are always trying to influence the agenda in a particular 
way.   But Botswana does not have memory loss: it should never be forgotten that 




Swaziland government official: It is not a difficult call.   Interfering in the sovereign 
affairs of a country as South Africa does by housing PUDEMO and giving them 
support through solidarity in destabilizing protests is without a doubt hegemonic 
behavior. 
 




Of note is that there is no homogeneous response to the South African government 
belief that its relations with the region are best described as partnership.  Equally 
interesting is the split between official government position and civil society 
perception in both South Africa and Zambia: officials in both South Africa and 
Zambia describe South Africa as a partner while the civil society in both these 
countries, predominantly view South Africa as hegemonic.    
 
It is not surprising that both Angola and Zimbabwe characterize South Africa as a 
partner with hegemonic elements: both these countries have been considered rivals 
(by RSA foreign policy makers) in terms of leading the region (Zimbabwe, 
traditionally and Angola, emerging).  It is also worth mentioning that interviews in 
Angola were initially conducted in 2006.  However, a second round of interviews was 
necessitated by the perceived tightening of relations between Angola and South 
Africa under the Zuma administration.  Of note is that apart from a more diplomatic 
response from Angolan government officials, there was no perceptible shift in 
perceptions towards South Africa, particularly in civil society circles. 
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Botswana’s position is not surprising: the country under Ian Khama, is increasingly 
becoming a thorn in South Africa’s attempts to foster a cohesive regional policy.   Its 
obstructive role in the negotiations of economic partnership agreements with the 
European Union as well as Khama’s anti-SADC position with regard to Zimbabwe is 
instructive in this regard.   However, the October 2010 visit of Khama to South Africa 
could well bring a shift in such relations. 
 
The response from Swaziland was also not surprising, given the Monarchy’s 
displeasure with South Africa’s perceived interference in its sovereign affairs.   
COSATU’s unilateral stance on alliance with pro-democracy groups such as 
PUDEMO in Swaziland is as much a sore-point for South Africa’s tri-partite alliance 
as it is for the Swazi government.  Although getting interviews with the muzzled civil 
society in Swaziland was difficult, the one representative that was prepared to share 
views was clear in articulating the position that “South Africa is a hegemon but selfish 
in not wanting others to enjoy what its people already have...Why else is it so 
inconsistent, leaving COSATU to put pressure on the oppressive regime in 
Swaziland..” 
 
With less than half the region considering South Africa a partner, it is obvious that 
South Africa’s foreign policy in the region will need to be reconceptualized or 
undergo a major public relations overhaul if South Africa is to successfully promote a 





4.4.2 Assess South Africa’s Foreign Policy Options in Southern Africa 
Interview Excerpts: 
 
Malawi government official: With all that political and economic might, even military 
if needs be, what else can South Africa be but hegemonic? And who will challenge 
South Africa if it chooses to exercise its power selfishly?  Such power even 
determines South Africa’s partnerships in a selfish way: I am sure it has a better 
partnership with Angola than Malawi.   These things are about what you can get... 
 
South African government official: In a globalised world and rapidly integrating 
region, all sustainable options point towards partnership.... 
 
Lesotho civil society: South Africa is well-positioned to underwrite the region’s 
integration project........the big brother, partner. 
 
Zambian citizen: A selfish giant that will always protect its interests above all else. 
 
 
There is an alarming consensus among all countries of the region (including South 
Africa) as well as between government and civil society that there are only two 
feasible options: selfish hegemony or partnership.   Such responses affirm the narrow 
conceptualization of South Africa’s role in the region and effectively pigeon-holes the 
country into an unmitigated good or a resolutely bad neighbor.  Moreover, the 
narrow-minded focus of the interviewees has blinded them to the possibility of South 
Africa not playing a role in the region and focusing on its broader regional alliances 
(as with Nigeria, Algeria etc.) and/or international relations (such as IBSA).   
Although some Southern African countries criticize or are wary of South Africa’s role 
in the region, they cannot imagine South Africa not playing such a role and simply 
being a regional bystander. 
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Neuman (1997: 435) reminds us that “Many researchers emphasize positive data and 
ignore what is not explicitly in the data, but being alert to absences is also important.” 
The fact that the notion of benign hegemony was not raised (even from the South 
Africans interviewed) and that ‘hegemony’ and ‘partnership’ are viewed as mutually 
exclusive options, is noteworthy.   In a sense, it explains why South Africa is so easily 
perceived as maintaining a fundamentally flawed global order instead of contributing 
to its transformation: as a selfish hegemon, South Africa will maintain the system that 
advantages it.  The research results are also an indictment against South Africa’s 
‘quiet diplomacy’ which has been the benign hegemonic response from South Arica 
to address the perceptions of it as the ‘bully-boy of the region.’ There is no 
appreciation from the region that partnership can actually be a modality of 
engagement for hegemons as is other more aggressive interventions.   In addition, the 
failure of South Africa’s own government officials to capitalize on and promote such 
thinking shows that the South African foreign policy position with regard to the 
region remains defensive rather than offensive.   It is disappointing that most South 
African government officials do not see and therefore cannot champion the benefits of 
South Africa being both a hegemon and a partner or a pivot state (as articulated by 






4.4.3 How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the region? 




Angolan government official: Important how? Angola is also increasingly being 
touted as a key regional player.   Each country has its own strengths.   No country, I 
think, is exceptional. 
 
Botswana editor: It is not the most important country.   Botswana is recognized as 
having the most stable economy in the region and is even ranked higher than South 
Africa in the 2009 World Bank Human Development report! 
 
Zimbabwean government official: South Africa is no doubt a regional driver but is as 
important as every other country in the region.   You are only as strong as your 
weakest link, especially in the current globalised world. 
 
 Namibian researcher: South Africa is a significant voice for Africa in global forums 
but is just as important as Namibia or Lesotho when it comes to regional integration. 
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Malawi government official: South Africa is critical to the region achieving its goals.   
South Africa is the strongest country in the region.   We need its support for the 
successful implementation of projects.   Just look at its contribution to SADC .... 
 
 
While South Africans believe that their country’s great importance to the region is 
reflected in the fact that Southern Africa is the apex of South Africa’s foreign policy 
priorities, more than half of its regional neighbors believe this is not the case.   
Interestingly, the United States and especially China have been identified as 
significant developmental partners by such countries.   Even a cursory review of the 
foreign policy focus of both the USA and China will show that Southern Africa is not 
a priority.  This harsh reality aptly underscores the dilemma that South Africa faces in 
Southern Africa.  The preference for external development partners is a testament to 
the damage caused by apartheid to the regional psyche.  While it is true that such 
external partners can facilitate development, their own national interests militate 
against such development being transformative.  However, in terms of the momentum 
towards regional integration, it is in South Africa’s long-term interests to ensure that 
the focus from competitive economic growth is shifted to inclusive and shared 
growth. 
 
The divide between the smaller economies (Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi) and the 
rest of the region in terms of South Africa’s importance for development is also an 
observation that warrants deeper reflection.  That Swaziland and Malawi find South 
Africa critical for development in the region; despite labeling it as a hegemon in 
question one is noteworthy.    
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The contradictory positions of Angola and Zimbabwe are also significant considering 
that they are viewed as current and future strategic partners by the South African 
government.  The choice of these countries as strategic partners, in a sense, affirms 
their positions that they are just as important in driving the regional agenda as South 
Africa.  Their responses show that the challenge to South African foreign policy 
makers is not only convincing the region that the South African vision is 
complementary to their needs; but also internalizing the reality that South Africa 
needs the region and its foreign policy should complement the regional integration 
vision or face the risk of alienation. 
 




South African academic: South Africa’s regional relations need to be premised on the 
country’s national interests rather than foreign policy ideals. 
 
South African government official: We spent a lot of resources in DRC and got kicked 
out of the Inga Dam project in return.  We need more mutually beneficial relations not 
the current ‘parent-ungrateful teenager’ dynamics. 
 
Lesotho government official: Relations need to be founded on current and historic 
realities.  SACU relations are a good example of a system that works.  A review of 
such relations will be a serious mistake. 
 
Zimbabwean citizen: South Africa’s regional relations should be rooted in the regional 




The divide between South Africa and the rest of the region over this issue reflects the 
challenge confronting South African foreign policy.  South Africans, whether in 
government or civil society, are unanimous in their belief that the country needs to 
benefit more from her costly regional investments (whether economic, diplomatic or 
peacekeeping).  South Africa’s failure to capitalize on post-conflict reconstruction 
initiatives in resource-rich DRC is an often quoted example in this regard. The 
development of Inga III hydro power project had initially been granted to SADC 
countries (Angola, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) which intended to build the 
hydro power plant under a joint venture (Westcor) and share the electricity generated.   
The DRC has since decided to de-couple Westcor from the construction of Inga III, 
and has offered Inga III to a private investor (Australian company, BHP).  This is 
perceived by almost all South African government officials interviewed as a huge slap 
in the face for South Africa which actively supported the finalization of the peace 
process in the DRC and which continues to play a major role with regard to Security 
Sector Reform.  Crudely put, their point is that South Africa was unable to benefit 
from an environment which it helped stabilize.  The expectations from such officials 
are interesting given that South Africa’s prioritized involvement in the DRC was 
defended in government documents (such as the IRPS Cluster Programme of Action) 
in terms of South Africa’s advancement of the African Agenda.   In a sense, it affirms 
the suspicions of Southern African countries that South Africa’s foreign policy vision 
is not as altruistic as it is made out to be. 
 
In contrast, the region is of the view that the country should focus on more equitable, 
less self-beneficial hegemonic regional relations.   Along with the findings of question 
three, it affirms this study’s hypothesis that South Africa’s inability to convince other 
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states that her vision is complimentary to their needs has inhibited her ability to 
engineer a process of transformation and development in the region.    
 
4.5.   An Allison–model Assessment of South Africa’s Foreign Policy Making 
The research above shows that there are clear inconsistencies in how South African 
foreign policy is perceived by the other countries of the Southern African region.   
However, this is not surprising when one considers that the data also reveals that there 
is no homogenous understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy within the country 
itself.  Given the broad disparities in the conceptualization of what South Africa’s role 
can and should be in the region, how have decisions been taken?  
 
Recognizing that foreign policy output is a function of the interplay of numerous 
actors, G.T.  Allison in 1971 developed a three-pronged model to explain the extent to 
which elements of choice, routine and contest influence foreign policy decisions.   By 
using the Allison models, foreign policy decision-making processes can be ‘mapped’ 
or framed in three ways to explain what happens when groups in a government meet, 
deliberate and recommend options.  These are known as the rational actor model, the 
organizational process model and the bureaucratic politics model and are a useful way 
for the government to rationalize the options available to it.  While the Allison models 
do not provide all the answers to the questions around the foreign policy making 
process; they provide a useful analytical tool to probe and investigate the nature and 
intricacies of the policy process and to ultimately understand the interlocking and 




4.5.1 The rational actor model 
This model maintains that foreign policy making occurs between identified players 
who have set goals and who make clearly-defined and informed choices about how to 
achieve them.  A range of assumptions underlie this approach:  the existence of a 
centrally controlled, informed and value-maximizing government; behavior which 
follows calculated choices from informed and rational leaders; and a government 
which will act on the basis of either opportunities or threats originating from the 
international environment.  If one assumes that the South African state acted as a 
central actor, that its leaders were well-informed and that they made a rational choice 
between competing alternatives, then one can argue that the South African foreign 
policy makers were faced with a fairly straightforward situation. They had to consider 
four scenarios (Fragmentation, Exploitation, Partnership and Strategic Autarky – as 
illustrated in Chapter 2) and choose a common way forward.   As part of the decision-
making process, the South African government would have had to consider the 
implications of these four competing alternatives (see summary of alternatives in 
Chapter 2), before coming to a final decision.  However, the reality is that South 
African foreign policy continues to be branded as ambiguous, an indicator that foreign 
policy makers vacillate among the various alternatives.  In this regard, it would be 
grossly inaccurate to assume that decision-makers act ‘rationally’ or with full or 
complete information at hand.   Moreover, the South African government is subject to 
unique pressures in that it is dominated by a ruling party that is constituted by a tri-
partite alliance (see section 4.1 on domestic constraints).    
 
While the model refers to ‘informed and rational leaders’, it does not cater for the 
personalized foreign policy that has characterized South Africa from 1994 to 2008 
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(see Alden, C.   and Le Pere, G.   2003.   South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy: 
from reconciliation to renewal? Adelphi paper, 362.   London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies).  Personality is one of the few non-rational aspects of foreign 
policy making.  For example, the celebratory rhetoric around the ‘miracle’ of Nelson 
Mandela’s ‘long walk to freedom,’ conveyed by the popular concept of ‘Madiba 
Magic’, promises that all things are possible if and when he becomes involved.  While 
having a leader of the caliber of Nelson Mandela had its advantages, Aziz Pahad 
(interview) pointed out that it put greater pressure on the country to deliver: “This is 
something no other country has to wrestle with; our president symbolizes everything 
everyone in the world aspires to, and while we are happy to be called a political 
miracle, those who create miracles are supposed to deliver on everything - internally 
and externally.” 
 
Moreover, a 2008 analysis of global media coverage on South Africa (100 
newspapers from 15 geo-politically representative countries) – undertaken by research 
group Media Tenor - shows that when Mbeki looks bad, South Africa looks bad.  The 
report notes that “Western media have grown particularly intolerant of President 
Mbeki and the country’s foreign policy in relation to Zimbabwe, and they are 
increasingly linking crime, xenophobia and the power outages to a crisis of leadership 
in the government as well as the ANC” (De Lange, 2008: 8).   Interestingly, the party-
internal coup that removed South African President Thabo Mbeki from power has 
provoked concern among African leaders regarding South Africa's future foreign 
policy.  The 2008 AU chairman, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete noted that: “It 
is a big loss for Africa to lose such a prominent leader…[who has]strong commitment 
to Africa's development…the New Partnership for Africa's Development  was his 
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brainchild” (cited in Heitman, 2008). It was under Mbeki, initially as deputy 
president, that South Africa took on a leading peace-making and peacekeeping role in 
the region and there are concerns that a populist successor might curtail South Africa's 
strategic engagement in Africa in favor of short-term social programmes to satisfy the 
left wing that toppled Mbeki.  Indeed, Robert Schrire (interview), head of the political 
science department at the University of Cape Town, forecasts that after Mbeki leaves 
office, there will likely be a ‘depersonalization’ of South African foreign policy and a 
turn to domestic issues such as social inequality and HIV/AIDS.   However, Zuma has 
taken a more nuanced position with the appointment of prominent presidential 
advisors who have experience in managing international relations.  These include 
Welile Nhlapo as National Security Special Advisor (former Ambassador to Ethiopia 
[1995] and the US [2007], Special Envoy to Burundi [1997], Deputy Director-General 
for Africa at DFA [1998], Head of Presidential Support Unit on conflict situations in 
Africa and Middle East [2001] and Lindiwe Zulu as International Relations Advisor 
(former Ambassador to Brazil, Chief Director in DFA).  The rational actor model 
does not cater for such informal dynamics in foreign policy making. 
 
Kegley and Wittkopf  (2001: 40-41) concur that rational decision-making is more of 
an idealized standard against which policy decision-making is made, rather than an 
accurate descriptor of behavior in the real world.  In reality, foreign policy making 
takes place in circumstances that are far from ideal.  Furthermore, the rational actor 
model also does not cater for the possibility that foreign policy is formulated not only 
in the pursuit of interests but also in the advancement of beliefs and values.   Though 
less tangible than, for example, trade interests, belief systems and  values are by no 
means less significant in the arena of South African foreign policy making.    
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Ideas continue to play an influential role in South African foreign policy.  Since 1948, 
apartheid ideology had a determining effect on South Africa’s foreign policy options 
and instruments.  In post-apartheid South Africa, the values of foreign policy were 
captured in 1993 by former President Mandela (1993: 87) in a Foreign Affairs article: 
 “•The issue of human rights is central to international relations and an 
understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the 
economic, social and environmental. 
• That concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be in our 
foreign policy issues. 
• That economic development depends on growing regional and 
international economic cooperation in an interdependent world. 
• These convictions stand in stark contrast to how, for nearly fifty years 
apartheid South Africa disastrously conducted its international relations.” 
 
The African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) are other notable ideas that have shaped South Africa’s foreign policy but 
which are ignored by the systemic rational actor model. 
 
4.5.2 The organizational process model 
According to this model, the pursuit of policy is determined by the routine behavioral 
habits of the organization involved in the decision.  In contrast with the rational actor 
perspective, governments are not unitary actors in the making of policy.   
Governments consist of a number of loosely allied organizations, each with a life and 
experience of their own.   One could argue that this model caters for the dynamics of 
 194
the tri-partite alliance that informs the policies of the ruling party.   This is especially 
critical in South Africa where the distinction between the ruling party and state is 
often blurred.   It cannot be disputed that the approach of the post-apartheid 
government has its roots in the experiences of the ruling party.  The model could  
explain why the influence of the military and intelligence in apartheid foreign-policy 
making has been balanced by civilian input in a post-apartheid era. 
 
The model also accounts for the role of interests outside the state such as the media 
and business.  The impact of business interests on foreign policy in South Africa is 
particularly visible with regard to post-apartheid corporate expansion on the 
continent.  In South Africa, the media has often been ignored with regard to foreign 
policy, largely because of its tendency to send conflicting messages to government, 
depending on the issue being sensationalized, whether it is the African Renaissance or 
refugees.    
 
However, like the rational actor model, there is a failure to recognize the impact of 
personality on foreign policy (as discussed in 4.5.1).  This is despite the contention by 
Jacob Zuma that “there is no difference in policy.  Mbeki does not have a policy of his 
own.   Zuma does not have a policy of his own, we all belong to the ANC, we all 
subscribe to the ANC policy” (interview with Smith, 2008: 20).   In this regard, Habib 
(2010: 50) is on the mark when he argues that “post-apartheid foreign policy cannot 
be understood outside an analysis of the ANC, its character, the hopes and political 
aspirations of its leadership, and ultimately their strategic orientations.”  It is worth 
noting that the ANC’s Polokwane Conference in 2007 generated a number of 
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resolutions relating to foreign policy.  Van Nieuwkerk (2010: 102) summarizes these 
as: 
[re-affirmation of] the ANC’s commitment to progressive internationalism 
as a response to the challenge of imperialism (where the system of 
capitalism is seen to be dominated by one ‘hyper-power’; support for the 
establishment of an AU government via processes of regional integration, 
for example, following a developmental approach to SADC’s 
consolidation; support for India, Brazil and China as strategic partners; the 
‘intensification’ of economic diplomacy; and a name change from DFA to 
the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). 
 
However, the role of DFA under the Mandela and Mbeki administrations is 
instructive in this regard.  Under Mandela, the DFA (specifically the multilateral 
section responsible for issues around disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation) 
played a leading role in the drafting of South African policy on the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and related matters.   In contrast, DFA played a facilitative 
rather than a policy role with regard to NEPAD issues.  Under Mbeki, it was the 
Presidential Policy Unit and other technocratic experts that were largely responsible 
for formulating the South African NEPAD input. 
 
In fact, one of the strengths of the organizational model is its ability to explain such 
role and influence of political parties in foreign policy making.  It should also be 
noted that such analysis is not confined to the ruling party and will also encompass 
the role of opposition parties which in South Africa have often been vociferous on 
foreign policy issues.  The Democratic Alliance’s position on Zimbabwe attests to 
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this.   The DA has often exploited the negative media perceptions of the government’s 
handling of the crisis.   In December 2003, the DA even released its policy alternative 
for Zimbabwe entitled, “Road map to democracy in Zimbabwe” 
(http://www.wits.ac.za/saiia/LeonSpeech.htm).  Of note, though, is that there is no 
evidence to suggest that any South African opposition party has successfully played 
any major role in shaping or altering South Africa’s policy on Zimbabwe.    
 
 
4.5.3 The bureaucratic politics model 
The central focus of this model is the conflict and cooperation between departments 
charged with the decision-making and administration of foreign policy.  There is 
recognition that specialized bodies (in government) have different interests and 
powers, and the policy process is about power relationships and bargaining between 
them.  One could argue that at the level of departments, Foreign Affairs and Trade 
and Industry compete for the ‘right to frame the policy question’ and for the right to 
inform and advise cabinet and the president on the position to take.  However 
depending on the issue, Defense (peace-keeping) and even Science and Technology 
(NEPAD Projects) can play a more prominent role.  The function of Intelligence in 
advising on the threats to and opportunities for the realization of South Africa’s 
foreign policy goals should also not be ignored.  Interestingly, Pfister’s study (2005) 
shows how different apartheid governments relied on different departments with 
regard to foreign policy.  He details how Verwoerd relied on the experts of the 
Foreign Affairs office, Vorster used intelligence to compensate for his ‘serious lack of 
decisive leadership’, Botha shifted responsibility to the military and de Klerk once 
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again turned to the foreign affairs professionals to lay the foundation for the 
dismantling of apartheid.    
 
The post-apartheid system is vastly different – the cluster system of governance- 
compels government departments to work together.  For example, the International 
Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) Cluster is responsible for foreign policy and 
brings together departments such as Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry, Intelligence, 
Defense, the Presidency and Home Affairs among others.  However, the greater 
impetus for cooperation does not discount the possibility of conflict.  A project 
initiated in 2006 to identify strategic partners on the continent for South Africa was 
abandoned largely because of the failure of the IRPS Cluster to reach consensus on 
the countries.   The different interests of the departments subjugated the ability of the 
Cluster to streamline South Africa’s foreign policy by identifying common strategic 
partners. 
 
While this model caters for the different departmental interests, it fails to take into 
account differences within a particular department.   Van der Westhuizen (1998: 444) 
alludes to such differences within South Africa’s DFA by differentiating between an 
‘internationalist’ and ‘neo-mercantilist’ camp.  Officials representing the previous 
apartheid government belong to the latter group which, consistent with the logic of 
neo-realism, emphasize the importance of trade and self interest over all else.  The 
‘internationalists’ are mainly those with exile experience that were in favor of a 
demonstrably greater degree of solidarity with the collective problems of the 
developing world.  The ambiguity that often characterizes South Africa’s foreign 
policy is attributed to these competing interests. 
 
Chapter 5 
Post apartheid foreign policy: Old wine in new bottles? 
 
Any analysis of South African foreign policy with regard to the Southern African 
region will have to involve an understanding of both the domestic and international 
environments and the relation of one to the other.  James Rosenau (1987: 1) notes that 
“the analysis of foreign policy is a bridging discipline that takes as its focus of study 
the bridges that whole systems called nation-states build to link themselves and their 
subsystems to even more encompassing international systems of which they are a 
part.” This section explores the changes in South Africa’s internal and external 
environment which provided material for the construction of new bridges as well as 
the extent to which the linkages created by such bridges remained the same. 
 
5.1 Catalyst for Change: New foreign policy environment 
In many ways the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994 and the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 which symbolized the end of the Cold War marked the turning 
point in South African relations with the rest of the Southern African region 
(Bischoff:1995, Black and Klotz: 1995, Davies: 1992, 1995, Evans: 1993, Southall: 
1994, Vale: 1991, 1992,1995, Owoeye: 1994, Mills and Clapham: 1991, Venter: 
1997, Du Pisani: 1994, Makoena: 1998).  Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 provide a broad 
exposition of how these changes in the internal and external environment set new 
parameters for the reconstruction of South Africa’s foreign policy towards the African 
continent while Section 5.2 demonstrates that the outcome continues to reflect old 
regional dynamics albeit packaged in a new form.    
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5.1.1 External Environment 
 
We cannot understand our own process of liberation without 
understanding the general conditions of the period in which we live.   
Having realized political liberation, how will global transitions impact on 
our ongoing search for economic and  social  emancipation? 
(Lenin collected works, 1964: 36) 
 
Lenin’s question was particularly relevant for a post-apartheid government that had to 
acclimatize to the changes in the broader system within which it found itself.  The 
most far-reaching of the major shifts in the global order was the disintegration of the 
Soviet empire and the unprecedented impact of globalization on the world economy.   
This impacted on South African post-apartheid foreign policy in two ways.    
 
Firstly, there is much consensus that with the end of the Cold War, Africa has become 
increasingly marginalized and lost its prominence as an ally in either supporting or 
stemming the advance of communism (Clapham: 1994; Bischoff: 1995; Callaghy: 
1995; Harbeson: 1995; Vale: 1995; Okeke Uzodike: 1996).  In fact, Jack Spence 
(Business Day, 1994) has warned that South Africa and its neighbors are in danger of 
being marginalized in the cutthroat world of international politics unless they succeed 
in establishing strong regional links.  It is a point that Fantu Cheru (1996: 46) aptly 
captures in his exposition of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) negotiations when African needs were never addressed.   In 
the UNCED process, issues of particular importance to Africa – the dumping of toxic 
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waste, debt and commodity prices, and desertification – were given scant 
consideration.  This can be contrasted with the considerable international concern 
expressed over deforestation, ozone depletion and global warming.  Edigheji (2007: 
9) attributes such social inequalities to “the triumphalism of liberal democracy and 
market fundamentalism, especially following the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union…” Edigheji (2007: 10) points out that “the era of market fundamentalism has 
witnessed rising inequality within nations, across nations, within regions and across 
regions, with the most compromised and impoverished being the African continent 
and its people.”  In essence, South Africa was forced to craft her new post-apartheid 
developmental agenda within such an unreceptive external environment.   It was such 
conditions that shaped her championing of the reform of the international system, that 
propelled her to use her newly acquired moral stature to be the voice of the 
developing world, and which underscored her focus on South-South co-operation.   
Habib (2009: 143) concludes that “The transition has occurred when a particular 
configuration of power prevailed in the global order that not only established the 
parameters which governed its evolution, but also determined which interests 
prevailed within it.”  Jeremy Cronin (interview with Gumede, 2005: 76) affirms that 
the ANC came into power at a time when there was not much space to maneuver: 
The triumph of neo-liberalism was at its zenith in the early 1990s.   So for 
a combination of reasons, including the sheer power, the ideological and 
hegemonic power of the neo-liberal model and the weakness of the 
left…whether from panic or deep concern, laden with the responsibilities 
of governing, they were persuaded of certain aspects, not necessarily the 
whole package.  The core aspects of the neo-liberal paradigm became very 
influential in government circles and in leading parts of the ANC. 
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Landsberg (2005: electronic) concurs that South Africa's transition coincided with 
what could be termed “heightened globalization, the drift toward free market 
orthodoxies as the only and best ways to address poverty and underdevelopment, and 
liberal democracy as the only democratic alternative on offer.” In the eloquent words 
of Fukuyama (1989: electronic):   
The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the 
total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western 
liberalism...What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold 
War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end 
of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution 
and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government. 
 
The second post-cold war feature that re-defined the international system and 
compelled South Africa’s foreign policy to respond through integration dogma was 
the impact of globalization and its concomitant  ‘compression’ of the world into new 
patterns of production, integrated financial spheres, homogenization of cultures etc.   
With its tendency to fragment, differentiate, and marginalize social forces and 
countries incapable of catching up with its processes, uneven development, long 
associated with capitalist expansion, is probably the most visible trade mark of 
globalization in its contemporary form.  However, social democrats such as Sachs, 
Held, and Stiglitz, believe that the benefits of globalization outstrip the costs.  They 
argue for an ‘enlightened globalization’ where global market integration is one that is 
managed fairly and is accompanied by a progressive global social integration.  For 
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countries on the periphery of the global order such as those in Africa, the task of 
humanizing such a globalist project is near impossible.  The immediate challenge 
remains simply contending with the forces of globalization. 
 
Hirst and Thompson (1996) observe that with globalization, unfettered and 
uncontrollable market forces have become the principal agents and forces of change, 
further eroding the primacy of states in the international system.  Developing 
countries, such as those in Africa, are particularly vulnerable to the pernicious effects 
of unbridled market forces and have turned to regional integration as a mechanism for 
redressing some of the negative effects associated with a world that is globalizing 
without much African role or input.  Mittleman (1999: 25) even claims that, 
“regionalism today is emerging as a potent force in the global restructuring of power 
and production.”  Many developing countries see regional integration as a strategy for 
overcoming the deficiencies of small and poor domestic markets in an increasingly 
liberalizing, globalizing, and competitive world economy which has been shaped by 
the Washington Consensus positioning of the unfettered market as the driver of 
development.    
 
The need for cooperation between South Africa and the region, the need to think 
together, act together and build together, had never been more compelling.   As Klaus 
Schwab, the then-president of the World Economic Forum (WEF), argued at the 1999 
Southern Africa Economic Summit in Durban, South Africa: “In the global economy, 
regional strength is paramount” (http://www.weforum.org/pdf 
/SummitReports/africa1999.pdf). In fact, the conclusion to the 1993 African 
Development Bank study on economic integration reads: “so serious are the 
 203
challenges facing Southern Africa that governments cannot afford to ignore…the 
limitations which national boundaries impose on their prospects for economic 
recovery and growth…Regional integration is not an optional extra; it is a matter of 
survival.”  It is within this context that we can better understand the evolution of post-
apartheid South Africa’s effort toward the transformative development of her region 
by strengthening regional organizations such as the SADC.   For example, while the 
relatively small individual sizes of SADC countries constrain their efforts to deal with 
the immense challenges posed by globalization, their combined weight represents a 
market of 190 million people and a $180 billion economy (Mills and Sidiropoulos, 
2001: 2).   The conclusion of a February 2000 study on Economic Cooperation and 
Regional Integration Policy by the African Development Bank African Development 
Fund affirms that: 
Regional economic integration has an important role to play in the pursuit 
of accelerated economic growth and sustainable development in Africa.   
Regional integration will permit: 
• The expansion of market size which will facilitate greater specialization 
and industrialization through economies of scale, thereby helping to 
overcome the small size problem of African economies; 
• Improved donor coordination, leading to a systematic exchange of 
information and mutually beneficial efficiency in the use of scarce 
development resources; 
• The acceleration of domestic and foreign direct investment and 
competitiveness of African economies in a globalizing world economy; 
• Greater trade among member countries through removal of trade 
barriers; and 
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• Rapid and extensive improvement in allocative and dynamic efficiency 
through enhanced competition among the participating countries and 
increased incentives for the adoption of new technologies and methods 
of production alongside rapid innovation. 
 
In essence, South Africa’s alignment with the region would in the long run provide 
the opportunity for strengthening the bargaining power of  Southern Africa on 
economic issues of contemporary significance such as external debt, commodity 
prices, and technical assistance, to name but a few. 
 
Regional integration is also critical in terms of South Africa’s broader support for the 
AU agenda and its related commitment to a process of gradual continental integration.   
The Abuja Treaty (1991) lays the ground work for the creation of an African 
Economic Community, with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) serving as the 
building blocks.  The RECs are expected to merge into the African Common Market 
between 2019 and 2023.  Southern African countries are members of COMESA 
and/or SADC.   Of note is that these two RECs, in particular, are taking major steps 
towards this continental vision.  The CES Tripartite Arrangement, launched in 
October 2008, currently defines the vision and regional strategic objective of Southern 
and Eastern Africa.  The CES tripartite arrangement covers a major part of the 
continent, involving 26 countries, accounting for about 56% of the population and 
about 58% of the combined GDP of Africa in 2008.   The Tripartite Arrangement is a 
bold initiative to expand intra-regional trade, promote inter-REC collaboration and 
facilitate joint planning, resource mobilization and project/program implementation.   
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It will also help to address the challenge of multiple memberships.  The key 
provisions of the CES Tripartite arrangement include:  
(i) establishment of the CES Tripartite FTA to promote deeper trade integration;  
(ii) development of joint infrastructure programs, financing and implementation (a 
good example of which is the CES North South corridor - a model aid for 
trade pilot program launched in April 2009);  
(iii) development of joint programs for agricultural development and food security;  
(iv)  development of programs to enhance movement of business persons, labor 
and services across the region; and  
(v) preparation of common regional positions and strategies in multilateral and 
international trade negotiations.    
 
However, it should be noted that scholars and analysts are not unanimous in their 
assessment of the efficacy of regional integration.  A number of questions have been 
raised regarding the utility of the regional integration route as a panacea to Africa’s 
marginalization in the global system (Davies: 1991; Gibb: 1998; Clapham et al eds: 
2001).  The most extreme thinking in this regard is that regionalization might be a 
double-edged sword, entrenching a few islands of development in the region thereby 
compounding the suffering and deprivation of the majority of its inhabitants.  Davies 
(1992) summarizes that the fundamental issue facing Africa’s regions is the extent to 
which disparities and inequalities can be addressed in an integration project: “to what 
extent… will integration aim to transform existing patterns of interaction in the 
region, rather than merely quantitatively extend existing ties…”  South Africa’s 
history within its own region (explained in Chapter 2) typifies the challenges facing 
countries as they attempt to deal with political differences and economic insecurities.  
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At the same time, one could argue that the critique of the efficacy of regional 
integration is premised largely on the misleading assumption that regional integration 
would be foremost a matter of economic issues.   
 
However, the reality is that the contemporary wave of regionalism is a heterogeneous, 
multidimensional phenomenon which involves state, market and society actors and 
covers economic, cultural, political, security as well as environmental aspects.   In this 
regard, it is a comprehensive response to the broad array of issues over which 
globalization has heightened interdependence.  This new reality has compelled a 
broadening of the security agenda, in particular, and reinforced the philosophy 
popularized by Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU Secretary-General between 1989 and 
2001, that “the problems of my neighbor are my problems.” Contested state borders 
and competition for scarce resources have now been exacerbated by new challenges 
that have not been part of the traditional understanding of national security, for 
example, climate change.  One can add to this, the soaring food and oil prices amidst 
a global financial crisis.   Indeed, countries find themselves in a world of old rules but 
new threats which forces them to re-conceptualize or abandon existing paradigms.  At 
the conclusion of the April 2009 Summit of the G20 Heads of State in London, the 
British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, started his media briefing by announcing that 
the Washington Consensus had been declared dead, and suggested the dawn of a new 
consensus era—akin to a London Consensus.   As Brown put it: 
The old Washington consensus is over.  Today we have reached a new 
consensus that we take global action together to deal with the problems 
we face, that we will do what is necessary to restore growth and jobs that 
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we will take essential action to rebuild confidence and trust in our 




Indeed, transnational and rapidly changing threats necessitate regional and 
international collaboration.  In addition, the events (terrorist attacks in the United 
States of America) and post-events (creation of the coalition of the willing to fight the 
scourge of terrorism) of 11 September 2001 further reinvigorated the notion of the 
regional security complex, associated with Barry Buzan (1991: 190), where security 
complex is defined “as a group of states whose primary security concerns link 
together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be 
considered apart from one another.” Global economic crisis has taught us that the 
prosperity of national economies is now acutely dependent on economic 
developments in other parts of the world and on the overall health of the global 
economy.  In a prescient article published in the early 1980s Richard Ullman made a 
general case for broadening the concept of security.   He insisted that national security 
is threatened by the consequences of events that quickly degrade the quality of life of 
state and nonstate actors alike, thus narrowing significantly the future range of 
political choice (Ullman, 1983: 130-135). 
 
In this regard, issues of illegal migration, terrorist networks, water scarcity, food 
insecurity and diseases such as cholera bind the countries of the Southern African 
region together.   As the South African industrialist Dr Anton Rupert put it over thirty 
years ago: “If they [RSA’s neighbors in the sub-region] don’t eat, we won’t sleep” 
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(cited in Mills, 2000: 8).  Minister Alfred Nzo, in September 1995, was more eloquent 
in describing the global environment and its impact on South Africa,  
Our operational environment has changed dramatically.  The end of the 
Cold War has created a new global situation in which our young 
democracy must find its feet.  The new world order, if it exists at all, is 
fraught with uncertainties and insecurities.  Ideological conflict has to a 
large extent been replaced by economic competition, the rules for which 
have not yet been fully agreed upon.  The ground beneath our feet is not 
firm: It is volatile and unpredictable.  Yet it is our primary task to secure 
and promote the sovereign integrity of the South African State, as well as 
the security and welfare of its citizens.  These are the considerations 
which ultimately determine everything we do in the conduct of our 
foreign relations. 
 
The underlying argument of this section is, therefore, that the geostrategic 
consequences of the end of the Cold War have required South Africa to prioritize and 
sharpen the focus on its foreign and security policies towards the countries in its 
immediate neighborhood.  The challenge of re-aligning domestic and foreign policies 
in a global environment was aptly captured by former Botswana President Festus 
Mogae in his 1998 Budget Speech: 
We are facing much more competitive regional and international 
environment, which rewards those countries which adapt to the dictates of 
market discipline and marginalize those that fail to do so.  Our timely and 
adequate response to the opportunities and challenges of globalization, 
will, to a very large extent, determine our future prosperity as a nation. 
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 5.1.2 Post–apartheid internal dynamics 
Co-incidentally, the broad changes in the external environment of 1989 were followed 
by propitious internal changes within South Africa.  While the Southern African 
region was divided for decades by bellicose rhetoric and active hostility between the 
South African apartheid regime and the rest of Southern Africa, in February 1990, the 
then-President de Klerk called for a new era of reconstruction and reconciliation in 
the region.  Moreover, as early as the 1990s, the ANC made no pretences that Africa 
represented an important sphere of strategic relationships.  This was reflected in the 
ANC’s policy documents which repeatedly committed itself to “actively seeking to 
promote greater regional cooperation along new lines which will correct imbalances 
in current relationships” (Davies et al, 1993: 2).  In 1993, an ANC foreign policy 
discussion paper further noted that: 
South Africa cannot escape its African destiny.  If we do not devote our 
energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have 
brought ruin to its various parts.[…] We are inextricably part of Southern 
Africa and our destiny is linked to that of the region, which is much more 
than a mere geographical concept . 
 
the fate of democratic SA is inextricably bound up with what happens in 
the rest of the continent…our foreign policy should reflect the interests of 
the continent of Africa. 
 
In this regard, both Southall (1994) and the 1994 ANC Foreign Policy Perspective 
allude to South Africa’s days as ‘a militaristic rogue elephant in Africa’ being 
replaced by a more cooperative philosophy and a professed intention “to become part 
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of a movement to create a new form of economic interaction in the region based on 
principles of mutual benefit and interdependence.” The Department of Foreign Affairs 
have distilled the ANC's commitments down to two primary objectives which cannot 
work in isolation of the region: wealth creation and security (www.dfa.gov.za).   This 
is underpinned by the thinking that creating sustainable wealth in a globalizing world 
needs the region as it gives it a stronger voice to challenge the international structures 
that disadvantage it.   At the same time, such security will be threatened if wealth is 
achieved in isolation and people within the region gravitate towards it, exacerbating 
problems such as illegal migration. 
 
As during the apartheid period, the centrality of the Southern African region to South 
Africa’s foreign policy is unquestionable.   However, in the post-apartheid period it is 
marked by a distinctive shift from policies of destabilization to those of cooperation 
(as captured in Chapter 2).   In 1992, Peter Vale argued that the challenge to those 
who have traditionally made South Africa's regional policy “is to liberate themselves 
from the narrow threat-based understanding of the country's regional priorities and to 
understand that South Africa's real interests in Southern Africa can only be 
determined by the interests of all those who have helped to create it.”  South African 
foreign policy-makers and government officials rose to this challenge: 
We have a special relationship with the peoples of Southern Africa, all of 
whom have suffered under apartheid.  While South Africa's people 
experienced discrimination and repression at home, the peoples of other 
countries fell victim to barbaric destabilization policies which left nearly 
two million people dead, displaced millions more, and inflicted damage 
estimated at $65-billion on the economies of neighboring countries.   The 
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region sustained us during our struggle and our destiny is intertwined with 
the region; our peoples belong with each other. 
(1994 ANC Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa)  
 
A democratic South Africa …should seek to become part of a movement 
to create a new form of economic interaction in Southern Africa based on 
principles of mutual benefit and interdependence…  We are conscious of 
the need for any plan or programme seeking to promote greater 
cooperation and integration in Southern Africa to take account of the 
acute imbalances in existing regional economic relations….  South Africa 
should avoid using regional cooperation or integration as a vehicle for the 
one-sided promotion of its immediate interests.  Instead, it needs to 
recognize that balanced and mutually beneficial cooperation and 
integration can be of considerable significance to the efforts of a 
democratic South Africa to place its economy on a new growth path. 
(1994 ANC Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa)  
  
…We are part of the region of Southern Africa and of the continent of 
Africa.  As members of the Southern African Development Community 
and the Organization of African Unity, and an equal partner with other 
member states, we will play our role in the struggles of these 
organizations to build a continent and a region that will help to create for 
themselves and all humanity a common world of peace and prosperity.    
(President Nelson Mandela, UN General Assembly in October 1994)  
 
 212
The promotion of economic development of the Southern African region 
is of paramount importance as the economies of the countries in the region 
are intertwined to such an extent that, for South Africa to believe that it 
could enter a prosperous future in isolation without taking neighboring 
countries with her, would be unrealistic and hazardous. 
(Minister Alfred Nzo, address to the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee 
of Parliament on 14 March 1995) 
 
Among the fundamentals of any future foreign policy would be for South 
Africa to support the needs and aspirations of the African continent and 
the promotion of the economic wellbeing of the people of the Southern 
African region.(Jackie Selebi, Director General of the DFA in 1999). 
 
The RDP White Paper (RDP White Paper, 1994) also recognizes that: 
It is impossible to rebuild the economy of South Africa in isolation from 
its Southern African neighbors.  It would also be dangerous for South 
Africa to dominate its neighbors, as it would restrict their growth, reduce 
their potential as markets which will worsen their unemployment and lead 
to increased migration to South Africa.   It is therefore important for South 
Africa to participate in regional development through multilateral forums 
such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
 
It is important for South Africa to co-operate with its neighbors to develop 
an effective growth and development strategy for Southern Africa, in 
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order to overcome the negative results of World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund programmes which had been forced on the region. 
 
In addition to such policy and pronouncements, it was Mbeki’s (1999 – 2008) notion 
of an African Renaissance (as articulated in his ‘I am an African’ speech as vice 
president of South Africa on behalf of the ANC in Cape Town on 8 May 1996, on the 
occasion of the passing of the new Constitution of South Africa as well as his speech 
on 13 August 1998 at Gallagher Estate) that unreservedly linked South Africa’s 
foreign policy and its fortunes to Africa.   The idea of an African Renaissance was 
rooted in the premise that progress in South Africa’s international and domestic 
position was impossible without an improvement in the position of the whole 
continent.   Despite this, the African Renaissance was regarded by many countries as 
an elitist project that was ‘high on sentiment, low on substance’ (Vale and Maseko, 
1998: 277).  Once again, the South African government was forced to reassure 
African leaders of South African intentions as well as counter the fears of some that 
the new ANC-led government might continue the old hegemonic policies in new 
economic guises:  
The construction of a new regional order will be a collective endeavor of 
all the free peoples of Southern Africa and cannot be imposed either by 
extra-regional forces or any self-appointed regional power.  Militaristic 
approaches to inter regional security and cooperation should have no place 




…a democratic SA will…resist any pressure or temptation to pursue its 
own interests at the expense of the subcontinent. 
(Nelson Mandela cited in Herbst, 1995: 91) 
 
Our own freedom as a people is diminished when another people are not 
free.  Thus we have a continuing responsibility to make whatever 
contribution we can to the struggle for the birth of the new world order 
that is so spoken of, so that the peoples of the world, including ourselves, 
live in conditions of democracy, peace, prosperity and equality among 
nations.  In pursuing these objectives, we must be careful to avoid great 
power arrogance and conferring ourselves a misplaced messianic role.    
(Nelson Mandela cited in a speech by Mr Alfred Nzo, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of South Africa in 1996) 
 
The Southern African region expects a positive contribution from South 
Africa in terms of their own development.  They expect that we interact 
with them as a partner and ally, not as a regional super power, so that 
what we achieve, in terms of political, security and economic relations are 
balanced and mutually beneficial.    
(Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, in his address to South African 
ambassadors during the September 1995 conference)  
 
I…assure our neighbors and the peoples of the rest of Africa that the 
government we lead has no great power pretensions.  We claim no right to 
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impose our will on any independent country.   We will not force anything 
on anybody…. 
(President Thabo Mbeki, 18 February 2003) 
 
In addition to such pronouncements, the actions of the South African government 
during the early phases of post-apartheid South Africa also reflected the country’s 
good neighborliness policy.  For example, President Mandela declined an invitation to 
Britain in July 1994 for a ceremony marking South Africa’s return to the 
Commonwealth and instead chose to go to Mozambique for his first overseas visit as 
a Head of State (Mwangi, 2002: 131). 
 
Clearly, the post-apartheid government’s reformulated foreign policy framework, 
buttressed by various policy initiatives and pronouncements, provide important 
insights about her determination to nurture her African relationships in a way that is 
reassuring, non-threatening, and mutually beneficial.  Arguably, one of the most 
visible shifts in the new South African government's foreign policy orientation after 
1994 has been its commitment to become a true partner in Southern Africa and where 
possible, to support regional economic development processes.   In fact, the severe 
imbalance of the Southern African regional economy (with South Africa accounting 
for three-quarters of the region's total gross domestic product and manufactured 
production), has compelled South Africa to negotiate an 'asymmetrical' free trade 
agreement with the rest of the region.   A senior official in the DTI (interview, 2008) 
pointed out that South Africa accounts for roughly 92% of the revenue of BLNS (used 
to describe Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland collectively) but only takes 
48%. 
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Moreover, although not a donor country, development cooperation with countries in 
Africa forms an integral part of South Africa’s foreign policy.  Technical and 
financial assistance, with a view to capacity-building, especially to SADC countries, 
is regarded as a major instrument for promoting economic development, peace and 
stability, democracy and the African Renaissance on a regional basis 
(www.gov.za/yearbook/foreign.htm).   Such support was grounded in the thinking that 
reconstruction of the region ‘must be a collective enterprise’ in which Pretoria will 
shoulder responsibilities “not in a spirit of paternalism or dominance but with mutual 
cooperation and respect” (Barber, 1994: 44/45). 
 
5.2 Post apartheid corporate expansion 
Interestingly, despite changes in the external environment which encouraged closer 
regional relations and the internal changes which underpinned new South African 
intentions in the region, South Africa’s inability to convince other states that her 
vision is complimentary to their needs has inhibited her ability to engineer a process 
of transformation and development in the region.  In this regard, a quick exposition of 
post apartheid corporate expansion reveals that the current dichotomy between 
government intentions and actions (a reflection of the disjuncture between regional 
vision and national interest) is at the heart of the arrant flop of the South African 
regional recipe for transformative development.   Regional visions of a post apartheid 
South African engine of economic growth and recovery in Southern Africa ignored 
the reality of South Africa’s own national interest of positioning itself as a ‘first 
world’ player in international markets rather than as a ‘third world’ country confined 
to regional markets (Marais, 1998). 
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In the early 1990s it was a foregone conclusion that the end of apartheid would open 
up the African market to South African corporates (Daniel et al, 2003).   South 
Africa’s Financial Mail (7 February 2003) posed an interesting question in this regard,  
‘Will the nations of Africa be able to look back and say that South African companies 
played a critical role in their recovery? Or will they be regarded as exploitative and 
neo-colonialists?’ To this one could add, is there a difference between western capital 
and South African capital? If so, should there be? As Nye (2002: 11) agues: 
The values our government champions in its behavior at home (for 
example, democracy), in international institutions (listening to others) and 
in foreign policy (promoting peace and human rights) also affect the 
preferences of others.....But softer power does not belong to the 
government in the same degree that hard power does.  Today popular 
[U.S] firms or non-governmental groups develop soft power of their own 
that may coincide or be at odds with official foreign policy goals. 
 
This dilemma has become a reality over which the government has less control than it 
would like: South Africa’s carefully constructed and nuanced diplomatic position of 
‘unassuming leadership’ is being increasingly threatened and undermined by the 
aggressive dominance of South African companies.   In this regard, Landsberg (2008: 
electronic) articulates South Africa’s twofold challenge: 
How to ensure first that the country’s economic roles are aligned with 
political foreign policy; and related in the second instance that South 
African business – which remains primarily in the hands of the white 
population in South Africa – does not undermine the policy position and 
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diplomatic practices of the continentalism project that the government has 
so assiduously and sensitively cultivated over the years. 
 
Indeed, many countries in Southern Africa did not anticipate the speed with which 
business in the region would leapfrog its politics and, therefore, were not in a position 
to make the most of post-apartheid corporate expansion (using it to drive 
infrastructure development).   While post apartheid foreign policy makers 
championed the common theme of  
“transformation from the scorned …economic storm troopers of white-minority rule 
and rapacious Western capitalism…” countries in the region continued to perceive the 
‘South Africanization’ of their economy as deleterious to their interests (Ahwireng-
Obeng and McGowan, 1998: 166).  Instead of taking advantage of the new 
employment opportunities, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, competitive pricing that 
reduced the costs of consumer goods and the availability of an African partner, the 
region has viewed South African post apartheid corporate expansion as a new form of 
core-periphery relationship.   It is believed that the constellation of states “which the 
apartheid regime could not achieve politically is now increasingly being accomplished 
through the structural power of capital….South African hegemony is being spread by 
profit-seeking South African businesses who are establishing a constellation of 
Southern African economies” (Iheduru, 1996).  In this regard, the well-known 1892 
cartoon in Punch magazine of the Colossus of Cecil Rhodes astride the African 
continent from the Cape to Cairo which captured the triumphalist British imperial 
mood of the time (South Africa had been the springboard for the gradual British 
conquest of much of southern and central Africa) was ironically reproduced by The 
Economist (12 August 1995: 17) under a modified caption, ‘The Cape Crusader’.   
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The  cartoon was intended to illustrate the  post-apartheid resurgence of South African 
commercial investment in the rest of Africa and was prompted by the article’s 
opening quote, in which one of the South African businessmen involved claimed that 
they wanted to ‘succeed where Cecil Rhodes failed.’ Such thoughts were symbolic of 
the reality that a change of government in South Africa had not necessarily resulted in 
a change of attitude in some quarters. 
 
Nevertheless, Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s immediate post apartheid president, 
claimed that “it was the colonial economy which had entrenched South Africa’s 
regional pre-eminence, and subordinated surrounding states to act as labor reserves 
and client markets” and committed his government to offsetting the skewed apartheid 
trade imbalance through investment in critical sectors (Barber, 1994: 44).  It is 
estimated that South African investment represents close to 20% of total foreign direct 
investment in Africa and comes at a critical time when investment flows to Africa 
have declined steadily (DBSA, 2003: 115).  For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, there 
has been a decrease in FDI from $8bn in 1999 to $6.5bn by the year 2000 (DBSA, 
2003: 115). 
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Fig5-1: South Africa’s FDI in the rest of Africa 




















Statistics adapted from the South African Reserve Bank. 
 
Essentially the graph illustrates that South Africa’s foreign direct investment in the 
rest of Africa has more than doubled in the period 1996 to 2001.  South Africa is now 
the largest foreign direct investor in Africa with an annual average of $1.4bn since 
1991 (DBSA, 2003: 115).  Moreover, between 1994 and 2000 South Africa 
outstripped former colonial powers and other countries engaged in major sectoral 
investment by topping the list of FDI into SADC, with US$5,424 million of actual 
and intended investments (Naidu et al, 2001) 
 
This process received further impetus from NEPAD, a vision for the continent’s 
renewal which stresses the need for partnerships amongst African countries in pursuit 
of a common goal of extricating themselves from underdevelopment and global 
marginalization.  Cognizant that a key barrier to African countries securing 
investment has been the absence of adequate supporting infrastructure such as 
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telecommunications, transport, power supplies, and road and air links; NEPAD has 
prioritized the bridging of the infrastructural gap and South Africa’s parastatals have 
taken a lead in this regard: 
•  rail, road and ports(parastatals Transnet and its divisions Spoornet and 
Comazar), 
•  aviation (Airports company of South Africa and South African 
Airways) 
•  power and energy (Eskom Enterprises, PetroSA and Sasol) 
•  information technology (Arivia.kom) 
•  telecommunications (Transtel and Eskom Enterprises) 
• financing for African projects (Industrial Development Corporation and 
the Development Bank of Southern Africa)   
 
With such parastatals there is also a significant shift from the past practice of mergers 
and acquisitions in favor of joint venture arrangements which not only helps assuage 
the resource/capacity void in African countries but also mitigates against the notion of 
an ascendant and influential South African dominance.  Jeff Radebe (2004), South 
African Minister of Public Enterprises, gave substance to the idea of South Africa as a 
‘development partner’ by affirming that: 
We do not want South Africa to be perceived as the new colonizer of 
Africa.  We aim to work together with our fellow Africans for an equal 
development of the continent.…We have to ensure that we build 
partnerships, to avoid an imbalance of economic development.  We will 
not be happy if South Africa develops in isolation, while there is poverty 
in the rest of the continent.    
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Such assurances were not matched by a similar public political behavior and South 
Africa’s role in the region continues to be viewed through the negative lens of the 
past, a problem that is compounded by the behavior of some of her private sector 
companies (an affirmation of the earlier point that a change in government has not 
resulted in a change of attitude that has permeated all levels of South African society).   
Warigi (2000: electronic) argues that “counterpoised to South Africa’s official 
commitment to more equitable forms of integration, is a one-sided commercial 
expansion that fortifies current inequalities.” Her article taps on genuine regional 
concerns that South African business has shown little interest in locally sourcing 
products (opting to import most or everything from down south), has undermined 
local business with their competition, and has pursued an economic game-plan that is 
selfishly geared towards creating a captive consumer markets for South African 
goods.  In addition, Mlambo (2000: 71) alludes to perceptions that while South 
Africa’s trade and investment policies are arguably undermining these countries’ 
economies, its higher wages and better job opportunities are fuelling a crippling brain 
drain in the region.   Indeed, there is an ingrained perception in the region (which was 
clearly evident in some of the interviews conducted) that South Africa has used its 
foreign policy objectives and NEPAD priority plans as a passport to gain market 
access and penetrate other African markets with the sole aim of profiteering.  
McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998: 191) aptly capture this sentiment with their 
assessment that  
the rest of Southern Africa is currently paying part of the cost of South 
Africa’s restructuring.’ Not surprisingly, such perceptions have churned 
up memories of apartheid destabilization and hostility invariably resulting 
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in resentment and the stereotyping of all South African businesses as 
‘neo-colonial invasions.    
 
Unfortunately, more often than not, the attitudes of South African companies to the 
rest of the region fail to negate such perceptions.   Like business anywhere, the South 
African business sector is driven by typical corporate interests – profits, market share, 
elimination of competition, and the urge to dominate and to monopolize.  The New 
York Times (2002) quoted Absa’s Rupert Pardoe as pointing out that Absa was 
“…not investing in Africa for altruism.   We’re investing in Africa to make some 
money.” “Every continent needs an America….” is how another South African 
investor responded when questioned about the importance of South African 
investment in a country like Mozambique (cited in Grobbelaar, 2004: 5).   Despite the 
South African government’s best attempts to play down its economic strength in 
relation to the rest of the region, such assertions reinforce the hegemonic thrust of 
South African capital.  In this regard, South Africa has also suffered the same 
criticism as the United States in terms of the exercise of economic power not being 
matched by a shift in social responsibility.  The 2002 United Nations report which 
highlighted the questionable practices of twelve South African companies operating in 
the DRC, including De Beers, ranks among the most notorious examples of South 
African private sector exploitation of other African markets.   In their special report 
that assesses the impact of South African business in Africa on development, Kapelus 
and Diaho (2003) further unpack regional accusations of discriminatory labor 
practices exported from South Africa, the adverse impact on local supply chains by 
retail stores, environmental destruction by mining companies, arrogance and lack of 
integration with local business networks, and corrupt business practices.  The 2003 
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special report by the Naledi and African Research Labor Network which questions 
whether South Africans are ‘new colonialists on the block’ also exposes the flouting 
of competition laws in some countries by South African companies:  
In 2003, reports were received from Zambia about the possible impact on 
local business of the importing of cheaper goods from SA and 
Zimbabwe… 
 
In December 2001 allegations of restrictive business practices were 
brought against Game stores, a South African chain operating in Zambia:  
there were complaints that Game stores had unfair trading terms designed 
to make it difficult for Zambian suppliers to supply Game stores… 
 
Arguably, the case of Shoprite-Checkers operations in the region best typifies the 
clash between the post apartheid South African government’s vision and the business 
practices of her private sector companies.  Extensive research by Miller (2003) and 
Muneku (2003) into Shoprite’s operation in Zambia exposed a strong belief that South 
African companies were ‘exporting apartheid’ to Africa.  This emerged from the 
interviews of trade union members during which the racial structure of management at 
the stores was highlighted.   Accusations of Shoprite Checkers exploiting labor in six 
Southern African countries by under-paying and overworking, crowding out local 
markets and securing a retail oligopoly in some African countries are a stark contrast 
to the company’s stated commitment to development plans such as NEPAD and 
visions like the African Renaissance. 
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Fig5-2: Contradictions of Shoprite Checkers in Zambia 
In the spirit of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), 
African countries are nurturing an economic union, which will allow 
Africa to grow to greater self-sufficiency and economic stability.   
Shoprite wants to play a meaningful role in building a ‘United States of 
Africa’, dominated not by foreigners but African companies… Apart from 
offering consumers quality products at the lowest prices, the respective 
local economies also benefit from… retail property infrastructure, job 
creation, the upliftment of local producers.    
(Shoprite’s African Vision as cited in the Shoprite Checkers Annual 
Report 2003)  
 
versus 
[excerpts from the studies conducted by Miller (2003) and Muneku 
(2003)] 
 
.   
They (these investors) are not helping Zambia to develop.  Shoprite, 
whatever they sell, the monies are transmitted to SA right away.  Even the 
government is aware that that these people, they are just using Zambia as 
a market, just to sell their things and send all their profits to SA.  So 
Zambians are not benefiting from it…. 
 
If we look at all the products, the merchandise they have, they all come 
from South Africa, which means that manufacturers in South Africa are 
on the benefit side, because they are the ones that receive the money … 
 
Control of Shoprite Zambia lie firmly with head office in the Western 
Cape and the six top jobs – such as general manager and finance manager 




However, one could also argue that such a clash derives from the inability of post 
apartheid foreign policy makers to separate national interest from idealistic visions 
and to appreciate the role of business in furthering such interest as well as the regional 
and external forces who seek to undermine this.  Daniel et al (2003) observe that 
while South African investment brings precious foreign currency into a region that is 
much in need of foreign exchange, South African capital represents a real threat to the 
ownership and property rights of Africa's political elites.  Goldstein (2003) affirms 
that political opposition to FDI is not uncommon in the rest of the world and “is often 
the result of the manipulation of public opinion by groups that previously benefited 
from the rents created under previously oligarchic economic systems and who now 
feel threatened by more efficient foreign competitors.” Grobbelaar (2004: 75-76) 
points out that it was the superior technology, business knowledge and (relative) 
financial strength of South African companies in the Mozambican market that  
contributed to the domination of  the local industry (the South African economy is 40 
times as large as that of Mozambique).   While this is also the case with other foreign 
investors, the sheer volume of South African investment in the market meant that 
South Africans were singled out as responsible for the crowding out of local business.  
Such beliefs have also been cultivated by foreign powers that have been overtaken as 
leading investors by South African companies.   The forays that the South African 
business community is making into the rest of Africa have tilted the balance of power 
and influence wielded by foreign investors in the continent in South Africa’s favor.   
South Africa’s surpassing of former colonial power, Britain’s investment in Zambia is 
a case in point.  Senior members of DTI (private discussions in 2008) also point to the 
current wrangling among Southern African countries with the European Union over 
Economic Partnership Agreements as a strategy to dislodge South Africa from the 
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region and to provide SACU countries with a degree of independence from South 
African economic dominance (discussed further in section 5.3 below). 
 
South Africa’s Finance Minister Trevor Manual (cited in Mills, 2000) once observed 
with regard to regional sensitivities that “If you want an omelet, you have to break the 
egg…” Despite regional sensitivities with regard to South African investment, 
transformative development in Southern Africa will not succeed unless South Africa 
plays a leading role.  The involvement of other major players in the region such as 
China and India is unlikely to promote the region’s integration agenda which will be 
the best means of achieving sustainable transformative development.  In fact, the 
narrow agendas of these countries will often work at cross-purposes with the region’s 
integration agenda.  At the same time, South Africa needs to take cognizance of the 
reality that investment of capital in the region will not automatically lead to 
development.  Grobbelaar (2004: 3) points out that: “South African FDI is primarily 
capital intensive and highly knowledge - based, making it difficult for local business 
to link into the opportunities created.” Whereas top officials in Pretoria pontificate on 
their intentions and champion an African Renaissance, the profiteering interests of top 
business officials drive actual investment policies.  In this regard, Pretoria’s political 
vision and expressed solidarity with the region, serve merely as useful tools for 
creating the right enabling environment for securing preferential access to those 
markets.  Drawing on the expositions of Chapter 4, one could also argue that this state 
of affairs is underpinned by South African current economic strategy which pivots on 
rapid growth in manufactured exports.  As a result, South African firms continue to 
aggressively penetrate the other, weaker economies in the region - where their goods 
and services currently enjoy comparative advantages.  Hein Marais (1998: electronic) 
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aptly captures the apparent contradiction that seems to exist, therefore, “between the 
RSA government’s political commitment to a more equitable framework for regional 
relations and its attempts to revive sustained economic growth in RSA on the basis of 
an economic strategy that conforms in the main to neo-liberal orthodoxy.”  Ironically, 
the regional response to South African business is also contradictory: generally 
welcoming inward investment, but concerned about South African imports flooding 
its markets.   
 
Clearly, without the trust and confidence of all the states in the region, it would be 
difficult for South Africa to play a more effective role in Southern Africa’s 
development.  The current tussle between South African government visions, regional 
interests and business priorities  has meant that post apartheid South Africa has so far 
been unable to weave an unambiguous  and coherent foreign policy towards Africa.  
Landsberg (2007: 205) contends that,  
…one of the greatest challenges faced by South Africa, and thus by the 
ANC, is to address the contradictory ideological strands in foreign policy.   
It should take up the challenge of articulating a truly progressive foreign 
policy, one that would make it difficult to allow others to label it 
politically progressive, but economically neo-imperialist. 
 
On the one hand, the brusqueness of  South Africa's current regional trade and 
investment patterns have  hampered its ability to engage productively  with the 
region’s development and integration priorities.   On the other hand, in their quest to 
dispel negative images of perceived South African hegemony, the country’s 
parastatals have inadvertently generated idealistic, impractical expectations of South 
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Africa’s role in the region, thereby placing greater strain on her foreign policy.  In 
essence, whether these issues are real or perceived, they constitute a serious risk to 
South Africa’s reputation in the region and threaten South Africa’s ability to engage 
in transformative regional development. 
 
 
5.3 The Tussle between Economic Interests and Political Realities: The Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) 
As the world’s oldest custom union, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
dates back to the 1889 Customs Union Convention between the British Colony of 
Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State Boer Republic which was extended in 
June 1910 to the Union of South Africa (which also administered Namibia at the time) 
and the British High Commission Territories (HCTs) of Botswana, Lesotho, and 
Swaziland (http://www.sacu.int/about.php?include=about/history.html).  Under 
SACU, the promotion of a very one-sided economic development through free trade 
captured the essence of the mercantilist approach that South Africa adopted towards 
its neighbors.  As early as 1925, South Africa adopted import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) policies, backed by the common external tariffs on non-SACU 
products.   These measures guaranteed a regional market for South African 
manufactures, while relegating the HCTs to producing primary commodities 
(http://www.sacu.int/about.php?include=about/history.html).  Far from promoting 
industrial development within SACU, South Africa often blocked its neighbors’ 
industrialization efforts.  Moreover, under apartheid, South Africa was the sole 
administrator of the common SACU revenue pool, setting SACU import duties and 
excise policy.  Even after the 1969 SACU Agreement, signed with the sovereign 
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states of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BLS), South Africa retained the sole 
decision-making power over customs and excise policies.  It also retained open access 
to the BLS market, while the high common tariff raised barriers for the exports of 
Southern African neighbors’ to SACU which benefited South African manufacturers.    
 
With the independence of Namibia in 1990 and the end of apartheid in South Africa 
in 1994, SACU members embarked on new negotiations in November 1994, which 
culminated in a new SACU agreement in 2002 
(http://www.sacu.int/about.php?include=about/history.html).  Transformation of 
SACU, which was regarded as a ‘colonial tool’, resulted in a Common Negotiating 
Mechanism: Article 31(2) was put in place to ensure a consultative decision-making 
process so that decisions would not be made by one member alone.   In addition, the 
new agreement also reviewed the revenue sharing formula, unfair trade practices, and 
protection of infant industries.   Revenue sharing was officially devised as a way of 
compensating Southern Africa’s smaller economies for South African tariff policy 
and its virtual monopoly on attracting external investment because of its sheer size. 
 
Less than a decade since the 2002 transformation of SACU, there is consensus among 
South African government officials that the country cannot afford to indefinitely carry 
the fiscal burden imposed on it by the revenue-sharing formula.  According to a senior 
government official: 
At the heart of challenges confronting SACU is the vast differences in 
levels of economic development and aspirations combined with a system 
of consensus decision-making.  Defining policy and strategic priorities by 
consensus among countries with differing imperatives is a recipe for 
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policy gridlock.  South Africa’s membership in SACU is becoming an 
impediment to pursuing our strategic regional and global economic 
objectives. 
 
Donnelly (2010: 35) is more frank but undiplomatic in his observation that:  
Think of South Africa’s economy as a car.  Finance Minister Pravin 
Gordhan is in the driver’s seat, lugging our neighbors in the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) behind him in a heavy trailer that drains 
our fuel. 
 
It is noteworthy that after more than 90 years of benefitting from a profoundly skewed 
customs arrangement, it is South Africa that is protesting the sustainability of a 
reviewed regional relationship that is not more than a decade old.  Of course, this is 
not surprising given SACU’s colonial history: SACU’s establishment was not a 
proactive initiative by a group of independent neighbors but a practical colonial 
arrangement of convenience between separate political entities sharing an integrated 
economic space.  This, in part, explains the strained relations between SACU 
countries at a time when regional integration is gaining momentum in Southern 
Africa.  The strain in relations is best reflected in the discord among SACU member 
states on how best to approach negotiations with the EU regarding the signing of the 
Economic Partnership Agreements.  Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland signed the 
agreement with the EU, while South Africa and Namibia refused.   South African 
President Zuma, speaking at the celebration of the 100th anniversary of SACU, held 
in Namibia on 22 April 2010, reminded SACU member states to “remain true to our 
commitments particularly upholding Article 31[of the 2002 renegotiated SACU 
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agreement], where we agreed to negotiate as a single bloc as a cardinal principle of 
our existence.” 
 
However, it is clear from engagement with government officials from the BLS states 
that the signing of the EPAs was an assertion of their sovereignty.  South African 
government officials in contrast, see the move as a blatant reflection of the resentment 
of these states to South Africa’s dominance in the SACU region.   A senior South 
African official from the Department of Trade and industry pointed out that “in as 
much as they assert their sovereignty, it is difficult to speak of BLS sovereignty when 
South Africa is responsible for over 90% of the region’s gross domestic product and 
finances about 70 % of smaller member states' budgets.” Donnelly’s (2010: 35) 
unpacking of the percentage of budget revenue that Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and 
Swaziland derive from SACU is also instructive in this regard: 
 











Njini (2010: electronic) affirms that “this year alone [2010] South Africa will pay R15 
billion from tariff incomes to SACU member states.” Draper and Dube (2010: 
electronic) observe that with South Africa subsidizing the BLNS States’ national 
budgets – heavily so, in the case of Lesotho and Swaziland, “an abrupt withdrawal of 
the revenues would have dire economic, social and political consequences for the 
BLNS States and would effectively create two failed States in Swaziland and 
Lesotho.” 
 
There is no doubt that the crafting of a regional development agenda that takes into 
consideration the different development priorities of each SACU country with a view 
to creating sustainable economies in the BLNS States and reducing their dependence 
on the revenue pool, will be central to  resolving the current regional strains.   In fact, 
trade across regional borders has often been identified as one of the weakest points in 
the efforts against underdevelopment on the continent.   So what are the challenges to 
a transformative development in Southern Africa that will address simultaneously 
regional integration and infrastructure development by strengthening regional 
industrial complementarities? 
 
South African government officials argue that it is difficult for South Africa to take 
this high road when the overriding interest of BLNS in SACU is revenue.  While RSA 
contributes around 98% to the revenue pool, BLNS draws around 50 % of the pool 
(interview with DTI official).  This is an implicit aid transfer from South Africa to 
BLNS and is seen as compensation for BLNS membership of a Customs Union with a 
much larger and diverse South African economy.  As shares of revenue are calculated 
on the basis of intra-SACU imports, it impedes expanding membership of SACU as 
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new members may reduce individual shares of revenue (which explains the reluctance 
of BLNS to include Mozambique).  Interviews with South African government 
officials also revealed that: 
• BLS seek to attract low value industries built on full access to South Africa to 
the detriment of South Africa and regional industrial development/capacity. 
• BLS have stalled South Africa’s efforts to build economic relations with 
emerging economies in the South that are the new sources of global trade and 
investment as their trade is locked in to the North.  For example, BLS has 
repeatedly delayed engagement on the proposed trilateral engagement between 
MERCOSUR, SACU and India. 
• Botswana and Swaziland have imposed bans on South Africa’s imports of 
sorghum and wheat flour, respectively, to build up their own industries.   
There is a growing and indiscriminate use of protection among BLS against 
imports from South Africa. 
 
Undoubtedly, any proposed change will have to be handled carefully.   However, it is 
also clear that there needs to be change.  Such change should not be based on the 
current complaints of South African disadvantage in the existing arrangement but 
should be motivated on the basis of mutually beneficial regional development.  One of 
the ideas being advanced by senior officials within South Africa’s DTI is the creation 
of a development fund derived from the revenue pool which is tied to investments in 
public goods.  It is argued that this would facilitate a more equitable revenue- sharing 
formula that takes account of the BLNS countries’ legitimate shares of customs 
revenues so that South Africa does not have to meet the burden of funding the large 
chunks of the BLNS countries’ national budgets which in turn, would reduce the 
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resentment of South Africa’s dominance in some quarters and facilitate a more equal 
partnership.    
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion: Findings and Recommendations 
 
“But that’s our business: to arrange ideas in so rational an order that 
another person can make sense of them…” (Becker, 1986: 133) 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
So how do we rationalize the conundrum facing South African foreign policy makers 
with regard to Southern Africa? Is it an exaggeration that transformative development 
in the region is impossible without South Africa playing a leading role? What is at the 
heart of the country’s inability to play such a role? The preceding chapters have 
attempted to answer these very questions.  Chapter 3 uses theory to debate the leading 
role that South Africa can play in the region.  Chapter 4 unpacks the various 
constraints inhibiting South Africa from achieving a more effective regional policy, 
key of which is the inability to reconcile South African vision with regional beliefs 
and needs.  There is a palpable incongruity with regard to the expectations that 
Southern African states have of the role that South Africa should play and South 
Africa’s own conception of its role.  Chapter 5 captures the impact of the challenges 
raised in Chapter 4, by illustrating that despite a changed policy environment, South 
Africa has been unsuccessful in entrenching transformative development in Southern 
Africa.    
 
One can conclude that South Africa’s post – apartheid reintegration into the Southern 
African region has been beset by many difficulties.   This is partly due to an apartheid 
history of destabilization in the region which has been followed by multiple 
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sensitivities and misapprehensions among regional neighbors of being dominated and 
overwhelmed by South Africa’s post-apartheid economic presence.  Ironically, such 
issues have in fact stalled the regional development agenda as evidenced by the 
desultory progress made with regard to achieving the benchmarks embodied in 
SADC’s RISDP.  Although the RISDP identifies a number of interlinked priority 
intervention areas (such as poverty eradication; combating HIV/AIDS; gender 
equality; the environment; trade and economic liberalization; infrastructure 
development; and food security), many of which dovetail with the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),  the prospect of the region realizing either 
its RISDP or achieving the MDGs remain bleak.  For example, roughly five years 
after the launch of the RISDP (approved by SADC Heads of State and Government in 
August 2003 but launched in March 2004), the poverty situation in the SADC region 
(poverty eradication is considered one of the major objectives of the RISDP) is a 
serious policy challenge for Southern African states individually and collectively as 
depicted in the table in annexure 1 (figure 1-4).  A September 2010 draft African 
Development Bank Strategy paper affirms that approximately 45% of the Southern 
Africa population lives below the poverty line and lives on less than one dollar a day. 
 
I would argue that robust South African leadership (as articulated in Chapter 3) is the 
key to unblocking the current inertia which threatens the region’s prospects of 
transformative development.  However, given the current schism between South 
African vision on the one hand and regional beliefs and needs on the other hand, 
South Africa’s position as the leading regional power is less important than how it 
chooses to use that power.  Former Mozambican President, Joaquim Chissano’s 
 238
contention at the 1999 Southern Africa Economic Summit in Durban, South Africa is 
instructive in this regard: 
…leading sometimes means commanding and on other occasions to show 
the way.  To show the way you do not always have to command.   South 
Africa cannot command me: I would reject its command.  You, South 
Africa, have so many problems: you will lead me by solving your 
problems.  I believe you are capable of solving your problems, and we 
may follow (http://www.weforum.org/pdf/SummitReports/africa1999.pdf) 
 
One could argue that the problems alluded to by Chissano are two-fold in nature and 
impact on South African foreign policy in very specific ways.  The first set of 
problems (covered in Chapter 4) is domestic in nature and influences South Africa’s 
ability to engage externally.  How does South Africa play a leading role in regional 
development without advancing her own internal socio-economic growth?  The point 
by Adebajo et al (2007) that an effective post-apartheid South African foreign policy 
can only be built on a strong domestic base is worth repeating.  The second set of 
problems can be attributed to the contradictions and ambiguity in South Africa’s 
foreign policy which can be traced to the foreign policy decision-making process.  
Given that South Africa has perhaps one of the most advanced foreign policy 
coordination mechanisms (the Cluster system), the rest of this chapter is devoted to 
examining why this has not translated into more effective foreign policy making and 
what can be done. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
6.2.1 Reviewing the Cluster System of Foreign Policy-making 
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In trying to understand and explain society, Adam Smith, Alexander 
Hamilton, Karl Marx, and other writers of their eras assumed that 
economics was political and that politicians attempted to control 
economic outcomes.  [It was] around the turn of the twentieth century, 
[that] the development of the academic disciplines of political science and 
economics separated the two topics. 
(Passé Smith, Roe Goddard, and Conklin, 1996: 2) 
 
As criticism mounted with regard to the ambiguity of post-apartheid foreign policy, 
South African foreign policy-makers began to appreciate the disservice that such 
academic disciplines had done to their craft.  In this regard, Professor Marie Muller 
(2000) alluded to the closeness of the linkages between the functions of the 
departments of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and Trade and Industry (DTI) and called for 
proper coordination and integration of South Africa’s economic diplomacy efforts.   
One of the early solutions suggested has been to merge the two departments.   It was 
argued that the merger would facilitate policy homogeneity and would enhance the 
department of foreign affairs expertise in foreign trade and multilateral economic 
issues.  Those in favor of a merger argued that this would bring about rationalization 
and greater productivity as evidenced by the successful amalgamation of the two 
departments in Canada (1985), New Zealand (1989) and Australia (1987).   
Nevertheless, the dominant sentiment in South Africa’s DFA (as reflected in 
interviews with senior members) is that the primary political focus of South Africa’s 
foreign policy should not be diluted, but should remain its first priority.  It is pointed 
out that neither Canada nor Australia has a strong political identity in international 
politics and therefore should not serve as models for South Africa.   Interestingly, Van 
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der Westhuizen (1998: 444) characterizes the different positions as a clash between 
apartheid-school ‘neo-mercantilists’ (favoring trade and self-interest over all else) and 
post-apartheid ‘internationalists’ 
 
So instead of a short-term response to specific post apartheid perceptions (for 
example, that post apartheid corporate expansion was a new form of imperialism), the 
DFA and DTI established a special committee to study how more regular and 
formalized liaison could be implemented (revealed in interview with senior 
members).  However, the departments were quick to realize that a better working 
relationship did not necessarily translate into improved coordination at policy level, 
especially in a globalised world where interests extended beyond the scope of DFA 
and DTI.  Indeed, foreign policy agendas now include issues as diverse as investment, 
migration, energy, inflation, food security, human rights, the environment, and so on.   
It was clear that the historical compartmentalized approach which in practice 
differentiated between aspects of policy (trade, political, military, etc.) was no longer 
feasible and that the nature and extent of cooperation within the various government 
departments would have to be expanded.  Beginning in 1999, the machinery of 
government (including its foreign policy-making) was overhauled to provide for 
greater coherence and better coordination among the various government 
departments, by means of integrated governance through the clustering of policy 
areas, with the Presidency as the primary locus of policy.   Currently, the International 
Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) Cluster is responsible for all matters related to 
international relations, including trade and peace and security. 
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However, the IRPS Cluster has proven that a forum for multiple bureaucratic players 
does not necessarily translate into effective foreign policy making.  In practice, 
competing departmental visions transcend the objectives of government’s idealistic 
‘experiment’ in coordinated policy-making.  The failure of the IRPS Cluster to 
identify strategic partners to streamline South African government’s foreign policy 
attests to this.  The base document, prepared by the Cluster’s supporting sub-
committee in 2006, was abandoned because the Directors-General of the various 
departments could not agree on common partners in the continent, let alone globally.   
The inconsistent participation of the DGs in monthly Cluster meetings has also been a 
sore-point.  Often, departmental priorities appear to be regarded as supplanting the 
broader Cluster priorities, and non-attendance by DGs has meant that there is no 
quorum for decisions to be processed for Cabinet.  The failure of all DGs to attend 
also defeats the purpose of the Cluster and the comprehensive, collective coordination 
of foreign policy issues.  Moreover, as the lead department in much of the 
implementation of foreign policy decisions (and Chair of the IRPS Cluster), some 
members of the DFA argue that it is unfair that they have to compete with other 
departments in shaping foreign policy (which such members regard as trampling on 
their terrain).  My conclusion is that in an attempt to control the diversified foreign 
policy agenda created by globalization, post-apartheid foreign policy decision-makers 
have replaced the problems of  reconciling competing issues (such as post-apartheid 
corporate expansion  and political vision) with the difficulties  of managing 
competing governmental departments.  The upshot is that the multiplicity of 
seemingly conflicting departmental interests has further complicated the initial 
conundrum of how best to coordinate the politics and economics of the DFA and DTI 
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respectively, resulting in continued incoherence, inconstancy and opaqueness in 
foreign policy formulation. 
 
However, in all fairness to the Cluster System (its participants and the progressive 
thinkers behind the idea), the proper functioning of the system has never been 
prioritized.   As noted in Chapter 4, the primary locus of foreign policy decisions has 
been the President.  Many analysts forecast a ‘depersonalization’ of South African 
foreign policy following the 2009 elections.  It was expected that such a situation 
would ultimately shift the focus of foreign-policy formulation back to the IRPS 
Cluster and would be a more accurate test of whether the Cluster can deliver on a 
coherent, coordinated foreign policy as was envisaged. 
 
This has not been the case.  Instead, the Presidency has announced a new ‘outcomes 
based’ system to boost the government’s delivery and ensure that departments and 
other role-players all pull in the same direction.  At the ANC’s September 2010 
National General Council, business people were told that the government’s cluster 
system has created a riddle of contradictions and time wasting activities and that it 
was changing significantly to produce efficiencies (Pressly, 2010: 17).  The new 
system provides for coordinating Ministers to take the lead in critical areas of delivery 
(based on ‘12 Outcomes to Guide the work of government, 2009-2014’) and to ensure 
that all departments, parastatals and other entities know exactly what to do.   Minister 
in the Presidency responsible for monitoring and evaluation, Collins Chabane, 
explained that coordinating Ministers would head groups of delivery agents or 
partnerships, including government departments and other entities like the office of 
the premiers, state-owned enterprises and private agents.  The key difference from the 
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IRPS Annual Programme of Action is the focus on measurable outputs which are the 
cornerstone of the delivery agreements that coordinating Ministers have to sign.   
However, almost all the bureaucrats working on Outcome 11 (which pertains to 
foreign policy and is unpacked in Chapter 1) would attest to the difficultly of 
assigning measurable outputs to foreign policy objectives.  For example, while the 
promotion of Africa’s positions in multilateral fora is a key activity of the goal of 
deepened contribution to regional, and continental security and stability and 
sustainable development, evaluating it as a measurable output may distort reality.   
Pushing a common African position 24 times in various multilateral fora may not 
necessarily lead to regional and continental security and development, especially if 
other countries in the region and the continent continue to view South African actions 
with suspicion.  This thesis shows that such a possibility is highly likely.  So while the 
outcomes approach attempts to foster greater accountability within government in 
general, it remains to be seen whether this blanket approach will produce the desired 
output for South Africa’s international relations: a better-coordinated, less ambiguous 
foreign policy that is able to deliver on the articulated objectives.    
 
6.2.2 Managing regional perceptions: Revamping the role of Intelligence 
Competing departmental interests and the personalization of foreign policy issues 
have also undermined the role of intelligence which I want to argue is the key to 
South Africa coping with negative regional perceptions.  This thesis recognizes that 
such perceptions are at the heart of South Africa’s failure to achieve an effective 
regional foreign policy. 
 
 244
Why intelligence? As James Der Derian (1992) has observed, intelligence is the least 
understood and most under-theorized area of international relations.   It is point well-
captured by Sir Alexander Cadogan (British Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs from 1938 to 1946) who averred that intelligence was the missing dimension 
of international affairs (cited in Andrew and Dilks, 1984).  In 2003, the British 
government and intelligence community became embroiled in one of the most serious 
political controversies amid charges that intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction was politicized in order to bolster support for the government’s bellicose 
posture towards the regime of Saddam Hussein.  The Government’s unprecedented 
public use of intelligence to support its foreign policy attest to the fact that 
intelligence is more deeply and visibly embedded in the conduct of international 
relations today than ever before. 
 
The neglected role of intelligence in enhancing post-apartheid foreign policy 
implementation can be attributed to two factors.   Firstly, there is an argument within 
some sectors of the South African Secret Service (responsible in terms of the 1994 
Intelligence Act for foreign developments) that a focus on foreign policy limits the 
organization’s broad protection of national interests (foreign policy is regarded as 
only one element of national interest).   However, as illustrated in Chapter 1, a foreign 
policy geared towards pursuing the broad national interest is the foundation of the 
realist school of international relations: foreign policy, in Morgenthau’s famous 
formulation, is about the national interest.   In foreign affairs all is relative - relative to 
one’s own needs, position, dangers, hopes and purposes.   In terms of the 1995 White 
Paper on Intelligence, SASS promotes South Africa’s ability to face foreign threats 
and enhance its competitiveness in a dynamic world by supporting the policy and 
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decision-making processes pertaining to the country’s expressed national interests of 
stability, security and development.   In this regard, foreign policy is the key, not just 
a component, through which South Africa’s national interests are promoted at an 
international level.  Secondly, the insidious role of intelligence during the apartheid 
era has devalued its importance in a post-apartheid context.   Pfister (2005: 68) shows 
how the apartheid state used the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) to implement a 
foreign policy of ‘buying, bluffing or bribing’ to balance the paucity of diplomatic 
successes by the DFA.   However, I would argue that instead of undermining the role 
of intelligence, post-apartheid foreign policy-makers should have drawn a distinction 
between intelligence as a guide to policy rather than a tool of policy.  While the 
apartheid state used intelligence as a form of state power, post-apartheid policy-
makers need to appreciate intelligence as a guide to the use of power -- that is, as an 
aid to policy-makers in understanding their environment and options, what tactics to 
apply (force, leverage, diplomacy, etc) and against whom. 
 
The example of the British government’s use of intelligence in 2003 vividly illustrates 
that intelligence can act as a mechanism for reinforcing a country’s misconceptions of 
the outside world.  It can be argued that intelligence can also be employed inversely 
as a mechanism for exposing a country’s misconception.  Therein lies its value to 
South African foreign policy-makers concerned with managing negative regional 
perceptions of the country.  Often intelligence has a predilection for threats rather than 
opportunities and we need to re-conceptualize how we use it or the prospect for more 
effective regional relations will be lost.   The United States’ Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (1995: 38) definition of covert action is instructive in this regard: “an 
operation designed to influence governments, events, organizations, or persons in 
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support of foreign policy in a manner that is not necessarily attributable to the 
sponsoring power; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary 
activities.” The point is not that South Africa should engage in covert action in the 
region but that the value of intelligence in positively influencing human beings and 
the decisions they make has been a grossly ignored dimension of post-apartheid 
foreign policy implementation.   In essence, with a mandate to jointly and separately 
provide information on internal and external security and related matters to decision-
makers in government, intelligence is in a unique position to substantially influence 
how a particular foreign policy problem is understood, conceptualized and resolved.   
 
6.2.3 Balancing economic imperatives and political realities: the advantage of a 
corporatist approach 
In a world where governments are no longer the sole arbiters of policy and interstate 
relations, the activities of non-state entities -- in particular business and civil society 
networks -- have become more pronounced.  It is important to recognize that other 
actors (such as business or NGOs) have their own foreign policies which they follow 
with as much dexterity as do states.  For example, in the South African context, Anglo 
American or Checkers have their own foreign policies which are not necessarily the 
same as South Africa’s foreign policy, but need to operate alongside it.  In this regard, 
South Africa’s Cluster system has been short-sighted: the current integrated 
governance system does not necessarily leave much room for voices from outside the 
government to be heard when it comes to policy-making.  In addition, the 
mechanisms to address these inadequacies in the system such as the Presidency’s 
Consultative Groups (which cater for non-state sectoral interests such as trade unions) 
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and Advisory groups (such as the International Investment Advisory Council) have 
had no real impact on foreign policy thus far.    
 
However, the perceptions generated by post-apartheid corporate expansion (chapter 5) 
highlight the need for a more constructive business-government nexus in foreign 
policy.  Moreover, the vociferous but often anti-DFA position taken by COSATU 
with regard to foreign policy issues is also indicative that the government ignores 
such interest groups at its own peril.  For example, the Swazi government has 
repeatedly appealed to the South African government to curtail the activities of its 
alliance partner who overtly supports ‘The People's United Democratic Movement’ 
(PUDEMO), an opposition group that has been banned (November 2008) in 
Swaziland.   Prime Minister Sibusiso Dlamini, reacting to the presence of COSATU 
officials (who Swazi police detained on the eve of a declared two days of protest 
strikes in September 2010 led by the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, a 
COSATU ally) pointedly observed that: “Each person should mind the politics of his 
own country and not come here to meddle in our affairs, especially if that country has 
a lot of its own problems (alluding to South Africa’s own public-sector strikes)” (Hall, 
2010: 6). 
 
A more nuanced tripartite consultative relationship between business, labor and the 
state whereby  business and labor have their interests represented and in turn 
contribute to the state’s implementation of its foreign policy objectives, would be a 
swift means of resolving some of the current tensions.  The adoption of such 
corporatist structures of representation would promote consensual consultation and 
bargaining between labor, capital and the state on various foreign economic policy 
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issues and would go a long way towards creating a coherent framework for South 
Africa’s engagement with the Southern African sub-region. 
 
South Africa’s current system of interest representation which includes the 
Presidency’s Consultative and Advisory Groups is more pluralist than corporatist; and 
the distinction is important in terms of the impact it has on foreign policy formulation 
and implementation.  Pluralism, by definition, is a system of representation where an 
infinite number of groups compete with minimal or no government direction or 
control; interest groups exhibit autonomy from the state.  Corporatism is unlike 
pluralism in that interest groups’ relationships to the state are part of a more formal 
and limited system of interest representation; interest groups are incorporated into the 
state and often regulated by it.  Philippe Schmitter’s (1974: 93) definition of 
corporatism is one of the most frequently cited and utilized: 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which 
the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular 
compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the 
state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their 
respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their 
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. 
It aptly captures the notion of corporatism as a patterning of relationships between the 
state and particular groups representing specific functional interests in society.  
However, corporatism is not merely about guaranteeing representative monopolies to 
the incorporated groups.  In return for the state subsidies, recognition, representation 
and protection, the groups are explicitly engaged in assisting the state to carry out its 
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policies and programmes.  Often, the incorporated groups are the institutional 
methods by which the state can guarantee conformity, loyalty and adherence to state 
policies and laws, as well as a national consensus regarding economic or social 
policy.  Although COSATU is part of the government’s tri-partite alliance, it has 
often been undermined in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and 
the duality that characterizes South Africa’s foreign policy externally is palpable 
when such interests have not been catered for internally.   The furor over the disputed 
March 2008 elections in Zimbabwe is a case in point.   In April 2008, Mbeki declared 
that he was "very pleased" with the manner in which the election had been conducted 
without any violence or restrictions on freedom of movement but admitted he was 
concerned about the slow release of results (www.iol.co.za).   In a July 2008 address 
to the preparatory meeting for a trade union and civil society international solidarity 
conference, COSATU General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, demanded that “the 
leaders of the SADC and AU governments withdraw their recognition of a 
‘government’ that has no mandate to rule following their defeat on 29 March 2008, 
but is clinging to power by brute force.” 
 
Similarly, the implications of post-apartheid corporate expansion (see Chapter 5) also 
point to the need for a specific corporate strategy to enhance the state’s ability to 
articulate and defend its national interest in the international system.  Miller (2003: 3) 
argues that South African companies are a primary agent of regional perceptions in 
host countries and as such post apartheid South African investors influence the way 
that host countries perceive South Africa’s regional role.  Like business anywhere, the 
South African business sector is driven by typical corporate interests – profit, market 
share, elimination of competition, the urge to dominate and or monopolize (Daniel et 
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al, 2003: 387).  Miller’s case study of workers from food supermarket chain, Shoprite 
(one of the largest investments in retail in Southern Africa, with 384 supermarkets) is 
revealing.   Despite the odd comment  that ‘South Africa is our Europe,’ the 
perception of the majority of workers is that South Africa, not Zambia, benefits the 
most from Shoprite’s investment: “…they are just using Zambia as a market to sell 
their things and send all the profits to South Africa…”(Miller, 2003: 14).  This is 
indicative of the strength of South African corporate executives who have essentially 
created their own system of relations with the sub-region without taking into 
consideration the post-apartheid government’s reformulated foreign policy towards 
Southern Africa as reflected in various policy documents (see Chapter 5). 
 
Moreover, Dlamini (2004: 170 -171) argues that “economic strength is more 
important and indeed more respected than military or other forms of power in a 
globalizing world economy in an era marked by the primacy of economics over 
politics” and alludes to Japan, France, South Korea, the US, the UK, and Germany as 
examples of the benefits of strategic cooperation between government and business.   
One of the core strategic objectives of the South African government is to “promote 
security and a better life for all South Africans through wealth creation” 
(www.gov.za/yearbook/foreign.htm).  Businesses are an important facet of wealth 
creation.  The government can foster or hinder wealth creation through the policy 
choices it makes and the relations it forges with business.   Business should therefore 
be a natural strategic ally of government in wealth creation.  Already, the business 
deals that have been signed by South Africa during several state visits to countries in 
Africa such as the DRC are indicative of the increasing link between Pretoria's foreign 
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policy initiatives and the creation of a climate conducive to investment by South 
African companies. 
 
Despite their interrelated importance to national interest, the connection between 
business and government in foreign policy-making is poorly thought out.   As Mills 
(1998: 85) puts it: “We need to implement and sustain, not just articulate, commercial 
diplomacy.” Indeed, South African based business is a fundamental, yet employed, 
asset in the government’s foreign policy.  Business has a wide range of contacts and 
experiences in the region and continent that can be more influential than those 
possessed by government alone.  For example, in some instances certain companies 
tend to be more knowledgeable about particular regions than their home governments 
are, because their operations embed them in the communities and countries where 
they are based.  This gives them an advantage over diplomatic missions, which tend to 
be located in capital cities, or in some cases do not exist, in the country concerned. 
 
Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the South African government can pursue an 
effective regional policy outside a corporatist framework.  The business community 
and the ANC’s key tripartite alliance partner, COSATU, must be co-opted into 
accepting such a sub-regional vision.  This is largely because both partners would be 
expected to accept potentially unfavorable short-term policy outcomes in order to 
ensure a more balanced sub-regional economic growth and transformative 
development.  The respective short-term tradeoffs for business (reduced profit) and 
labor (increased unemployment) would be made up with vastly improved sub-regional 
economic conditions and capacity over the medium and longer terms.   In this regard, 
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corporatism would facilitate the reconciliation of the investment ventures of South 
African firms with the South African government’s regional development priorities.    
 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
South African foreign policy over the past fifteen years has been one of the most 
high-profile and contested aspects of government decision-making.   It is a reflection 
of the tensions and contradictions that were from the onset present in post apartheid 
foreign policy principles.   In deciding on the choices available to South Africa, the 
country’s foreign policy makers were constrained by the difficulties of balancing 
departmental pragmatism against the post apartheid government’s idealism, national 
interest against the collective good, and the limitations of capacity and resources 
against regional expectation.  In essence, South Africa’s regional foreign policy 
dilemma is a product of the country’s inability to adjust timeously its strategic 
compass in the mercurial world of foreign policy where a country seeking to advance 
an ambitious foreign policy agenda will always be confronted with powers arrayed 
against it, forces that it cannot manage and battles that it cannot win.   As this thesis 
argues, South Africa’s inability to convince other states that her vision is 
complimentary to their needs has inhibited her ability to engineer a process of 
transformation and development in the region.   
 
It is clear that any regional anti-South Africanism would make it even harder for 
South Africa to achieve even mutual developmental objectives in Southern Africa.  
Moreover, such sentiment could develop a momentum of its own and become an easy 
and simplistic axis of division for any country to exploit, not just within the region but 
even external actors.   The example of the EU and the EPAs are a case in point.   The 
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challenge for the South African government is to shift the power dynamic against 
which projections of South African dominance trigger fierce rejection or reluctant 
cooperation by governments.  This foreign policy drive could be underpinned by a 
clearly defined developmental strategy that entails an active role for the soon-to-be-
established South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) as a 
development assistance mechanism that includes donor transfers and infrastructure 
development. The SADPA mechanism in particular could constitute a crucial 
component of South Africa's foreign policy in the region: it could ensure that the 
country continues to play an appropriate developmental role and is committed to 
building relations of mutual benefit in the region.   As Nye (2002: 10) observes: 
If a country can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will 
encounter less resistance to its wishes..........If it can help support 
institutions that encourage other countries to channel or limit their 
activities in ways it prefers, it may not need as many costly carrots and 
sticks. 
 
Nevertheless, there needs to be recognition that the idea of SADPA and 
development is not unique and if such relations with the region are to be 
sustained, it has to be anchored in the interest of both South Africa and Southern 
Africa.  After all, South Africa established the African Renaissance and 
International Cooperation Fund (ARF) in 2000, just one year into Mbeki’s 
presidency, which strategically positioned South Africa to challenge the 
hegemony of established western donors.  The fund was aimed at promoting 
cooperation between South Africa and other countries through financial 
assistance for development projects. The Mbeki government was even 
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committed to allocating as much as 0.7% of annual income to aid by 2015.  
However, Mbeki’s unceremonious removal from office was as much an 
indicator of internal political dynamics within the ANC as it was an illustration 
that such projects were not sustainable in a country with its own socio-economic 
development backlogs, including a major service-delivery crisis.    
 
One can conclude that South Africa’s regional foreign policy requires a coordinated 
strategy that is able to compromise between high ideals and stark realities, between a 
preference for paternalistically reshaping regional relations and realizing that given 
internal challenges and international expectations, South Africa needs the region 
perhaps even more than the region needs South Africa.  In order to restore some 
balance to this trend, regional relations grounded in transformative development must 
be seen as a critical component of South Africa’s national interests.  Without a long-
term strategy or perspective, regional foreign policy will simply be reactive to 
agendas set elsewhere (China or EU).  Moreover, in crafting such a long term strategy 
South African foreign policy makers need to accept the reality that ‘we talk on 
principle but we act on interest’ (observation by the English author, William Savage 
Landor [1775-1864], http://www.joesphsoninstitute.org/quotes/quoteprinciple.htm).   
If South Africa is to address the ambiguity that plagues her foreign policy and 
regional relations, the familiar adage that ‘nations have no permanent friends, only 








“Without continual growth and progress, such words as improvement, 
achievement, and success have no meaning.”  (Benjamin Franklin) 
 
The contours of South African foreign policy have evolved and continue to evolve 
since the inception of this study.  One of the most salient changes has been the change 
of name from Department of Foreign Affairs to Department of International Relations 
and Cooperation.  According to Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, 
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (14 May 2009), “the renaming of the Department as 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation is a deliberate decision on the 
part of government to ensure a holistic approach to foreign relations which reflects on 
the developmental agenda.” She further explained (August 2009) that the decision 
was in accordance with the 2007 ANC Polokwane Conference decision and 
elaborated: 
The renaming was largely motivated by international trends which require 
states to put greater emphasis on cooperation than competition, and on 
collaboration rather than confrontation.  The globalised nature of the 
world necessitates that states continue to forge ways of cooperating better 
with each other.  Through the renaming of the Department, our 
government desires to give more clarity and focus to the role of the 
Department in meeting our domestic priorities through international 
partnerships and cooperation. 
(Speech included in Zondi and Masters, September 2010: 12) 
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Such articulation points towards a more inclusive pursuit of common interests.   There 
is also an acknowledgement that: 
Power in the world is more diffused than ever before.  We know, for 
example, that our freedom of 1994 created opportunities for our 
companies to expand into the African continent, but this has not been 
without posing serious challenges to our foreign policy.  Many of our 
policy think-tanks are also players on the continent...we need to...think 
deeply about the role of these non-state actors -- who are they and what 
challenges do they pose to us? 
(Minister Nkoana-Mashabane’s speech in Zondi and Masters, September 
2010: 12) 
 
This reflects a definite shift away from statist notions of foreign policy.  In essence, 
Nkoana-Mashabane’s August 2009 speech links the department’s name change to its 
more nuanced focus on the correlation between political diplomacy and the 
management of development cooperation.  Despite the rhetoric of development and 
cooperation, Nkoana-Mashabane admits in the same speech (in Zondi and Masters, 
September 2010: 14) that “...we have not missed the opportunity to play a role in our 
SADC neighbors to promote some of the principles we treasure.”  There is a 
patronizing assumption that South Africa’s SADC neighbors do not have such 
principles, need such principles and will therefore graciously accept them.  This 
resonates with some of the concerns raised in Chapter 4.  In spite of the implementing 
department’s name change, one can expect South Africa’s foreign policy dilemma in 
Southern Africa to remain unresolved in the short term. 
 
 257
Nevertheless, there are currently a number of attempts to refine South Africa’s foreign 
policy approach through a conceptualization of the country’s national interests, the 
articulation of an international relations strategy and the drafting of a foreign policy 
white paper.  However, the impact of these strategic documents on foreign policy 
making in the country will be dependent on two key issues: the speed with which they 
are processed through the government’s bureaucracy (which will ultimately influence 
implementation) and more importantly, the consultative process which shapes it 
(which will determine the buy-in from government departments and other non-
government stakeholders).    
• Paradoxically, the conceptualization of the country’s national interests has 
taken a top-down approach.   Discussions initiated at a departmental level are 
currently trapped at the highest echelons of the Cluster system.   However, 
without the engagement of broader civil society, the very idea of ‘national’ 
interests remains debatable.  Without such moorings (as well as the possibility 
of acquiring such within at least the next year), South Africa’s foreign policy 
will remain adrift; responding to short-term challenges rather than positioning 
the country for long-term, sustainable security and development. 
• In contrast, the foreign policy white paper process has taken a bottom-up 
approach.  Consultations, led by DIRCO, began in October 2010 with the 
country’s academics and research institutes, and are expected to continue until 
the end of the year with engagements with business, broader civil society, and 
other government departments.   However, it is clear that the process is at an 
infant stage.  Consultations are currently centred on a non-paper, not a draft 
document.    
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• The proposed International Relations Strategy is also at a developmental stage 
and is currently the subject of a planned workshop by the Minister of DIRCO. 
 
In this regard, the infamous epigram from the French novelist, Alphonse Karr (1808-
90), provides an apt summation of South Africa’s foreign policy ‘the more things 
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Ann1-1: Economic Indicators 
 
 
Ann1-2:  Military Indicators 
Country  Military Forces 
(mid-2006) 
Defense Budget 
(2006) (US $m) 
% of GDP 
Angola 117,000 1,560 8.8% (2005) 
Botswana 10,500 359 3.5% 
Lesotho 2,000 32 n/a 
Malawi 5,300 9,5 0.76 
Mozambique 11,200 25,8 1 .0 (2000est) 
Namibia 15,200 73,1 (2002) 2.4 (2002) 
South Africa n/a n/a n/a 
Swaziland 3000 20 4.75 
Zambia 15,100 42,6 (2003) 0.9 (2003) 
Zimbabwe 29,000 60 3.8 (2006) 
 








































1,246,700 18,497.63 65,462.78 3,340.00 14.05 -3.77 
Botswana 
 
581,730 1,949.78 11,808.20 6,760.00 8.25 -4.21 
Lesotho 
 
30,355 2,066.92 1,282.80 1,060.00 4.82 -0.17 
Malawi 
 
118,484 15,263,42 3,333.07 260.00 8.49 -8.09 
Mozambique 
 
801,590 22.894.29 11,008.20 380.00 3.38 -14.22 
Namibia 
 
825,418 2,171.14 9,201.40 4,210.00 8.78 5.65 
South Africa 
 
1,221,037 50,109.82 277,791.25 5,870.00 7.14 -4.53 
Swaziland 
 
17,364 1,184.94 2,905.24 2,560.00 4.11 -2.63 
Zambia 
 
752,618 12,935.37 13,390.92 960.00 13.41 -3.96 
Zimbabwe 
 
















Ann1-4: Incidence of Human Poverty in the SADC Region 
























US$1 a day 
(1993 PPP$) 
(1989-98)  
Angola  37.7  58.0  69.0  76.0  …  
Botswana  37.1  24.4  10.0  14.0  33.3  
DR Congo  31.7  41.1  32.0  …  …  
Lesotho  26.0  17.6  38.0  20.0  50.4  
Malawi  47.5  41.8  53.0  20.0  42.1  
Mauritius   4.8  16.2   2.0   1.0  …  
Mozambique  41.9  57.7  54.0  70.0  37.9  
Namibia  33.5  19.2  17.0  45.0  34.9  
South Africa  25.9  15.4  13.0  25.0  11.5  
Swaziland  20.2  21.7  50.0  45.0  …  
Tanzania  35.4  26.4  34.0   7.0  19.9  
Zambia  46.2  23.7  62.0  25.0  72.6  
Zimbabwe  41.0  12.8  21.0  29.0  36.0  
Source: UNDP/SADC/SAPES, 2000.    
 






Country Contribution to 
Regional GDP in 2009 
(constant 2000 US $) 
Source: AFDB Data Platform 
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